City of Houston v. Williams
| Decision Date | 31 March 2009 |
| Docket Number | No. 14-08-00059-CV.,14-08-00059-CV. |
| Citation | 290 S.W.3d 260 |
| Parties | The CITY OF HOUSTON, Appellant, v. Steve WILLIAMS, et al., Appellees. |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Reagan Douglas Pratt, Timothy J. Higley, Houston, for appellant.
E. Troy Blakeney, Richard Charles Mumey, Vincent L. Marable, III, Houston, for appellees.
Panel consists of Justices YATES, SEYMORE and BOYCE.
This interlocutory appeal from denial of the City of Houston's plea to the jurisdiction requires us to construe sections of the Texas Local Government Code providing for waiver of governmental immunity relative to breach-of-contract suits against local government entities. The appeal involves a suit brought by appellees, a group of former Houston firefighters ("the firefighters"), against appellant, the City of Houston ("the City").1 The case is before this court for the second time.
In a partial judgment rendered in 2004, the trial court denied the City's plea to the jurisdiction and ruled in favor of the firefighters on their two claims.2 We affirmed the trial court's partial judgment, holding governmental immunity was waived (1) under the "plead and be impleaded" language in Local Governmental Code section 51.075 and the "sue and be sued" language in the City's charter and (2) because the firefighters' suit was one for declaratory judgment. City of Houston v. Williams, 183 S.W.3d 409, 414, 416 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2005), rev'd, 216 S.W.3d 827 (Tex.2007) (per curiam).
The supreme court disagreed and reversed. City of Houston v. Williams, 216 S.W.3d 827, 828 (Tex.2007) (per curiam). The supreme court then remanded the cause to the trial court to determine whether the recently enacted Local Government Code sections 271.151 through 271.160, waiving governmental immunity for certain breach-of-contract suits, applied to the firefighters' action. Id. at 829. During the pendency of the case, additional firefighters were added as plaintiffs. On remand, the trial court concluded, under Local Government Code sections 271.151 through 271.160, governmental immunity was waived with respect to all plaintiffs. See Tex. Loc. Gov't Code Ann. §§ 271.151-.160 (Vernon 2005).
Concluding the firefighters have alleged facts that affirmatively demonstrate they have a contract with the City that meets the requirements of Local Government Code sections 271.151 through 271.160, we affirm the order of the trial court.3
The City's actions about which the firefighters complain have not changed since the inception of the case. Those actions resulted in what the parties and the courts denominated the "debit dock claim" (allegedly improper reduction of termination payouts by docking previously paid overtime) and the "termination pay claim" (allegedly improper exclusion of premium pay from the calculation of termination pay). See Williams, 183 S.W.3d at 419, 424. The claims and the procedural history of the case through remand are set forth in the supreme court's and this court's opinions, and we do not repeat them here. See Williams, 216 S.W.3d at 828-29, 183 S.W.3d at 417-20, 424.
After the supreme court's mandate issued, the firefighters filed their eighth amended petition in the trial court. In their first cause of action, the firefighters alleged facts constituting the debit dock claim. In their second cause of action, they alleged facts constituting the termination pay claim. In relation to both claims, they requested declaratory judgment mandamus, and equitable and injunctive relief. They alleged violations of Texas Local Government Code section 142.0017, Texas Local Government Code chapter 143, and City of Houston, Code of Ordinances section 34-59. They alleged waiver of governmental immunity under Texas Local Government Code sections 271.151 through 271.160, but did not otherwise refer to a written contract.
The City specially excepted. In part, it argued it was not aware of a written agreement as described in Local Government Code sections 271.151(2) and 271.152 and denied the existence of such a document. The City further complained, "The [firefighters'] pleading does not give [the City] fair notice as to the identity of the alleged document, or the location, description or content of any such document." The City argued that, by not containing information about the alleged document, the pleading failed to demonstrate affirmatively the court's jurisdiction over the firefighters' claims. The City also argued the supreme court had dismissed the firefighters' claims for declaratory judgment, mandamus, and equitable and injunctive relief.
The firefighters responded by filing a ninth amended petition. The amended pleading contained the same facts as alleged in the eighth amended petition. The firefighters alleged the City's actions violated Texas Local Government Code section 142.0017, Texas Local Government Code chapter 143, and City of Houston, Code of Ordinances section 34-59. They deleted requests for declaratory judgment, mandamus, and equitable and injunctive relief in relation to these alleged violations. Instead, they denominated these requests as claims for breach of contract and asserted that Texas Local Government Code sections 271.151 through 271.160 were applicable to the case. Finally, they identified the following as contracts subject to those sections: (1) "[s]upporting evidence and arguments made by [the firefighters] in their `Respondents' Brief on the Merits' filed in the Texas Supreme Court" in the present case; (2) "[s]upporting evidence and arguments made by Appellee Alan Hildebrant" in his brief filed in case number 01-06-00936-CV in the First Court of Appeals; (3) an "Agreement Between Houston Professional Fire Fighters Association and City of Houston, Texas, executed on August 30, 1995" (the "1995 Agreement"); (4) an "Agreement Between Houston Professional Fire Fighters Association and City of Houston, Texas, executed on December 18, 1997" (the "1997 Agreement"); and (5) a 2005 Collective Bargaining Agreement (the "2005 CBA").
The City filed an amended plea to the jurisdiction and an amended answer. In the former, the City argued, in part, that (1) under the supreme court's ruling in this case, the firefighters could not bring an action for damages, regardless of how those actions were characterized, unless the legislature expressly waived the City's immunity, (2) the City enjoyed immunity to interpret its own rules and regulations without judicial interference, (3) the firefighters failed to exhaust administrative remedies, (4) the firefighters pleaded no facts affirmatively demonstrating their claims qualified for the limited waiver of immunity found in Local Government Code sections 271.151 through 271.160, and (5) the firefighters failed to pursue the contractual grievance procedures set forth in the collective bargaining agreements they had cited. Among the defenses listed in its answer, the City asserted the following: (1) the firefighters' claims were barred by (a) the doctrine of governmental immunity and (b) the terms and effect of the agreements between the City and the Association, and (2) there was no written contract forming the basis of the firefighters' claims.
The firefighters responded by arguing, "The claims asserted in this case by the Retired Fire Fighters are based on City of Houston ordinances and applicable and related statutes which satisfy the requirements for waiver of sovereign immunity under Sections 271.151-271.160." The firefighters also argued the statutory provisions of Texas Local Government Code chapters 142 and 143 constituted "part of the written employment contracts" between the City and the firefighters. Finally, the firefighters argued the 1995 and 1997 Agreements and the 2005 CBA met the criteria of sections 271.151 through 271.160.
After hearing argument, the trial court denied the City's plea to the jurisdiction. The City appealed.
In a single issue, the City argues the trial court erred in denying its plea to the jurisdiction based on governmental immunity and lack of standing. "Questions involving the application of the principles of sovereign and governmental immunity and a party's standing to bring an action are the proper subjects of a plea to the jurisdiction." Nivens v. City of League City, 245 S.W.3d 470, 474 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, pet. denied) (citing Brown v. Todd, 53 S.W.3d 297, 300-01 (Tex.2001)).
In a plea to the jurisdiction, a party challenges the trial court's authority to determine the subject matter of the cause of action. City of Mont Belvieu v. Enter. Prods. Operating, L.P., 222 S.W.3d 515, 518 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, no pet.). Because subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law, we review the trial court's decision de novo. Id. In deciding a plea to the jurisdiction, we may not weigh the merits of the claim, but must consider only the plaintiff's pleadings and the evidence pertinent to the jurisdictional inquiry. See Tex. Natural Res. Conservation Comm'n v. White, 46 S.W.3d 864, 868 (Tex.2001); Bland Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Blue, 34 S.W.3d 547, 554-55 (Tex.2000). When we consider a trial court's order on a plea to the jurisdiction, we construe the pleadings in the plaintiff's favor and look to the pleader's intent. See Tex. Ass'n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 446 (Tex.1993). To prevail, the party asserting the plea must show that, even if all the allegations in the plaintiff's pleadings are taken as true, an incurable jurisdictional defect appears on the face of the pleadings, rendering it impossible for the plaintiff's petition to confer jurisdiction on the trial court. City of Mont Belvieu, 222 S.W.3d at 518.
If a plaintiff fails to plead sufficient facts affirmatively demonstrating the trial court's jurisdiction, but the pleadings do not affirmatively demonstrate...
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City of Houston v. Williams
...under section 271.152. Both the trial court and court of appeals agreed, determining again that the City's immunity had been waived. 290 S.W.3d 260, 262. The Firefighters also argued that Local Government Code Chapter 143, the two MCAs from 1995 and 1997, and the 2005 CBA, all likewise cons......
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