City of Hapeville v. Sylvan Airport Parking, LLC.
| Decision Date | 17 May 2021 |
| Docket Number | A21A0519 |
| Citation | 858 S.E.2d 538,359 Ga.App. 448 |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
| Parties | CITY OF HAPEVILLE et al. v. SYLVAN AIRPORT PARKING, LLC. |
Andrew Jackson Welch III, Priya Mahendra Patel, McDonough, for Appellant.
Frank Edward Jenkins III, Cartersville, Douglas Ryan Brumlow, for Appellee.
Sylvan Airport Parking, LLC d/b/a Peachy Airport Parking (hereinafter, "Peachy Airport Parking") brought an action for declaratory and injunctive relief against the City of Hapeville and its mayor and members of its city council in their official and individual capacities. The relief sought by Peachy Airport Parking concerned the city's threatened use of a city tax ordinance to prohibit Peachy Airport Parking from using a particular parcel of land as a parking facility. Among other things, Peachy Airport Parking asked the trial court to declare that ordinance unconstitutionally vague. Citing sovereign immunity, the defendants moved to dismiss the action. The trial court denied the defendants’ motion and we granted interlocutory review.
As detailed below, we affirm in part and reverse in part the trial court's judgment. We affirm the denial of the motion to dismiss the claims for declaratory relief against the city and the individual defendants in their official capacities, because those claims are subject to a statutory waiver of sovereign immunity. But no such waiver exists permitting the claims for injunctive relief against the city and the individual defendants in their official capacities, so we reverse the denial of the motion to dismiss as to those claims. Finally, we affirm the denial of the motion to dismiss the claims for both declaratory and injunctive relief against the individual defendants in their individual capacities, because these claims are not subject to sovereign immunity and the complaint stated claims for such prospective relief.
As stated above, Peachy Airport Parking filed a complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief against the city and the individual defendants in both their official and individual capacities. In the petition, Peachy Airport Parking alleged that it owned "combined tracts of land commonly identified as [a single address]" within the city on which, since 2011, it has conducted a parking-services business pursuant to a commercial occupational tax permit that it renews annually. In 2018, the city cited Peachy Airport Parking for violating the city's occupational tax ordinance by operating its parking facility on one of the eleven parcels making up the combined tracts. Peachy Airport Parking interpreted the citation to refer to Section 17-5-23 of the city's code of ordinances, which provides:
Where a business or profession is operated at more than one place or where the business includes more than one line, the business or profession shall be required to obtain the necessary tax certificate for each location and line and pay an occupation tax in accordance with the prevailing taxing method and tax rate for each location and line.
The city's municipal court dismissed the citation against Peachy Airport Parking, but the city informed Peachy Airport Parking that if it parked vehicles on the parcel it would violate the city's occupational tax codes and be subject to another citation. An employee of the city also informed Peachy Airport Parking that it was not entitled to a commercial occupational tax permit for the parcel.
Peachy Airport Parking filed this action in superior court seeking a declaration that it is not in violation of the city's code of ordinances, that it is only operating one line of business under Section 17-5-23, that Section 17-5-23 is unconstitutionally vague, that its commercial occupational tax permit covers the parcel at issue, that it is authorized to park cars on the parcel in question, and that further prosecution of it for doing so would be unlawful. In this action, Peachy Airport Parking also sought an injunction barring the defendants from further prosecuting it for parking cars on the parcel.
The defendants moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under OCGA § 9-11-12 (b) (1) and for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under OCGA § 9-11-12 (b) (6). They asserted that sovereign immunity barred the claims against the city and the individual defendants in their official capacities because Peachy Airport Parking had shown no waiver of sovereign immunity. And they asserted that the individual defendants were also entitled to sovereign immunity against the claims brought against them in their individual capacities because the relief sought by Peachy Airport Parking could only be granted by the city. The trial court denied the motion.
"We review de novo a trial court's ruling on a motion to dismiss based on sovereign immunity grounds, which is a matter of law." Dept. of Transp. v. Thompson , 354 Ga. App. 200, 840 S.E.2d 679 (2020) (citation and punctuation omitted). Although the trial court's "[f]actual findings are sustained if there is any evidence supporting them, and the burden of proof is on the party seeking [a] waiver of immunity," id. (citation and punctuation omitted), in this case the trial court made no factual findings, nor were any necessary for the trial court to determine whether sovereign immunity had been waived under the circumstances of this case.
"The constitutional doctrine of sovereign immunity bars any suit against the [s]tate to which it has not given its consent, including suits against state departments, agencies, and officers in their official capacities, and including suits for injunctive and declaratory relief from the enforcement of allegedly unconstitutional laws." Lathrop v. Deal , 301 Ga. 408, 444 (IV), 801 S.E.2d 867 (2017). This includes suits against municipalities. Godfrey v. Ga. Interlocal Risk Mgmt. Agency , 290 Ga. 211, 214, 719 S.E.2d 412 (2011). To avoid dismissal of its claims against the city and the individual defendants in their official capacities, Peachy Airport Parking must point to a waiver in either our state Constitution or statutory law. See Lathrop , supra at 444 (IV), 801 S.E.2d 867.
As stated above, Peachy Airport Parking's complaint included a claim for a declaration that Section 17-5-23 of the city's code of ordinances could not be enforced against it because the ordinance was unconstitutionally vague. In City of Rincon v. Ernest Communities , 356 Ga. App. 84, 86 (1), 846 S.E.2d 250 (2020), we held that, under OCGA § 9-4-7 (b), "a municipality is subject to a declaratory judgment action where, as here, the validity of its ordinance is challenged." OCGA § 9-4-7 (b) provides that "[i]n any proceeding involving the validity of a municipal ordinance or franchise, the municipality shall be made a party and shall be entitled to be heard fully as a party." As explained in the City of Rincon decision, OCGA § 9-4-7 (b) constitutes a waiver of sovereign immunity in the declaratory judgment action, and the trial court did not err in denying the motion to dismiss the declaratory judgment claim against the city and the individual defendants in their official capacities. See City of Rincon , supra at 86 (1), 846 S.E.2d 250.
Unlike the claim for declaratory relief, however, no waiver of sovereign immunity permits the claim for injunctive relief against the city and the individual defendants in their official capacities. See City of Rincon , supra at 86-87 (1), 846 S.E.2d 250. We disagree with Peachy Airport Parking that OCGA § 36-33-1 (b) is the source of a statutory waiver. That Code section provides: " OCGA § 36-33-1 (b) (emphasis supplied). The waiver of sovereign immunity contained in this Code section does not apply to Peachy Airport Parking's claim for injunctive relief, because a claim for injunctive relief does not seek to impose liability on the defendants. As our Supreme Court explained in Lathrop v. Deal , supra, the term " ‘liability’ often refers to a financial or pecuniary obligation, that is, monetary damages." 301 Ga. at 442 (III) (C), 801 S.E.2d 867 (citation and punctuation omitted). And, as in Lathrop , that usage of the term "liability" is consistent with surrounding language, in this case the language of OCGA § 36-33-1 (a), which addresses the immunity of municipal corporations "from liability for damages. " OCGA § 36-33-1 (a) (emphasis supplied). See Lathrop , 301 Ga. at 442 (III) (C), 801 S.E.2d 867 ().
Because the claim for injunctive relief against the city and the individual defendants in their official capacities was not subject to a waiver, sovereign...
To continue reading
Request your trial