City of Enid v. Public Employees Relations Board, 2005 OK 55 (OK 7/5/2005)

• Citation: 2005 OK 55
• Decision Date: 05 July 2005
• Docket Number: No. 101729,101729
• Parties: CITY OF ENID, OKLAHOMA, an Oklahoma Municipal Corporation, Plaintiff/Appellee v. PUBLIC EMPLOYEES RELATIONS BOARD and AMERICAN FEDERATION of STATE, COUNTY, and MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES, a/k/a AFSCME OK ORGANIZING COMMITTEE, Defendants/Appellants.
• Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court

Page 1

2005 OK 55

CITY OF ENID, OKLAHOMA, an Oklahoma Municipal Corporation, Plaintiff/Appellee v. PUBLIC EMPLOYEES RELATIONS BOARD and AMERICAN FEDERATION of STATE, COUNTY, and MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES, a/k/a AFSCME OK ORGANIZING COMMITTEE, Defendants/Appellants.

No. 101729

Supreme Court of Oklahoma

Decided: July 5, 2005

ON APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT IN OKLAHOMA COUNTY, OKLAHOMA, THE HONORABLE DANIEL L. OWENS, PRESIDING.

¶0 The City of Enid filed this action against the Public Employees Relations Board and the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief from enforcement of the Oklahoma Municipal Employee Collective Bargaining Act. On summary judgment, the district court determined that the statutory classification of municipalities with populations greater than 35,000 for purposes of collective bargaining is arbitrary and discriminatory. The district court ruled that the Oklahoma Municipal Employee Collective Bargaining Act is a special law contrary to the Okla. Const., art. 5, §§ 46 and 59. The district court enjoined the Public Employees Relations Board from administering the law. The Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees timely filed a petition in error and the Public Employees Relations Board filed a petition in error as co-appellant. We retained the appeal.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT ORDER OF DISTRICT COURT AFFIRMED.

Tony G. Puckett, Ronald T. Shinn, Jr., McAfee & Taft, Oklahoma City, for appellee, City of Enid.

W.A. Drew Edmondson, Attorney General of Oklahoma, Sandra D. Rinehart, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Oklahoma City, for co-appellant, Public Employees Relations Board.

James R. Moore, Sue Wycoff, James R. Moore & Associates, Oklahoma City, for appellant, American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees.

TAYLOR, J.

¶1 The dispositive question presented in this appeal is whether the Oklahoma Municipal Employee Collective Bargaining Act is a special law prohibited by the Okla. Const., art. 5, § 46. We answer the question in the affirmative. We find the Oklahoma Municipal Employee Collective Bargaining Act is unconstitutional.

I. Background

¶2 The Oklahoma Legislature passed the Oklahoma Municipal Employee Collective Bargaining Act (the Act)¹ during its 2004 session. The Act grants qualifying municipal employees² the right to organize and choose representation for the purpose of collective bargaining³ and requires municipal employers to recognize, negotiate and bargain with employee representatives.⁴ It defines municipal employers to be those municipalities⁵ with populations greater than 35,000.⁶ The Act provides that it shall be administered by the Public Employees Relations Board (PERB).⁷

¶3 Although an express purpose of the Act is "to promote orderly and constructive employment relations between municipal employers and their employees,"⁸ the parties agree that the Act presently applies to only eleven municipalities in Oklahoma. They are incorporated cities that have populations greater than 35,000: Broken Arrow, Edmond, Enid, Lawton, Midwest City, Moore, Muskogee, Norman, Oklahoma City, Stillwater, and Tulsa.⁹ The promotion of "orderly and constructive labor relations" promised by the Act is granted to only this small number of Oklahoma cities.

¶4 When the Act became effective on November 1, 2004, the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees a/k/a AFSCME OK Organizing Committee (Union) requested certification from PERB to represent the City of Enid's qualifying employees. On November 4, 2004, PERB gave notice of Union's request to the City of Enid and directed the City to post the notice. Under PERB's emergency rules, PERB must certify Union as the Enid municipal employees' representative unless PERB receives a request from a rival union within fifteen days.

¶5 On November 19, 2004, the City of Enid filed an action against PERB and Union seeking a temporary restraining order, temporary and permanent injunctions, and declaratory judgment that the Act is special legislation contrary to the Oklahoma Constitution, art. 5, §§ 46 and 59 and art. 18, § 3(a). PERB and Union responded, urging that the district court not hastily decide the constitutional issues in a temporary injunction hearing. At the hearing on November 22, 2004, the district court granted a temporary restraining order and set a briefing schedule. Thereafter, the City of Enid filed its motion for summary judgment.

¶6 On summary judgment, the district court determined that the classification of municipalities with populations greater than 35,000 is arbitrary and discriminates against employees of municipalities with populations less than 35,000 and that the Act is a special law that cannot stand because it is not impossible to design a general law. The district court decided the Act is contrary to the Okla. Const., art. 5, §§ 46 and 59 and issued a permanent injunction against PERB. Union timely filed a petition in error and PERB filed a petition in error as co-appellant in Union's appeal. We retained the appeal. The parties presented oral arguments to the Court en banc on May 10, 2005.

II. Standard of Review

¶7 The issues presented for review are legal questions which we review de novo. Gladstone v. Bartlesville Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 30, 2003 OK 30, ¶5, 66 P.3d 442, 445. Our de novo review is plenary, independent and non-deferential. Id.

III. Arguments of the Parties

¶8 The essence of the City of Enid's constitutional argument is that defining municipal employers to include only municipalities with populations greater than 35,000 creates a class of municipal employers and municipal employees that has no reasonable relation to the subject of the Act contrary to the Okla. Const., art. 5, § 59 and makes the Act a special law contrary to the Okla. Const., art. 5, § 46. The City also argues that the Act is unconstitutional under Okla. Const., art. 18, § 3(a) and the home-rule doctrine. The City urges that the Act in its entirety be declared unconstitutional and void and the permanent injunction be affirmed.

¶9 PERB argues that the 35,000-population restriction creates a class of similarly-situated, larger municipalities across the state which bears a reasonable relationship to the subject of the Act and that the Act is general in nature because it applies statewide to all municipalities in the class consistent with the Okla. Const., art. 5, §§ 46 and 59. Union also argues the Act reasonably classifies larger cities across the state that share similar circumstances of complex, multi-tiered organizations and the classification is rationally related to the purpose of the Act to promote orderly relations between municipal employers and their employees who are further removed from city management in larger cities and thus have a greater need to speak collectively to city management about the workplace. They urge that in the event the 35,000-population restriction is declared unconstitutional, the void provision be severed and the remainder of the Act be upheld.

IV. Oklahoma Constitution, art. 5, § 46

¶10 Every statute is presumed to be constitutional, Reynolds v. Porter, 1988 OK 88, ¶15, 760 P.2d 816, 819, and we approach a constitutional attack on a statute with great caution and grave responsibility. Way v. Grand Lake Ass'n, Inc., 1981 OK 70, ¶39, 635 P.2d 1010, 1017. In considering the constitutional arguments presented, we are guided by the following general principles. The Legislature is sovereign and the legislative power has no limitations except by specific declarations in the state and federal constitutions. Id. Constitutional restrictions on the Legislature will be strictly construed. Id. The law presumes that the Legislature carefully observed the requirements of the constitutions in enacting the statutes. Id. A statute will be upheld against a constitutional attack unless it is clearly and overtly inconsistent with the constitutions. Id.

¶11 The Oklahoma Constitution, art. 5, § 46, provides in pertinent part:

The Legislature shall not, except as otherwise provided in this Constitution, pass any local or special law authorizing:

. . .

Regulating the affairs of counties, cities, towns, wards, or school districts; . . . .

(Bold added.)

¶12 This constitutional provision is designed to prevent legislators from interfering with local management by passing laws that single out some localities but leave others unaffected by the law. Bradford v. Cole, 1923 OK 571,¶12, 217 P. 470, 471-472. Section 46 specifically prohibits the Legislature from enacting special laws dealing with twenty-eight subject areas. Reynolds v. Porter, 1988 OK 88, ¶17, 760 P.2d 816, 822. One of those twenty-eight subject areas is "regulating the affairs . . . of cities" within which the Act squarely falls.

¶13 This Court has determined that the phrase "regulating the affairs" as used in art. 5, § 46 refers to any law that touches upon matters of the political subdivision and affect the people of the political subdivision. Bradford v. Cole, at¶¶5-6, 217 P. at 471. The Legislature has defined "city" to mean "a municipality which has incorporated as a city in accordance with the laws of this state".¹⁰ Under these definitions, a law that affects the people of a city by granting the privilege of collective bargaining to municipal employees and requiring the municipal employer to bargain with the employees' representative certainly touches upon city affairs. Clearly, the Act touches upon matters of a city that affect the people of the city. No other application can be had if we, as we must, apply the phrase "regulating the affairs of cities" to carry out the principle embodied in the constitutional provision. See Welch v. Holland, 1936 OK 598, 61 P.2d 559. No special state law may regulate the affairs of cities.

¶14 The Oklahoma Constitution, art. 5, § 46 prohibits the Legislature from enacting special laws that regulate the affairs of cities,...