City of Dall. v. Sanchez, 15–0094

• Court: Supreme Court of Texas
• Writing for the Court: PER CURIAM.
• Citation: 494 S.W.3d 722
• Parties: City of Dallas, Petitioner, v. Diane Sanchez, Individually and as Representative of the Estate of Matthew Sanchez, Deceased, and Arnold Sanchez, Respondents
• Docket Number: No. 15–0094,15–0094
• Decision Date: 01 July 2016

494 S.W.3d 722

City of Dallas, Petitioner,
v.
Diane Sanchez, Individually and as Representative of the Estate of Matthew Sanchez, Deceased, and Arnold Sanchez, Respondents

No. 15–0094

Supreme Court of Texas.

OPINION DELIVERED: July 1, 2016

Barbara E. Rosenberg, Assistant City Attorney, James B. Pinson, Assistant City Attorney, Patricia Medrano De La Garza, Assistant City Attorney, Warren M.S. Ernst, Dallas City Attorney, Dallas, for Petitioner City of Dallas.

Charles (Chad) E. Baruch, Johnston Tobey Baruch, P.C., Dallas, Michael Brett Anthony, Anthony & Peterson, L.L.P, Corpus Christi, for Respondents Arnold Sanchez and Diane Sanchez.

PER CURIAM

Hours before Matthew Sanchez died from a drug overdose, a 9–1–1 operator dispatched an ambulance to his apartment complex. Once on scene, however, emergency personnel provided assistance to a different drug-overdose victim at the same complex and then left the premises without aiding Sanchez, erroneously concluding that two closely timed 9–1–1 calls concerning overdose victims at the same locale were redundant. In a wrongful-death suit against the City of Dallas, Sanchez's parents allege the 9–1–1 telephone system malfunctioned and disconnected Sanchez's call before the responders could establish the overdose reports were not duplicative.

The issue in this Rule 91a dismissal proceeding is whether the Texas Tort Claims Act waives the City's immunity from suit based on allegations in the wrongful-death suit that a condition of the City's telephone system proximately caused Sanchez's death by preventing him from receiving potentially life-saving medical care. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 101.021(2) (providing a limited waiver of governmental immunity arising from the “condition or use” of tangible personal property); TEX. R. CIV. P. 91a (authorizing dismissal of a cause of action that has no basis in law or fact). We hold governmental immunity is not waived and dismissal is required because the requisite causal nexus between the alleged condition and Sanchez's injury is lacking. See Dallas County v. Posey, 290 S.W.3d 869, 872 (Tex.2009) (the alleged condition must actually have caused the injury to invoke the Tort Claims Act's immunity waiver; mere involvement of property is not sufficient). We therefore reverse the court of appeals' judgment and render judgment dismissing the case.

Dismissal is appropriate under Rule 91a “if the allegations, taken as true, together with inferences reasonably drawn from them, do not entitle the claimant to the relief sought ... [or] no reasonable person could believe the facts pleaded.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 91a.1. Whether the dismissal standard is satisfied depends “solely on the pleading of the cause of action.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 91a.6. We review the merits of a Rule 91a motion de novo because the availability of a remedy under the facts alleged is a question of law and the rule's factual-plausibility standard is akin to a legal-sufficiency review. See Wooley v. S c haffer, 447 S.W.3d 71, 75–76 (Tex.App.–Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, pet. denied) ; cf. Marsh USA Inc. v. Cook, 354 S.W.3d 764, 768 (Tex.2011) (application of the law to undisputed facts is reviewed de novo ); City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 827 (Tex.2005) (“[L]egal-sufficiency review in the proper light must credit favorable evidence if reasonable jurors could, and disregard contrary evidence unless reasonable jurors could not.”).

The dismissal grounds under Rule 91a have been analogized to a plea to the

494 S.W.3d 725

jurisdiction, which requires a court to determine whether the pleadings allege facts demonstrating jurisdiction. See Wooley, 447 S.W.3d at 75. In this case, the analogy is particularly apt because the City's Rule 91a motion challenges the trial court's subject-matter jurisdiction on the pleaded facts. Whether a pleader has alleged facts affirmatively demonstrating the existence of subject-matter jurisdiction is a question of law reviewed de novo . See Tex. Dep't of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 226 (Tex.2004) ; see also Ryder Integrated Logistics, Inc. v. Fayette County, 453 S.W.3d 922, 927 (Tex.2015) (per curiam) (“We review jurisdiction and pleading sufficiency de novo .”). To determine whether dismissal under Rule 91a is required in this case, we thus consider whether the pleadings, liberally construed, allege sufficient facts to invoke a waiver of governmental immunity under the Tort Claims Act. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 226 ; see also Ryder Integrated, 453 S.W.3d at 926.

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