City of Evanston v. Wazau

• Decision Date: 13 October 1936
• Docket Number: No. 23642.,23642.
• Citation: 364 Ill. 198,4 N.E.2d 78
• Parties: CITY OF EVANSTON v. WAZAU.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

364 Ill. 198

4 N.E.2d 78

CITY OF EVANSTON

v.WAZAU.

No. 23642.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

June 17, 1936.

Rehearing Denied Oct. 13, 1936.

Appeal from Municipal Court of Evanston; J. M. Corcoran, judge.

Marguerite Wazau was convicted of violating an ordinance of the City of Evanston for compulsory inspection of motor vehicles owned by residents of such city, and she appeals.

Affirmed.

Frank E. McAllister, of Chicago, for appellant.

Edward T. Arnold, of Evanston, for appellee.

JONES, Justice.

Marguerite Wazau was convicted in the municipal court of Evanston of violating an ordinance for the compulsory inspection of motor vehicles owned by residents of that city. She brings the case here by appeal.

The facts are not in dispute. It is stipulated that appellant operated her automobile on the streets of the city without complying with the requirements of the ordinance. The validity of the ordinance and of the enabling statute under which it was passed are challenged as grounds for reversal.

The ordinance was passed on July 1, 1935, and provides that it shall be unlawful for a resident owner of a motor vehicle to operate it over the streets of the city without first having it inspected at the municipal testing station, as provided by the ordinance. The inspection shall be conducted under the direction of the department of police, for the purpose of determining whether the vehicle conforms to the statutory requirements as to equipment for safe operation. The manner of giving notice to owners of the time when their vehicles are to be called for inspection is specified. Two inspection periods are provided-one for each half of the calendar year. Each resident owner of a motor vehicle is required to submit it for inspection at least once in each inspection period. A certificate of inspection will be issued to the owner of a conforming vehicle and prominently attached thereto. Nonconforming vehicles must be resubmitted for further inspection not less than seven nor more than ten days after disapproval. The operation of a motor vehicle without display of the inspection certificate is prohibited. Penalties are fixed for each day's violation of any of the provisions of the ordinance.

The ordinance is based on section 21c of the Motor Vehicle Act, added by the amendment of June 6, 1935, Laws 1935, p. 1228. (Smith-Hurd Ann.St. c. 95 1/2, § 26b; Ill.Rev.Stat.1935, c. 95a, par. 22(3). That section provides: ‘Any city, village or town having a population of 40,000 or over, may, by ordinance, require the resident owner of a motor vehicle to submit, not more often than semiannually, such motor vehicle for inspection to determine the sufficiency of the equipment required by this Act for safe operation on public highways, and may provide testing stations, located at convenient places in each such city, village or town, for the inspection of such equipment. Said testing stations may be constructed, maintained and operated from funds authorized to be appropriated for such purpose by section 26 of this Act. No fee shall be charged said owner for such inspection.’

The act of June 6, 1935, which added section 21c, also amended section 26 (Smith-Hurd Ann.St. c. 95 1/2, § 32) by conferring authority to appropriate money from license fees for establishing and maintaining inspection stations. By a subsequent act filed July 13, 1935 (Laws 1935, p. 1230), section 26 was again amended (Smith-Hurd Ann.St. c. 95 1/2, § 32), and omitted any provision for such appropriation. This amendment was to become effective January 1, 1936. Appellant insists that inasmuch as the last amendment eliminated the provision for the use of certain funds to defray expenses incurred under section 21c and provided that the amendatory act should not take effect until January 1, 1936, the result in some way suspended section 21c. Municipalities have power to appropriate money from the general funds for any corporate purpose. The power granted under section 21c to establish and maintain inspection stations is complete without any specific legislation concerning appopriation of funds. It is in no way dependent upon or controlled by any provision of section 26, and was not affected by the amendment of the latter section.

It is claimed that the provision of the ordinance requiring inspection ‘at least once’ in each semiannual inspection period is in conflict with section 21c of the statute, which provides that inspection may be required not more than semiannually. The ordinance plainly requires an original inspection only once in each inspection period. The words ‘at least once’ cover reinspection upon a determination of nonconformity with the requirements of the statute. In the absence of power to enforce the statutory requirements, the purpose of the law to accomplish safe operation of motor vehicles would be ineffectual. The provision for reinspection on nonconformity is a power included by necessary implication in connection with the expressed purpose of the law. The ordinance is not in conflict with the statute because of a difference in penalties. The violation of a statute and the violation of an ordinance by the same act are separate offenses, separately punishable.

[6][7] It is asserted that section 21c and the ordinance violate the due process clause of the State and Federal Constitutions (Const.Ill. art. 2, § 2; Const.U.S.Amend. 14). The argument advanced is that the terms are arbitrary, harsh, and unreasonable and not a valid exercise of the police power. The law is that an act which deprives a citizen of his liberty or property rights cannot be sustained under the police power unless a due regard for the public health, comfort, safety or welfare requires it. In the exercise of this power the Legislature may enact laws regulating, restraining, or prohibiting anything harmful to the welfare of the people, even though such regulation, restraint, or prohibition interferes with the liberty or property of an individual. Neither the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution nor any provision of the Constitution of this state was designed to interfere with the police power to enact and enforce laws for the protection of the health, peace, safety, morals, Bros. v. Upholsterers' Union, 358 Ill. 239,Bros. v. Upholsterers' Union, 358 Ill. 23., 193 N.E. 112, 97 A.L.R. 1318;People v. Anderson, 355 Ill. 289, 189 N.E. 338. The same tests are applied to municipal ordinances (Koos v. Saunders, 349 Ill. 442, 182 N.E. 415), and the Legislature may confer upon cities police power over subjects which are also within the provisions of the state laws. City of Chicago v. Union Ice Cream Mfg. Co., 252 Ill. 311, 96 N.E. 872, Ann.Cas.1912D, 675. Common knowledge of the enormous and steadily increasing toll of deaths and injuries from automobile accidents undoubtedly actuated the Legislature in enacting the statutes requiring safe equipment and enabling municipalities to assist in the safety program by periodical inspection.

Section 21c and the ordinance do not unreasonably discriminate against residents of the city. The classification is reasonable and valid. Heartt v. Village of Downers Grove, 278 Ill. 92, 115 N.E. 869.

The claim that the amendatory act of June 6, 1935, is unconstitutional because it does not express the subject in its title must be denied. The title is, ‘An Act to amend section 26 of 'An Act in relation to motor vehicles and to repeal a certain Act therein named,’ approved June 30, 1919, as amended, and to add section 21c thereto.' An act to amend another act, the former setting out the latter's title, is as comprehensive as the act amended, and any provision which might have been inserted in the original act may be incorporated in the amendatory act without violating the constitutional provision that the subject of an act shall be expressed in the title. Michaels v. Barrett, 355 Ill. 175, 188 N.E. 921;People v. Board of County Com'rs, 355 Ill. 244, 189 N.E. 26. The subject-matter contained in the amendatory act could have been included in the original act, and since...