City of Edina v. School District of City of Edina and Knox County

• Decision Date: 25 November 1924
• Docket Number: 24239
• Citation: 267 S.W. 112,305 Mo. 452
• Parties: CITY OF EDINA to Use of PIONEER TRUST COMPANY, Appellant, v. SCHOOL DISTRICT OF CITY OF EDINA and KNOX COUNTY
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

267 S.W. 112

305 Mo. 452

CITY OF EDINA to Use of PIONEER TRUST COMPANY, Appellant, v. SCHOOL DISTRICT OF CITY OF EDINA and KNOX COUNTY

No. 24239

Supreme Court of Missouri

November 25, 1924

Appeal from Knox Circuit Court; Hon. Newland M. Pettingill Judge.

Affirmed (in part) and reversed (in part).

C S. Palmer and W. E. Cottey for appellant.

(1) The exemption of "counties and other municipal corporations from taxation," Art. 10, sec. 6, Mo. Constitution, has no reference to assessments for local improvements. Lockwood v. St. Louis, 24 Mo. 20; Sheehan v Good Samaritan Hospital, 50 Mo. 156; Farrar v. St. Louis, 80 Mo. 379; Clinton ex rel. v. Henry County, 115 Mo. 557. (2) School property, although exempt from general taxes, is liable for special assessments for local improvements. St. Louis Public Schools v. St. Louis, 26 Mo. 468. (3) The statute requires all property abutting on each side of the street improved shall be assessed with the cost of the work. This includes public property and "all" means all. Sec. 8502, R. S. 1919; Sec. 9403, R. S. 1909; Heman Const. Co. v. Wabash Railroad Co., 206 Mo. 172; County of McLean v. City of Bloomington, 106 Ill. 209; City of Kalispell v. School Dist., 45 Mont. 221; Comrs. of Franklin County v. Ottawa, 49 Kan. 747; Hassan v. Rochester, 67 N.Y. 528; Roosevelt Hospital v. New York, 84 N.Y. 108. (4) A construction of the law which would exempt school property, or other property held for public use would unjustly increase the burden of other property in the taxing district, and such construction should not be adopted unless the language of the statute will bear no other interpretation. Lockwood v. St. Louis, 24 Mo. 20; E. & W. Const. Co. v. Jasper County, 117 Iowa 365, 380; Hassan v. City of Rochester, 67 N.Y. 528. (5) The fact that the property of a school district could not be sold to satisfy the lien is no defense to a judgment declaring the lien. City ex rel. v. Wabash Railroad Co., 206 Mo. 172; City of Chicago ex rel. v. City of Chicago, 207 Ill. 37; County of McLean v. Bloomington, 106 Ill. 209. (6) The tax bills are made prima-facie evidence of the validity of all proceedings leading to their issue. There is therefore the presumption that the statutory proceedings have been complied with so far as Knox County is concerned. There is no requirement that the owners be named in bills for paving and curbing. Sec. 8507, R. S. 1919.

Claud M. Smith and R. J. Raleigh for respondents.

(1) All school property is specifically exempted by the Constitution from taxes, the same as all county courthouse grounds and other public buildings, of necessity, for the operation and maintenance of the business of the Government. Section 6, Article 10, Mo. Constitution, clearly shows that school property is not held in the eyes of the law subject to the same liabilities as privately-owned property, but is a favorite ward of the Government. It is true the Legislature, if it saw fit, could enact laws to provide for public school property to be subjected to the payment of special assessments for local improvements, but they have so far failed so to do. Hence it is not liable. Valle v. Ziegler, 84 Mo. 214; Thogmartin v. School Dist., 189 Mo.App. 11. (2) The tax bills in question were issued under Art. 5, chap. 84, R. S. 1909. Section 9403 stipulates that all taxes such as herein sued for "shall be levied as a special assessment upon all lots and pieces of ground upon either side of such street, avenue, alley or other highway or part thereof, etc., abutting thereon." Section 9409 shows when and how it shall be paid, and if not paid as therein provided, it becomes a lien on the property, and the only way to enforce payment is to enforce the lien on the property. St. Louis v. Wright Contr. Co., 202 Mo. 469; Neenan v. Smith, 50 Mo. 525; City of Clinton v. Henry County, 115 Mo. 557. (3) The taxes sued for cannot be collected in any way except by enforcing the special lien and selling the land as provided in the statute. The same article and chapter provides in Section 9429, when certain notices have been given to the county court (which were not given in the present cause) then and in that case alone the tax bills shall become a valid claim against the county. As no way is provided by law for the collection of the taxes against the school property, then it is the presumption of law the Legislature never intended the school property should pay it. Clinton v. Henry County, 115 Mo. 557; St. Louis v. Brown, 155 Mo. 543; Thogmartin v. School District, 189 Mo.App. 11; Chandler v. Railroad, 251 Mo. 594.

Small, C. Lindsay, C., concurs.

OPINION

SMALL

Suit on special tax bills for paving and curbing Main Street in the city of Edina. The bills were for $ 2140.33, payable in three annual installments. The petition is in the usual form in such cases and alleges that defendants own or claim to own the land described in the tax bills and sought to be charged with payment thereof or some estate or interest therein. The defendants each filed a general demurrer to the petition on the ground that it does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. The court sustained said demurrers, and the defendants appealed to the St. Louis Court of Appeals, which duly certified the cause to this court -- the county being one of the defendants.

I. The reason urged in this court and the court below for sustaining said demurrers is that the tax bills are void because there is no statute authorizing the issue of tax bills against the property of a public school district. This is the first time the question is presented directly to this court, whether a tax bill for the improvement of a street adjoining public school property upon which a public schoolhouse is located can be lawfully issued against such property. Edina is a city of the fourth class, and the statute, Section 8502, Revised Statutes 1919, under which the tax bills were issued, provides as follows: "The cost of paving, macadamizing, guttering, and curbing all . . . streets . . . or any part thereof or any connection therewith . . . shall be levied as a special assessment upon all lots and pieces of ground upon either side of such street . . . abutting thereon, along the distance improved in proportion to the front foot."

In St. Louis Public Schools v. City of St. Louis, 26 Mo. 468, this court, Napton, J., delivering the opinion, held that public school property was liable to be assessed under the charter of the city for the construction of sewers, paving, streets and sidewalks and opening streets the same as private property. The school district claimed its property was exempt from special taxation under the Revised Statutes of 1845.

The court had previously construed said statute in the case of Lockwood v. City of St. Louis, 24 Mo. 20, and held, Leonard, J., delivering the opinion, that, under said statute, church property was not exempt from special assessments for building sewers under the charter of St. Louis of 1849, which provided that said city was authorized to levy and collect to pay for such sewers "a special tax on the real estate within the district." The ground of the decision was that the Acts of 1845 relied on only exempted church and public property from general taxation as distinguished from special assessments for public improvements, citing cases from New York and Pennsylvania, and stating that it was "a maxim that he who feels the benefit ought to feel the burden" which "was consistent with the interests and dictates of science and religion."

Judge Napton's opinion in Public Schools v. St. Louis, 26 Mo. 470, was as follows:

"We have not been able to distinguish this case from the case of Lockwood, 24 Mo. 20. It has been suggested that the two corporations concerned in this suit -- the city of St. Louis and the St. Louis Public Schools -- are identical in interest, being composed of the same constituents, and therefore the local assessment levied and collected on the property of the public schools by the city authorities is merely transferring the burden of the improvement from one branch of the treasury to another. But although the citizens of St. Louis may be alike interested in both corporations, the management of each is distinct, invested in different bodies, differently organized and governed by different rules and responsibilities. It is important to the interest of the people composing each corporation that these separate responsibilities should not be removed. The result of the contrary doctrine would be that every ordinance for paving a street, or making a sewer in a district of the city in which the public schools had property, would be virtually to tax the citizens of the district for an increase in the funds of the public schools, when it may be that this latter corporation has already ample means for its purposes. The judgment of the land court is affirmed, the other judges concurring."

The question of the validity of special tax bills against a courthouse square owned by the county, for paving the streets adjacent to said square, was before the court, in City of Clinton ex rel. v. Henry County, 115 Mo. 565. In that case the court, opinion per Black, J., held that the tax bills were void because the courthouse was general public property and belonged to the sovereign, and was used by it in performing a vital governmental function, and it was a principle of the common law, well established, "that the Crown was not bound by a statute, the words of which restrain or diminish any of his rights or interests unless he be specially named therein. [1 Bla. Com. 262.] The same principle applies in favor of the states in this country. [Endlich on Interpretation of Statutes, sec. 161.] Hence it is that as a general rule, tax laws...