City of Fort Dodge v. Iowa Public Employment Relations Bd.

• Decision Date: 21 February 1979
• Docket Number: I,AFL-CI,No. 61709,61709
• Citation: 275 N.W.2d 393
• Parties: 100 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3218 CITY OF FORT DODGE, Iowa, a Municipal Corporation, Appellee, v. IOWA PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD, Appellant, and Local 6-502, Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers International Union,ntervenor.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Page 393

275 N.W.2d 393

100 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3218

CITY OF FORT DODGE, Iowa, a Municipal Corporation, Appellee, v. IOWA PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD, Appellant, and Local 6-502, Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers International Union, AFL-CIO, Intervenor.

No. 61709.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Feb. 21, 1979.

Richard C. Turner, Atty. Gen., Marie A. Condon, Asst. Atty. Gen. and Hugh J. Perry, Public Employment Relations Bd., for appellant.

Maurice C. Breen, City Atty., Fort Dodge, for appellee.

William F. Sueppel, of Meardon, Sueppel, Downer & Hayes, Iowa City, for amicus curiae League of Iowa Municipalities.

Charles E. Gribble, of Dreher, Wilson, Adams & Jensen, Des Moines, for amicus curiae Iowa State Ed. Ass'n.

Considered by REES, P. J., and McCORMICK, ALLBEE, McGIVERIN and LARSON, JJ.

LARSON, Justice.

This sole issue to be decided in this appeal is whether clothing, or a clothing allowance, is a mandatory subject of bargaining under Iowa Public Employment Relations Act, chapter 20 of The Code. Local 6-502 of the Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers International Union, AFL-CIO, is "the employee organization" representing the employees of the City of Fort Dodge.

The City had been requested to furnish items of work clothing (or as the PER Board treated it, a clothing Allowance for those items). There is no issue here as to its providing protective clothing for employees such as firemen nor uniforms for employees requiring them. These types of clothing had been provided by the city prior to negotiations. The controversy here arose over the union's proposal that certain of its members be furnished items of "everyday" clothing. The trial court in its findings of fact found that "(w)hat the union sought was common work pants and shirts, overalls and jackets for the employees."

The Public Employment Relations Board (PERB) determined the allowance was a mandatory subject of negotiations under § 20.9, The Code, and the city sought judicial review under our Administrative Procedures Act, § 17A.19, The Code. The district court reversed the PERB ruling; on appeal from that action, we affirm. The Iowa State Education Association and the Iowa League of Municipalities, through their amicus curiae briefs have assisted this court in determination of the issue, which is one of first impression.

There have been numerous administrative decisions by the PERB on the scope of mandatory negotiations. Conflicting views on the general philosophies of strict or broad applications of the scope of negotiations have divided legal scholars ¹ and promise to furnish a fruitful area for future contention before the PERB and in the courts. The reason for the conflicting views is, primarily, that the legislature has assumed a greater role in scope determinations in our Act than Congress did in the National Labor Relations Act. This is obvious in comparing the specific "laundry list" of mandatory items of negotiations under § 20.9, The Code, with § 8(d) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 158(d), and by comparing the list of matters reserved for public employers under the "public employer rights" provisions of Iowa's § 20.7 with the national act, which has no similar provisions.

Section 20.9, The Code, states in part that:

The public employer and the employee organization Shall meet at reasonable times, including meetings reasonably in advance of the public employer's budget-making process, to negotiate in good faith with respect to wages, hours, vacations, insurance, holidays, leaves of absence, shift differentials, overtime compensation, supplemental pay, seniority, transfer procedures, job classifications, health and safety matters, evaluation procedures, procedures for staff reduction, in-service training and Other matters mutually agreed upon. (Emphasis added.)

Two categories of negotiation topics are created by this section: mandatory (the parties "shall" negotiate as to certain items) and permissive (as to items "mutually agreed upon"). The classification of a particular item is important, because only mandatory items may be taken through statutory impasse procedures to final arbitration, unless the employer consents. Sections 20.9, 20.10, The Code; PERB Rule 6.1; Pope, Analysis of the Iowa Public Employment Relations Act, 24 Drake L.Rev. 1, 33 (1974).

On the other hand, the NLRA provides, as to mandatory items of negotiation, that the parties negotiate "in good faith in respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment . . . ." (29 U.S.C. § 158(d)) and stated another way in the Act, to bargain "in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of employment. . . ." (29 U.S.C. § 159(a)).

The Iowa provisions for "employers' rights," as to which there is no NLRA counterpart, provide in part:

Public employers shall have, in addition to all powers, duties, and rights established by constitutional provision, statute, ordinance, charter, or special act, the exclusive power, duty, and the right to:

(1) Direct the work of its public employees.

(2) Hire, promote, demote, transfer, assign and retain public employees in positions within the public agency.

(3) Suspend or discharge public employees for proper cause.

(4) Maintain the efficiency of governmental operations.

(6) Determine and implement methods, means, assignments and personnel by which the public employer's operations are to be conducted.

(7) Take such actions that may be necessary to carry out the mission of the public employer.

(9) Exercise all powers and duties granted to the public employer by law.

Section 20.7, The Code.

The PER Board, in ruling that this clothing allowance was a mandatory subject of bargaining, stated that:

We have previously construed the term "wages" in Section 9 of the Act to encompass all types and methods of compensation, including for example, severance pay and moving expenses. Such a construction is, moreover, consistent with the interpretation of the same term in the National Labor Relations Act, as developed through case law by the National Labor Relations Board and the federal courts. Further, the Iowa Act additionally requires bargaining on items of "supplemental pay."

We believe that clothing allowance, as a form of compensation to employees for their labor, constitutes a mandatory subject of bargaining under the categories of wages and supplemental pay.

The Board apparently held the allowance was within both the "wages" and "supplemental pay" provisions of the list.

The issue before us is a question of law, one of statutory construction. While we give weight to an agency's construction of a statute, such construction may not make law nor change the legal meaning of a statute. We are not bound by an agency's views of a statute interpreted and applied by it. West Des Moines Ed. Ass'n v. PERB, 266 N.W.2d 118, 124-5 (Iowa 1978); Iowa Dept. Rev. v. Iowa Merit Emp. Comm., 243 N.W.2d 610, 613 (Iowa 1976). As PERB stated in its ruling, it had previously used a broad approach in determining what constituted "wages" under the Act. However, agency applications, even of long standing, may not alter the meaning of a statute. Consolidated Freightways Corp. v. Nicholas, 258 Iowa 115, 121-2, 137 N.W.2d 900, 905 (1965). In addition, the PERB has not always been consistent in its approach to the scope of mandatory negotiations. It has in at least one case stated that Iowa's laundry list "must be read narrowly." Bettendorf Community School Dist., Iowa PERB No. 598 (1976), page 4.

Clothing allowances are not expressly mandated for negotiations under the laundry list of § 20.9, The Code. Are they "wages" or "supplemental pay" as PERB held?

The term "wages" under the NLRA has been given a broad application, including vacation and holiday pay (Oughten v. NLRB, 118 F.2d 486 (3rd Cir. 1941); Singer Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 119 F.2d 131 (7th Cir. 1941)) and insurance and pension plans (W. W. Cross & Co. v. NLRB, 174 F.2d 875 (1st Cir. 1949); United Brick and Clay Workers v. International Union, 439 F.2d 311, 314 (8th Cir. 1971)).

In W. W. Cross the court said, at page 878:

The word "wages", following the phrase "rates of pay" in the Act must have been intended to comprehend more than the amount of remuneration per unit of time worked or per unit of work produced. We think it must have been meant to comprehend emoluments resulting from employment in addition to or supplementary to actual "rates of pay." This did not necessarily mean that the word "wages" as used in the Act covers all satisfactions, pleasures or gratifications arising from employment such as playing on a company baseball team, or attending a company picnic, or belonging to a company social club, although perhaps under some peculiar circumstances of employment in an isolated plant it might. Nor does our construction of the word "wages" necessarily mean that we construe it as covering "real wages" in all the breadth with which some economists use that phrase.

(The word "wages") covers a group of insurance program for the reason that such a program provides a financial cushion in the event of illness or injury arising outside the scope of employment at less cost than such a cushion could be obtained through contracts of insurance negotiated individually.

"Wages" is defined as:

Pay given for labor, usually manual or mechanical, at short stated intervals, as distinguished from salaries or fees.

Syn. Wages, hire, salary, stipend, pay, emolument. Wages . . . denote(s) the price paid for labor, esp. by the day or week . . . . Emolument applies to whatever profits arise from office or employment. . . .

Webster's New International Dictionary (2d ed.) (G. & C. Merriam Co. 1952).

In attempting to determine the meaning to be given a word used in a statute, we must "examine the statutes and, unless a contrary intention is evident, give the words used their ordinary and commonly-understood meaning. Unless the words are of doubtful meaning, or it appears adherence to the strict...