City of Hallandale v. State ex rel. Zachar, 77-849

• Decision Date: 16 May 1979
• Docket Number: No. 77-849,77-849
• Parties: CITY OF HALLANDALE, a municipal corporation of Florida, and Charles Deyo, Jr., Building Official for the City of Hallandale, Appellants, v. STATE of Florida ex rel. Stefan H. ZACHAR and Dorothy Lape Zachar, his wife, Appellees.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

Page 186

371 So.2d 186

CITY OF HALLANDALE, a municipal corporation of Florida, and Charles Deyo, Jr., Building Official for the City of Hallandale, Appellants, v. STATE of Florida ex rel. Stefan H. ZACHAR and Dorothy Lape Zachar, his wife, Appellees.

No. 77-849.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

May 16, 1979.

Rehearing Denied June 13, 1979.

Robert S. Miller, Hallandale, for appellants.

Fred J. Ward, Hallandale, for appellees.

DOWNEY, Chief Judge.

Appellants, City of Hallandale and Charles Deyo, Jr., the City Building Official, seek review of a final judgment holding certain municipal ordinances to be invalid and directing the issuance of a peremptory writ of mandamus commanding appellants to forthwith process the plans and specifications filed by appellees for the issuance of a building permit.

Appellees are the owners of certain improved commercial property in the City of Hallandale. They desired to construct an addition to said improvements but their application for a permit was declined because a City Zoning Official advised appellees they were required to submit their plans to an "Impact Review Board" pursuant to Ordinance 993 as amended. Appellees refused to submit their application to the Impact Review Board, and instead filed a petition for writ of mandamus attacking the ordinances in question on grounds of statutory and constitutional invalidity. The trial court heard some brief testimony and ultimately entered the peremptory writ directing the appellants to process appellees' application.

Appellants raise two points on appeal which warrant discussion:

a) The trial court erred in finding the city ordinances in question were invalid for failure to comply with Chapter 166 of the Florida Statutes when they were enacted.

b) The trial court erred in ruling that the ordinances of the City of Hallandale were unconstitutional because they did not contain reasonable standards or guidelines and are vague, indefinite and uncertain.

In support of the trial court's findings appellees submit that the ordinances in question were invalid because they violate the provisions of Section 166.041, Florida Statutes (1973). Specifically, appellees contend that 1) the titles of the ordinances in question are defective because they do not contain the subject matter of the ordinance, and 2) the amendatory ordinances are deficient because they do not republish at length the section or subsection of the ordinance which is being amended.

Section 166.041, Florida Statutes (1973), in pertinent part, provides:

"166.041. Procedures for adoption of ordinances and resolutions

"(2) Each ordinance or resolution shall be introduced in writing and shall embrace but one subject and matters properly connected therewith. The subject shall be clearly stated in the title. No ordinance shall be revised or amended by reference to its title only. Ordinances to revise or amend shall set out in full the revised or amended act or section or subsection or paragraph of a section or subsection."

Subsection 2, which specifies procedural requirements for the enactment of municipal ordinances, actually embodies Article III, § 16, of the Florida Constitution as it pertains to state statutes. Thus, most of the cases which interpret the foregoing language are cases involving the application of Article III, Section 16, to a state statute. In Lipe v. City of Miami, 141 So.2d 738 (Fla.1962), the Supreme Court stated the rule to be:

"(W)hen the new act as amended is a revision of the entire original act or is an amendment of a section, sections, subsection of a section or paragraph of a subsection of a section, that the new act, section, subsection of a section, or paragraph of a subsection of a section, as the case may be, shall be set forth at length, so that the provisions as amended may be seen and Understood in their entirety by the Legislature." at 741-742.

Lipe was followed by Auto Owners Insurance Company v. Hillsborough County Aviation Authority, 153 So.2d 722 (Fla.1963), wherein the Supreme Court said:

"We have also held that the constitutional provision was designed to inform both the legislature and the public of the nature and extent of proposed changes in existing laws. For this reason it is required that when a specific section or subsection is being amended it should be republished with the proposed amendment so that an examination of the act itself will reflect the changes contemplated, as well as their impact on the amended statute." at 725. (Emphasis supplied.)

Subsequently, the Supreme Court again treated this question and adopted the wording of the trial judge in Jackson v. Consolidated Government of the City of Jacksonville, 225 So.2d 497 (Fla.1969):

" 'The two cases (Lipe and Auto Owners ) do not say how much "reference" is required to the original statute for a violation of Article III, § 16 to exist. The explicit terms of the constitutional provision contemplate that in a proper case reenactment of a single paragraph of a sub-section is sufficient. Speaking literally, no paragraph, section or group of sections has meaning without some reference to the act which is being amended. If the constitutional provision were construed to require republication whenever Any reference is required it would be unworkable. Every act would have to be restated in its entirety for an amendment to be effective. Needless to say, this is not necessary. The draftsman of an act may assume that members of the Legislature are acquainted with the general purpose of the original act, with its over-all framework, with the manner in which the section fits into that framework, and with the meaning of any defined terms in the legislation.

'The facts in Lipe and Auto Owners demonstrate what is meant by "reference" and provide a guide for deciding when more than the...