City of Decorah v. Peterson
| Citation | 203 N.W.2d 629 |
| Decision Date | 17 January 1973 |
| Docket Number | No. 55314,55314 |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Iowa |
| Parties | CITY OF DECORAH, Iowa, Appellee, v. Annie S. PETERSON et al., Appellants. |
Strand & Anderson, Decorah, for appellants.
Thomas C. Lynch, Decorah, for appellee.
Heard before MOORE, C.J., and LeGRAND, REES, UHLENHOPP and HARRIS, JJ.
This is still another case in which municipal anxiety to provide adequate room for anticipated growth is matched against the dogged determination of outlying landowners to remain beyond the city's boundaries. We affirm the trial court's judgment that the city, having substantially complied with the relevant provisions of chapter 362, The Code, 1966, is entitled to annex approximately 960 acres adjacent to its present borders.
No challenge is made concerning procedural matters. The sole propositions urged for reversal are the following: (1) section 362.26 violates both the due process and equal protection clauses of the federal constitution and is therefore unconstitutional; (2) the trial court erred in failing to apply section 362.26 as amended in 1970, which for the first time granted to those in the area proposed to be annexed the right to vote on the proposition; (3) the trial court erred in finding the city had made an affirmative showing it was capable of extending to the proposed area of annexation substantial municipal services not theretofore enjoyed by it; and (4) the trial court erred in finding the annexation proceedings were not brought merely for the purpose of increasing the tax revenues of the city.
The first two propositions have been settled adversely to defendants by our recent decision in City of Monticello v. Adams, 200 N.W.2d 522 (Iowa 1972). We there held section 362.26 does not violate either the due process or equal protection clauses of the constitution. We also held, under circumstances identical to those existing here, that the 1970 amendment is not retrospective in application. There as here, the annexation was approved by the city council, the required election was held, and the annexation petition filed in district court before, although trial commenced after, the amendment became effective. What we said at page 525 of the Monticello opinion is equally applicable here:
'The prior proceedings in this annexation were in accord with the statutes in effect at the time, and, under the presumption against retrospectiveness, the amendment did not reach back and invalidate those proceedings.'
Defendants conceded as much in oral argument and now place complete reliance on their third and fourth propositions dealing with the ability of the city to extend substantial municipal services not theretofore enjoyed within the annexed area and the claim that the city annexed the area solely to increase its tax revenue.
As pointed out in City of Cedar Falls v. Sieglaff, 259 Iowa 263, 270, 144 N.W.2d 116, 120 (1966), these two are closely related and proof of the first negatives the second.
In that case we said: '(The statute) clearly implies, if it does not directly state, that an affirmative showing the municipality is capable of furnishing the area substantial municipal services and benefits not theretofore enjoyed warrants a finding the annexation will not result Merely in increasing the municipality's revenue from taxation.' (Emphasis in original.) We repeated this statement approvingly in City of Bettendorf v. Abeln, 261 Iowa 404, 415, 154 N.W.2d 836, 843 (1967).
Our principal task, then, is to decide if the city established by a preponderance of the evidence its ability to render substantial municipal services not therefore enjoyed within the area. This is, of course, a purely factual determination.
The following general principles have been established by our prior decisions:
(1) The review is de novo, and in deciding the issues we give weight to the findings of the trial court but are not bound by them.
(2) Annexation is a legislative function which cannot be delegated to the courts.
(3) The court has no discretionary power to determine whether the proposed annexation is good or bad, wise or unwise.
(4) Annexation does not depend upon the desires of the persons residing in the area to be taken into the city (although under the 1970 amendment they are, for the first time, given the right to vote on the proposal.)
(5) Only the ability of the city to extend services is important, not the economic practicability of doing so.
(6) The burden is on the municipality to prove by a preponderance of the evidence it is capable of furnishing...
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City of Muscatine v. Waters
...same. I. Our review is de novo. We accord weight to trial court's findings but are not thereby bound. See City of Decorah v. Peterson, 203 N.W.2d 629, 631 (Iowa 1973). It is also understood annexation is purely statutory. The legislature prescribes conditions under which a municipality may ......
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Mason City v. Aeling
...been analyzed and decided contrary to their contentions in City of Monticello v. Adams, Iowa, 200 N.W.2d 522. See also City of Decorah v. Peterson, Iowa, 203 N.W.2d 629. The case of In re Incorporation of Town of Avon Lake, 249 Iowa 1112, 88 N.W.2d 784 on which defendants-appellants here st......
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City of Altoona v. Sandquist, 2--56555
...to vote on the proposition. § 362.26(3), The Code, 1966; see Mason City v. Aeling, 209 N.W.2d 8, 10 (Iowa 1973); City of Decorah v. Peterson, 203 N.W.2d 629, 630 (Iowa 1973); City of Monticello v. Adams, 200 N.W.2d 522, 524--525 (Iowa 1972). Defendants assert the amendment not only extends ......
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State ex rel. Johnson v. Allen, 96-635
...that city can provide territory to be annexed with "substantial municipal services," including police protection); City of Decorah v. Peterson, 203 N.W.2d 629, 631 (Iowa 1973) (discussing city's ability to provide police protection as "municipal service" in context of annexation proceeding)......