City of Freeport v. Illinois State Labor Relations Bd.

• Decision Date: 18 April 1990
• Docket Number: Nos. 67147,67152 and 67181,s. 67147
• Citation: 143 Ill.Dec. 220,135 Ill.2d 499,554 N.E.2d 155
• Parties: , 143 Ill.Dec. 220, 135 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2492 The CITY OF FREEPORT, Appellee, v. The ILLINOIS STATE LABOR RELATIONS BOARD et al., Appellants. The VILLAGE OF WHEELING, Appellant, v. The ILLINOIS STATE LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, Appellee.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Page 155

554 N.E.2d 155

135 Ill.2d 499, 143 Ill.Dec. 220, 135

L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2492

The CITY OF FREEPORT, Appellee, v. The ILLINOIS STATE LABOR RELATIONS BOARD et al., Appellants.

The VILLAGE OF WHEELING, Appellant, v. The ILLINOIS STATE LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, Appellee.

Nos. 67147, 67152 and 67181.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

April 18, 1990.

Neil F. Hartigan, Atty. Gen., Springfield (Robert J. Ruiz, Sol. Gen., and Valerie J. Peiler, Asst. Atty. Gen., Chicago, of counsel), for appellants Illinois State Labor Relations Board et al. in Nos. 67147 & 67152.

J. Dale Berry and Gilbert Feldman, Cornfield & Feldman, Chicago, for appellant AFSCME Council 31, in Nos. 67147 & 67152.

John T. Weise, Seyfarth, Shaw, Fairweather & Geraldson, Chicago, for appellee City of Freeport in Nos. 67147 & 67152.

Thomas W. Kelty, Pfeifer & Kelty, P.C., and Roger Huebner, Springfield, for amicus curiae Illinois Municipal League in Nos. 67147 & 67152.

James A. Murphy, Peoria, and Giacomo A. Pecoraro, Springfield, for amicus curiae Illinois Association of Chiefs of Police, Inc. in Nos. 67147 & 67152.

James C. Franczek, Jr., Andrea R. Waintroob and James J. Zuehl, Vedder, Price, Kaufman & Kammholz, Chicago, for amicus curiae Illinois Public Employer Labor Relations Association.

James Baird and Gary S. Kaplan, of Seyfarth, Shaw, Fairweather & Geraldson, Chicago, for appellant Village of Wheeling in No. 67181.

Neil F. Hartigan, Atty. Gen., Springfield (Robert J. Ruiz, Sol. Gen., and Ann Plunkett-Sheldon, Asst. Atty. Gen., Chicago, of counsel), for appellee Illinois State Labor Relations Board in No 67181.

J. Dale Berry, Cornfield & Feldman, Chicago, for appellee Wheeling Firefighters Association in No. 67181.

Wayne M. Klocke, of Long, Rabin & Young, Ltd., of Springfield, for amicus curiae Associated Fire Fighters of Illinois in No. 67181.

Joel A. D'Alba and Anne Wells Clark, Chicago (Asher, Pavalon, Gittler & Greenfield, Ltd., of counsel), for amicus curiae Illinois State Federation of Labor, AFL-CIO in No. 67181.

Justice WARD delivered the opinion of the court:

These consolidated actions are before this court on administrative review of certain orders of the Illinois State Labor Relations Board (Board). We must consider whether the Board erred in determining that certain employees of the Village of Wheeling fire department and of the City of Freeport police department were not supervisors within the meaning of section 3(r) of the Illinois Public Labor Relations Act (Act) (Ill.Rev.Stat.1987, ch. 48, par. 1603(r)).

In Nos. 67147 and 67152, the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees (AFSCME) petitioned the Board for certification as the exclusive bargaining representative of certain employees, including lieutenants and sergeants, of the Freeport police department. The City opposed the petition arguing that the lieutenants and sergeants in the department were "supervisors" within the meaning of the Act and should be excluded from the bargaining unit. The matter was referred to a hearing officer, who determined that neither the sergeants nor the lieutenants satisfied the statutory definition of "supervisor." Accordingly, the hearing officer recommended that AFSCME be certified as the representative of an employee bargaining unit composed of all sworn officers of the department except the chief and assistant chief of police. The Board accepted the recommended decision and directed an election within the bargaining unit. (City of Freeport, 2 Pub. Employee Rep. (Ill.) par. 2052 (ISLRB 1986).) Following the representation election, the Board certified AFSCME as the exclusive bargaining representative of the unit. When Freeport refused to bargain, the Board determined that it had engaged in an unfair labor practice. Freeport appealed, challenging the inclusion of lieutenants and sergeants in the bargaining unit. The appellate court held that the Board's decision was contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence and reversed the order finding Freeport guilty of an unfair labor practice. (169 Ill.App.3d 151, 119 Ill.Dec. 746, 523 N.E.2d 214.) We allowed the Board's and AFSCME's petitions for leave to appeal (107 Ill.2d R. 315(a)).

In No. 67181, the Wheeling Firefighters Association, a labor union (the Union), petitioned the Board for certification as the exclusive representative of a bargaining unit composed of all full-time fire department employees. The matter was referred by the Board to a hearing officer. At the hearing, the Village of Wheeling argued that those individuals holding the rank of lieutenant were supervisors and should be excluded from the bargaining unit. The hearing officer rejected this argument and recommended that the union be certified as the representative of an employee bargaining unit composed of all full-time fire department employees except the chief, the assistant chief and the fire inspector. The Board accepted the recommended decision of the hearing officer and directed an election within the bargaining unit. (Village of Wheeling, 3 Pub. Employee Rep. (Ill.) par. 2005 (ISLRB 1986).) Following the representation election, the Board certified the Union as the exclusive bargaining representative of the unit. When the Village refused to bargain with the Union in order to obtain appellate review of the unit determination, the Board found that it had engaged in an unfair labor practice. The Village appealed and the appellate court affirmed the order of the Board. (170 Ill.App.3d 934, 120 Ill.Dec. 776, 524 N.E.2d 958.)) We allowed the Village's petition for leave to appeal (107 Ill.2d R. 315(a)).

The Illinois Public Labor Relations Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1987, ch. 48, par. 1601 et seq.) provides a comprehensive system of collective bargaining for those public employees and employers who fall within its scope. (County of Kane v. Carlson (1987), 116 Ill.2d 186, 196, 107 Ill.Dec. 569, 507 N.E.2d 482). The Act specifies, however, that a bargaining unit determined by the Board may not include both supervisors and nonsupervisors. See Ill.Rev.Stat.1987, ch. 48, pars. 1603(n), (s)(1).

Section 3(r) of the Act defines a "supervisor" as follows:

" 'Supervisor' is an employee whose principal work is substantially different from that of his subordinates and who has authority, in the interest of the employer, to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge, direct, reward, or discipline employees, or to adjust their grievances, or to effectively recommend such action, if the exercise of such authority is not of a merely routine or clerical nature, but requires the consistent use of independent judgment. Except with respect to police employment, the term 'supervisor' includes only those individuals who devote a preponderance of their employment time to exercising such authority State supervisors notwithstanding." Ill.Rev.Stat.1987, ch. 48, par. 1603(r).

This definition is similar to that in the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) (29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. (1982)), which also excludes supervisors from collective-bargaining units. The exclusion of supervisors in the NLRA was thought necessary to redress a perceived imbalance in labor-management relationships that arose when supervisors were put in the position of serving two masters with opposing interests. (Beasley v. Food Fair of North Carolina, Inc. (1974), 416 U.S. 653, 660, 94 S.Ct. 2023, 2027, 40 L.Ed.2d 443, 449-50.) The exclusion of supervisory employees from bargaining units ensures employers that pro-union bias will not impair the supervisor's ability to apply the employer's policies to subordinates according to the employer's best interests.

This same philosophy is reflected in our act. The definition of "supervisor" in our statute, however, is narrower than that in the NLRA. Under the NLRA, an individual who has authority to perform supervisory functions with independent judgment is considered a supervisor and excluded from bargaining units. (29 U.S.C. § 152(11) (1982).) Our act, however, adds two requirements which are not included in the NLRA's definition. First, the individual's principal work must be substantially different from that of his subordinates. Second, except with respect to police employment, only those individuals who spend the preponderance of their employment time exercising the enumerated supervisory functions may be considered supervisors. Accordingly, while National Labor Relations Board precedent is useful in determining whether an individual performs any of the enumerated functions with independent judgment, it is not useful in analyzing the "principal work" and "preponderance" prongs of our supervisory definition. See City of Burbank v. Illinois State Labor Relations Board (1989), 128 Ill.2d 335, 131 Ill.Dec. 590, 538 N.E.2d 1146; City of Peru v. Illinois State Labor Relations Board (1988), 167 Ill.App.3d 284, 118 Ill.Dec. 40, 521 N.E.2d 108; City of Burbank, 1 Pub. Employee Rep. (Ill.) par. 2008 (ISLRB 1985).

The Illinois State Labor Relations Board, the agency charged with responsibility for administering and enforcing the Act, is empowered to determine whether an individual meets the definition of "supervisor" in the Act. Judicial review of the Board's decision is governed by the provisions of the Administrative Review Law (Ill.Rev.Stat.1987, ch. 110, par. 3-101 et seq.). That statute specifies that judicial review of agency action extends to all questions of law and fact presented in the record. It further provides that the agency's findings and conclusions on questions of fact shall be held prima facie true and correct. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1987, ch. 110, par. 3-110.) Where the findings of fact are against the manifest weight of the evidence and it is clearly evident that the Board should have reached the opposite conclusion, the reviewing court may reverse the agency's findings of fact. (Rockford Township Highway Department v. Illinois State Labor Relations Board (1987), 153 Ill.App.3d 863, 106...