City of La Crosse v. Ducharme

• Citation: 356 Wis.2d 831,855 N.W.2d 721 (Table)
• Decision Date: 07 August 2014
• Docket Number: No. 2014AP374.,2014AP374.
• Parties: CITY OF LA CROSSE, Plaintiff–Respondent, v. Corina DUCHARME, Defendant–Appellant.
• Court: Wisconsin Court of Appeals

356 Wis.2d 831
855 N.W.2d 721 (Table)

CITY OF LA CROSSE, Plaintiff–Respondent
v.
Corina DUCHARME, Defendant–Appellant.

No. 2014AP374.

Court of Appeals of Wisconsin.

Aug. 7, 2014.

Opinion

¶ 1 KLOPPENBURG, J.¹

Corina Ducharme appeals an order of the circuit court affirming a judgment of the municipal court of the City of La Crosse, finding her guilty of first-offense operating while intoxicated (OWI). Ducharme argues that the stop of her vehicle was neither supported by reasonable suspicion, nor justified by the community caretaker exception. For the reasons that follow, I affirm the circuit court's order.

BACKGROUND

¶ 2 At approximately 2:41 a.m. on August 1, 2012, Jovanna Randall, a police officer for the City of La Crosse, issued a citation to Ducharme for operating while intoxicated. At the trial before the City of La Crosse municipal court, Ducharme's counsel began by making a motion to suppress evidence based on an unlawful stop. It appears that a written motion had previously been filed, but a copy of the motion is not part of the record on appeal. The municipal court heard the testimony relating to the motion to suppress, which consisted solely of Officer Randall's testimony. What follows is a summary of Randall's testimony regarding the stop of Ducharme's vehicle.²

¶ 3 Randall was on patrol the morning of August 1, 2012. Randall was patrolling “in the vicinity of the boat landing.” Randall had been “asked to follow ... any kind of criminal activity in the area” because there had been “criminal activity in the vicinity of [the] boat landing.” Randall testified, “[e]very year we have multiple entries into the boat houses that are ... stationed” in the area, and “[p]eople would enter the boats that are ... docked there, [and] steal belongings.”

¶ 4 Randall saw a car parked in the parking lot near the boat landing. There were boat houses approximately fifty yards to the west of where the car was parked. When asked whether she noticed anything unusual about the car, Randall testified: “[T]he parking lights were on and the right turn signal on, indicating it was going to make a right turn toward the river, if it were to move.”³ Randall explained that she was “concerned for the driver” because the driver “might possibl[y] be intoxicated or impaired or need medical attention.” Randall further explained:

[I]t's 2:41 a.m. .... That's an unusual time for anyone to be in that boat landing unless they're gaining access to a boat or have a trailer attached to the boat. [I]t's unusual to be parked with just your running lights and the turn signal on and I feared that somebody had passed out or was not aware of where they were.

¶ 5 Randall drove up behind the car and “was going to step out” of her squad car, but the car “moved forward approximately two feet.” Randall shined a spotlight on the car and activated her squad's red and blue emergency lights. Randall testified that she felt that the driver of the car was “trying to leave the area before [Randall] could make contact with them.” The car stopped and Randall made contact with the car's driver, who identified herself as Ducharme.

¶ 6 Before the municipal court, Ducharme's counsel argued that the stop was not supported by reasonable suspicion, and that the stop did not fall within the community caretaker exception. The municipal court rejected these arguments and denied the suppression motion. The municipal court subsequently found Ducharme guilty of operating while intoxicated.

¶ 7 Ducharme appealed to the circuit court, requesting “a record review” of the municipal court's decision pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 800.14(5). The circuit court affirmed the decision of the municipal court, and Ducharme now appeals to this court.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 8 As noted, Ducharme appealed the municipal court's decision to the circuit court pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 800.14(5). An appeal under § 800.14(5) “shall be based upon a review of the proceedings in the municipal court.” As this court has explained, “ ‘an appeal ... based upon a review of a transcript of the proceedings' under sec. 800.14(5), Stats., does not permit the circuit court to review the record de novo and to substitute its judgment for that of the municipal court.” Village of Williams Bay v. Metzl, 124 Wis.2d 356, 361, 369 N.W.2d 186 (Ct.App.1985). Review under § 800.14(5) is limited “to an examination of the transcript to determine whether the evidence supports the municipal court decision.” Metzl, 124 Wis.2d at 361, 369 N.W.2d 186.

¶ 9 Ducharme has now appealed to this court. We review the decision of the municipal court and not that of the circuit court. Id. When reviewing the municipal court's decision, “[t]he court of appeals applies the same standard of review as the circuit court.” Id. at 362, 369 N.W.2d 186. Accordingly, we uphold the municipal court's factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous, and “[w]e search the record for facts to support the municipal court's findings of fact.” Id. at 361–62, 369 N.W.2d 186.

¶ 10 While we uphold the municipal court's factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous, “[w]hether evidence should be suppressed is a question of constitutional fact.” State v. Truax, 2009 WI App 60, ¶ 8, 318 Wis.2d 113, 767 N.W.2d 369. The application of constitutional principles to the facts is a question of law that we review de novo. State v. Pinkard, 2010 WI 81, ¶ 12, 327 Wis.2d 346, 785 N.W.2d 592.

DISCUSSION

¶ 11 In this appeal, Ducharme renews her argument that the stop of her vehicle was unlawful. Specifically, Ducharme argues that the stop was unlawful because: (1) it was not supported by reasonable suspicion, and (2) it was not justified by the community caretaker exception. As I explain below, I conclude that the stop was lawful because Randall was acting in a community caretaker capacity when she stopped Ducharme's vehicle. I therefore do not address whether Randall also had reasonable suspicion to stop Ducharme's vehicle. See Turner v. Taylor, 2003 WI App 256, ¶ 1 n. 1, 268 Wis.2d 628, 673 N.W.2d 716 (if a decision on one issue disposes of an appeal, we will not generally decide other issues raised).

¶ 12 The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and article I, section 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution both protect against unreasonable searches and seizures. An investigative stop is a seizure within the meaning of these constitutional provisions. State v. Harris, 206 Wis.2d 243, 258–59, 557 N.W.2d 245 (1996). To execute a valid investigatory stop, a law enforcement officer must have reasonable suspicion to believe that a crime or traffic violation has been or will be committed. State v. Popke, 2009 WI 37, ¶ 23, 317 Wis.2d 118, 765 N.W.2d 569. However, an investigatory stop not supported by reasonable suspicion may nonetheless be justified as an exercise of the officer's duties as a community caretaker. See State v. Maddix,...