City of Dequincy v. Randy James Henry.

• Decision Date: 15 March 2011
• Docket Number: No. 2010–C–0070.,2010–C–0070.
• Citation: 62 So.3d 43
• Parties: CITY OF DeQUINCYv.Randy James HENRY.
• Court: Louisiana Supreme Court

62 So.3d 43

CITY OF DeQUINCY
v.
Randy James HENRY.

No. 2010–C–0070.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

March 15, 2011.

[62 So.3d 44]

Law Office of Christopher R. Philipp, Christopher Richard Philipp, Lafayette, for Applicant.Broussard & Hart, LLC, J. Steven Broussard, Lake Charles, for Respondent.CLARK, Justice.^*

[2010-0070 (La. 1] We granted this application to determine whether the courts below erred in deciding that an employer had approved in writing a compromise between an employee and a third-party, and that the employer was not entitled to a credit toward the employee's future medical costs, all as described in Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:1102. For the reasons set forth below, we find that the issue of whether or not the City had given written approval of the settlement need not be resolved, but that the courts below did, in fact, err in ruling that the employer was not entitled to a credit toward future medical costs, and we, therefore, reverse.

FACTS and PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In November of 2000, while investigating an automobile accident, Officer Randy James Henry came into contact with a live electricity line owned by CLECO Utility Group, Inc. (“CLECO”) and suffered severe disabling injuries. Mr. Henry was employed as a police officer by the City of DeQuincy (“the City”) at the time of the accident.

Following the accident, the City, through the Louisiana Municipal Risk [2010-0070 (La. 2] Management Agency (“RMI”), began paying Mr. Henry workers' compensation benefits. Mr. Henry subsequently filed a tort suit against CLECO, in which the City intervened in order to recover the benefits paid to and on behalf of Mr. Henry.

After years of litigation, Mr. Henry and CLECO agreed to mediate the matter. The City and RMI were informed of the impending mediation but declined to attend. Instead, the City, by email, agreed to waive one-third of its lien as attorney's fees and verified to the mediator the exact amount of the lien at the time of the mediation.

On October 23, 2008, Mr. Henry and CLECO mediated the third-party suit and agreed to settle the claim for the sum of $4,350,000.00. On that day, Mr. Henry, his wife, their attorney, and the attorney for CLECO all signed a written document containing the terms of the settlement agreement.

[62 So.3d 45]

Following the completion of the settlement, the City filed a motion to terminate Mr. Henry's workers' compensation benefits due to Mr. Henry's failure to obtain the prior written approval of the City and its insurer as required by Section 23:1102(B). Mr. Henry, in return, moved to declare that the City had tacitly approved the settlement and that any future credit to the City from Mr. Henry's settlement proceeds applied only to Mr. Henry's future disability benefits, and not to the cost of his future medical treatment.

The hearing of the matter, held on December 1, 2008, consisted of the arguments of the attorneys and the introduction of exhibits. No witnesses testified. Separate from the proceeding, the attorneys for the City and CLECO agreed that CLECO would pay the City $321,045.25, representing the amount of the City's lien less one-third for attorney's fees, in return for the City's dismissal of its intervention against CLECO and the City's promise to not pursue against CLECO its reimbursement rights afforded by Section 23:1102(C)(1).

[2010-0070 (La. 3] On March 9, 2009, the workers' compensation judge ruled that the City had given prior written approval for the settlement; that the City and/or RMI was paid in full for the full amount of the lien less one-third for attorney's fees, reinstating Mr. Henry's rights to future compensation; that the City was entitled to a credit for the balance of the settlement funds; but that the credit only applied to Mr. Henry's future disability benefits and not to the cost of his future medical treatment.

On December 9, 2009, the court of appeal affirmed the ruling of the workers' compensation judge. City of DeQuincy v. Henry, 09–636 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/9/09), 25 So.3d 237. This Court granted the City's writ on April 30, 2010. City of DeQuincy v. Henry, 2010–0070 (La.4/30/10), 34 So.3d 296.

DISCUSSION

Initially, we note that this issue is one of statutory interpretation. The fundamental question in all cases of statutory interpretation is legislative intent. SWAT 24 Shreveport Bossier, Inc. v. Bond, 2000–1695, p. 11 (La.6/29/01), 808 So.2d 294, 302; Succession of Boyter, 99–0761, p. 9 (La.1/7/00), 756 So.2d 1122, 1128. The rules of statutory construction are designed to ascertain and enforce the intent of the legislature. Stogner v. Stogner, 98–3044, p. 5 (La.7/7/99), 739 So.2d 762, 766. The meaning and intent of a law is determined by considering the law in its entirety and all other laws on the same subject matter and by placing a construction on the law that is consistent with the express terms of the law and with the obvious intent of the legislature in enacting the law. SWAT 24 Shreveport Bossier, 2000–1695 at 11, 808 So.2d at 302; Succession of Boyter, 99–0761 at 9, 756 So.2d at 1129. A statute must be applied and interpreted in a manner that is logical and consistent with the presumed purpose and intent of the legislature. Succession of Boyter, 99–0761 at 9, 756 So.2d at 1129.

[2010-0070 (La. 4] Further, it is presumed that every word, sentence, or provision in a law was intended to serve some useful purpose, that some effect is to be given to each such provision, and that no unnecessary words or provisions were employed. Sultana Corporation v. Jewelers Mutual Insurance Company, 03–0360, p. 9 (La.12/3/03), 860 So.2d 1112, 1119. As a result, courts are bound, if possible, to give effect to all parts of a statute and to construe no sentence, clause or word as meaningless and surplusage if a construction giving force to, and preserving, all words can legitimately be found. St. Martin Parish Police Jury v. Iberville Parish Police Jury, 212 La. 886, 33 So.2d 671, 676 (La.1947);

[62 So.3d 46]

State v. Fontenot, 112 La. 628, 36 So. 630, 634 (La.1904). Finally, it is presumed that the legislature acts with full knowledge of well-settled principles of statutory construction. Sultana Corporation, 03–0360 at 9, 860 So.2d at 1119.

In addition to the above judicial principles which are guides to determine the intent of the legislature, the legislature has enacted rules for the construction of statutes in the provisions of the revised statutes. Louisiana Revised Statutes 1:3 provides:

Words and phrases shall be read with their context and shall be construed according to the common and approved usage of the language. Technical words and phrases, and such others as may have acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning in the law, shall be construed and understood according to such peculiar and appropriate meaning.

With these rules in mind, we note that both courts below and both parties agree that Section 23:1102 ¹ is the controlling

[62 So.3d 47]

statute, although Mr. Henry asserts that [2010-0070 (La. 5] Section 23:1102 should be read in para materia with a related statute, Section 23:1103.² As Mr. Henry admits in

[62 So.3d 48]

brief, by their very terms, Section 23:1102 applies [2010-0070 (La. 6] only to situations involving the settlement of a third-party tort claim, whether or not suit was filed, while Section 23:1103 applies to those cases which are actually tried to judgment. Section 23:1102 is applicable after “either the employee or his dependent or the employer or insurer brings suit against a third person” when “a compromise with such third person is made by the employee or his dependents.” Section 23:1103, on the other hand, applies “[i]n the event that the employer or the employee or his dependent becomes party plaintiff in a suit against a third person, as provided in R.S. 23:1102, and damages are recovered.”

While we acknowledge that the courts of this state have applied the statutes inconsistently, sometimes applying Section 23:1102 to third-party claims which proceeded to judgment, and at other times applying Section 23:1103 to third-party claims which were settled, the plain language of the two statutes convinces us that the legislature intended, and the lower courts were correct in finding, that only Section 23:1102 applies in cases where, as here, an employer has intervened in an employee's suit, and the suit was settled prior to judgment.

The City assigns two errors by the lower courts. The City's first assignment of error is that those courts misinterpreted and incorrectly applied the written approval requirement imposed by Section 23:1102 when ruling that the City had given prior written approval of the settlement, so as to not forfeit Mr. Henry's future workers' compensation benefits. The City's second assignment of error is that the lower courts committed legal error when they concluded that the City's credit did not apply toward Mr. Henry's future medical expenses.

Written Approval

[2010-0070 (La. 7] With regard to the City's first assignment of error, we look again to the wording of the statute. Section 23:1102 reads, in pertinent part:

Employee or employer suits against third persons causing injury; notice of filing

A. (1) If ... the employee ... brings suit against a third person ..., he shall forthwith notify the other in writing of such fact and of the name of the court in which the suit is filed, and such other may intervene as party plaintiff in the suit.

* * *

B. If a compromise with such third person is made by the employee ..., the employer ... shall be liable to the employee or his dependents for any benefits under this Chapter which are in excess of the full amount paid by such third person, only after the employer ... receives a dollar for dollar credit against the full amount paid in compromise, less attorney fees and costs paid by the employee in prosecution of the third party claim...