Sioux City Police Officers' Ass'n v. City of Sioux City

Decision Date17 February 1993
Docket NumberNo. 91-1779,91-1779
Parties144 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2433, 61 USLW 2519, 10 IER Cases 1858 SIOUX CITY POLICE OFFICERS' ASSOCIATION, a Public Employee Organization; Sioux City Professional Fire Fighter's Association, Local 7, International Association of Fire Fighters, a Public Employee Organization; and American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, Local 212, a Public Employee Organization, Appellants, v. CITY OF SIOUX CITY, Iowa, Appellee.
CourtIowa Supreme Court

MacDonald Smith, Smith & Smith, Sioux City, for appellants.

James L. Abshier, City Atty., and C. Maurice Rawe, Asst. City Atty., Sioux City, for appellee.

Considered by HARRIS, P.J., and CARTER, LAVORATO, NEUMAN, and SNELL, JJ.

SNELL, Justice.

This is a declaratory judgment action seeking to determine that an anti-nepotism resolution passed by the City of Sioux City affecting its employees is unlawful. The trial court denied plaintiffs' request for a declaratory ruling, holding that an exclusive remedy existed before the Public Employment Relations Board (PERB). On appeal by plaintiffs, we affirm in part and reverse in part.

Plaintiffs are three unincorporated associations whose members are all public employees of the City of Sioux City. They are the Police Officers Association, Firefighters Association, and Municipal Employees Association. These groups object to the anti-nepotism resolution, believing that it unlawfully infringes on their rights. The policy in question provides in part:

6. No individual shall be an applicant for a position in a department or be employed by a department of the city if a family relationship will be created by such employment.

7. No employee shall be promoted or transferred into a department if a family relationship will be created by such a promotion or transfer.

8. If a family relationship is created by the marriage or cohabitation of two employees, the two employees will be given the option of deciding who will transfer, if possible, or who will terminate employment. If the decision cannot be made by the two employees, department seniority shall be the deciding factor and the least senior employee shall be transferred, if possible; otherwise, the least senior shall be terminated. If a family relationship is created by marriage between an employee and a non-employee, the employee who became married must transfer, if possible, or terminate employment.

Family relationship is defined in the resolution as employment of two or more family members within the same department. Family members are listed as follows:

[M]other, father, brother, sister, spouse (including cohabitating couples), children, aunts, uncles, nieces, nephews, first cousins, mother-in-law, father-in-law, brother-in-law, sister-in-law, stepfather, stepmother, stepbrother, stepsister, stepchild, half-brother, half-sister, grandparent, grandchild, and legal guardian. Relationships created by adoption are included.

Those departments included are the legal department, employee relations, community development, finance, city clerk, city manager, utilities, public works, police including WCICC, fire including WCICC, art center, library, museum, transit, human rights, CCAT, and WCICC (including communication center personnel).

The City adopted the anti-nepotism resolution on August 13, 1990, by giving notice as required by Iowa Code chapter 21 (1989), but did not specifically address a notice to the plaintiff associations. On learning of the policy, plaintiffs filed this suit claiming the policy is illegal and invalid for these reasons:

1. The anti-nepotism policy is in irreconcilable conflict with Iowa Code sections 400.9 and 400.16-400.19 and is in excess of the City's "home rule" authority under Iowa Code sections 364.1-364.2, and Article III, Section 38A of the Iowa Constitution.

2. The anti-nepotism policy interferes with the association members' rights to associate and marry pursuant to the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.

3. The unilateral adoption of the anti-nepotism policy violated the associations' rights to negotiate and bargain promotion and transfer procedures pursuant to Iowa Code section 20.9.

The petition does not allege immediate or irreparable harm to the associations or to their members nor are such allegations made in the statement of facts, which is stipulated. It is also clear that the associations did not request negotiation or bargaining on the issue of the anti-nepotism policy.

Although refusing to rule on the validity of the anti-nepotism resolution itself, the trial court opined that the City's act was within its "home rule" powers, did not violate constitutional rights of the associations, and was not overbroad. We reverse on the issue of jurisdiction to render a declaratory ruling and affirm the trial court on the issues of statutory construction and alleged constitutional violations addressed herein.

Our scope of review of this action is based upon how the case was tried in the district court. In re Mount Pleasant Bank & Trust Co., 426 N.W.2d 126, 129 (Iowa 1988). Since it was tried at law, we review for correction of errors at law. Uffelman v. Fire Pension Bd., 424 N.W.2d 467, 467 (Iowa 1988).

I. Jurisdiction--declaratory judgment action.

The City's anti-nepotism policy was created to address and alleviate management problems that the City perceived to potentially exist when family members are working in the same department. Mainly, these problems are defined as:

1. Favoritism in job assignment,

2. Favoritism in job promotion,

3. Favoritism in additional employment,

4. Favoritism in pay increase,

5. Creation of morale problems,

6. Reduced work productivity,

7. Increased absenteeism,

8. Conflicts of interest,

9. Problems in the administration of discipline.

Reliance by the City is placed on experts in the personnel management field who advise against allowing these family relationships to be created.

We note at the outset that the procedural posture of this case is unlike the majority of our cases in this area, which have come from a review of a decision by the Public Employment Relations Board (PERB). See, e.g., Saydel Educ. Ass'n v. PERB, 333 N.W.2d 486 (Iowa 1983); City of Mason City v. PERB, 316 N.W.2d 851 (Iowa 1982); City of Fort Dodge v. PERB, 275 N.W.2d 393 (Iowa 1979). In the case at bar, PERB is not a party nor is it the adjudicating agency, the case having been processed from a declaratory judgment petition filed initially in the district court pursuant to Iowa Rules of Civil Procedure 261-269. The thrust of plaintiffs' action is that the resolution condemning family relationships in departmental employment illegally interferes with their civil service employee rights, their freedom of association and marriage, and the right to bargain regarding promotion and job transfer procedures. None of these issues come from a grievance about a contractual provision involving the employees.

We have been careful in our jurisdictional procedures to have disputes decided initially by the agency in whose field of expertise the case lies. Our case of Salsbury Laboratories v. Iowa Department of Environmental Quality, 276 N.W.2d 830, 836-37 (Iowa 1979), discussed our rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies. We have returned jurisdiction to the agency when the procedure involved has avoided agency action although an adequate remedy was available through the agency. See City of Des Moines v. Des Moines Police Bargaining Unit Ass'n, 360 N.W.2d 729, 732-33 (Iowa 1985). Moreover, a district court's role is limited in reviewing agency action under section 17A.9 of our Code. In PERB v. Stohr, 279 N.W.2d 286, 290 (Iowa 1979), we held that the district court's authority allowed a review of PERB's refusal to issue a ruling but did not extend to deciding the merits of the controversy.

At the same time, we have recognized that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies has never been absolute. See Salsbury, 276 N.W.2d at 836; Matters v. City of Ames, 219 N.W.2d 718, 719-20 (Iowa 1974) ("Exhaustion is not required before every court challenge."). "If the agency is incapable of granting the relief sought during the subsequent administrative proceedings, a fruitless pursuit of these remedies is not required." Salsbury, 276 N.W.2d at 836; Matters, 219 N.W.2d at 719; 3 K. Davis, Administrative Law § 20.07 (1958). We have also held that the district court in a particular factual scenario may have concurrent jurisdiction with PERB. Norton v. Adair County, 441 N.W.2d 347, 354 (Iowa 1989) (action by employee against union alleging violation of statutory duty of fair representation).

The Public Employment Relations Board generally has exclusive jurisdiction to determine negotiability issues under Iowa Code chapter 20. City of Des Moines, 360 N.W.2d at 732. It is appropriate for an agency in the first instance to interpret the statutes it administers. Id. When resolution of a controversy has been delegated to PERB, the district court has no original authority to declare the rights of parties or the applicability of any statute or rule. Stohr, 279 N.W.2d at 290. The district court's power to decide such issues is derived from and is dependent upon its authority to review PERB's action. Id.; see, e.g., City of Dubuque v. PERB, 444 N.W.2d 495, 497 (Iowa 1989) (court affirmed PERB's decision which concluded that evaluation procedure for police promotion was a mandatory subject of bargaining); City of Des Moines, 360 N.W.2d at 732 (court holds PERB is body to determine negotiability disputes in the first instance); Saydel Educ. Ass'n, 333 N.W.2d at 489 (court affirms PERB ruling that criteria including skill, ability, and experience to be considered by school district in connection with transfer or staff reductions was a mandatory subject of bargaining). Our cases have assumed that the administrative declaratory...

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