City of Houston v. Jackson

• Citation: 192 S.W.3d 764
• Decision Date: 07 April 2006
• Docket Number: No. 04-0465.,04-0465.
• Parties: The CITY OF HOUSTON, Petitioner, v. Robert JACKSON, Respondent.
• Court: Supreme Court of Texas

192 S.W.3d 764

The CITY OF HOUSTON, Petitioner, v. Robert JACKSON, Respondent.

No. 04-0465.

Supreme Court of Texas.

Argued October 20, 2005.

Decided April 7, 2006.

Rehearing Denied June 30, 2006.

Timothy J. Higley, Constance K. Acosta, City of Houston Legal Dept., Arturo G. Michel, City Attorney, Anthony W. Hall Jr., Asst. City Attorney, David W. Holman, Godwin Pappas Langley Ronquillo, LLP, Houston, for the City of Houston.

Fred A. Keys Jr., Harris County Deputies' Organization, Joan M. Lucci Bain, Bain & Bain, P.L.L.C., Houston, for Robert Jackson.

Rance L. Craft, Office of the Attorney General, Austin, for the State of Texas.

Justice O'NEILL delivered the opinion of the Court.

Section 143.134(h) of the Texas Local Government Code imposes a $1,000 penalty payable to an aggrieved fire fighter for each day a department head intentionally fails to implement a decision of the Fire Fighters' and Police Officers' Civil Service Commission (the "Commission") under Section 143.131 or a decision of a hearing examiner under Section 143.129 that has become final. TEX. LOC. GOV'T CODE § 143.134(h). The court of appeals held that the penalty provision also applies to a grievance examiner's unappealed recommendation under Section 143.130 of the Code. 135 S.W.3d 891. We hold that, by the provision's plain language, it does not. Accordingly, we reverse the court of appeals' judgment and dismiss Jackson's statutory penalty claim for want of jurisdiction.

I. Background

In May 1996, Robert Jackson, an Engineer Operator with the City of Houston Fire Department, requested a voluntary transfer to Fire Station 70. When his request was denied, Jackson initiated a grievance pursuant to Subchapter G of Chapter 143 of the Local Government Code. See TEX. LOC. GOV'T CODE §§ 143.127-35.¹ That subchapter establishes a four-step process for resolving complaints of aggrieved fire fighters and police officers employed by municipalities with a population of 1.5 million or more. Proceedings under that process increase in formality as the grievance advances from Step I to Step IV, when a final and binding decision is made by an independent hearing examiner or the Commission. See id. When Jackson's transfer was denied under the proposed solutions presented at Steps I and II of the grievance process, he elected to pursue his Step III appeal before a Commission-appointed grievance examiner rather than an independent third party hearing examiner, a choice the Code expressly afforded him. See id. § 143.129(d).

After an informal hearing, the grievance examiner recommended Jackson receive a transfer to any station, other than Station 70, that had an opening on November 21, 1996, the date of the recommendation. The grievance examiner noted that it was Jackson's responsibility to apply for his choice of transfer. Neither Jackson nor the Fire Chief appealed the grievance examiner's recommendation to the Commission; consequently, the recommendation was deemed accepted by the parties. See id. § 143.130(e). At the time of the recommendation, Jackson occupied a "roving" position in the department, meaning he was assigned to a particular station but was often sent to others when the need arose. The only stations with openings on the date of the recommendation were 11B, 21B, and 82B. Although Jackson had a standing application to Station 11B when the grievance examiner's recommendation issued, Jackson was not awarded that transfer, purportedly because the fire department's district chief believed the grievance examiner's decision required Jackson to submit a new, written transfer request, which he did not do. In April 1998, Jackson was transferred from his "roving" position to Station 48D as a result of an agreement with the Fire Chief. After this transfer, he continued to submit, and often withdraw, applications to transfer stations, including various transfer requests in August and September of 1998. These requests were not granted, primarily because they were for stations other than those three that had openings available on the date of the recommendation.

On September 18, 1998, Jackson filed a second grievance, complaining that the original recommendation had never been implemented. The assistant fire chief disposed of this second grievance by informing Jackson that he could not "rule on a grievance that supposedly has been decided by a grievance examiner." Jackson did not appeal the assistant fire chief's decision by filing a Step II grievance form.

Two months later, Jackson sued the City of Houston and Lester Tyra, as Fire Chief of the Houston Fire Department, alleging the City's failure to implement the grievance examiner's 1996 recommendation violated Section 143.134(h) of the Local Government Code and seeking declaratory and mandamus relief. Jackson sought $798,000 in statutory penalties and interest as a result of the City's alleged violation of Section 143.134(h), as well as costs and attorney's fees.

The City filed a plea to the jurisdiction, alleging Jackson had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies because the penalty provision applies only to decisions of the Commission under Section 143.131 or the decisions of independent hearing examiners under Section 143.129, whereas Jackson chose to pursue his grievance before a grievance examiner under Section 143.130. The trial court denied the City's jurisdictional plea, and the court of appeals affirmed. City of Houston v. Jackson, 42 S.W.3d 316 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, pet. dism'd w.o.j.) ("Jackson I"). The appeals court concluded that an unappealed grievance examiner's recommendation under Section 143.130 constituted a final decision of the Commission under Section 143.131 for purposes of invoking the statutory penalty provision; thus Jackson had exhausted his administrative remedies and properly invoked the trial court's jurisdiction. Id. at 322-23.

The case proceeded to trial, and the jury found that the Fire Chief had intentionally failed to implement Jackson's transfer request from November 21, 1996 to April 7, 1998. Based on the jury's findings, the trial court rendered judgment on the jury's verdict in Jackson's favor, and awarded $477,000 in statutory penalties, attorney's fees, post-judgment interest, and other expenses. Both the City and Jackson appealed, the City challenging the trial court's judgment on a number of grounds, including lack of jurisdiction, and Jackson contesting the period for which the trial court awarded the statutory penalty. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment in all respects. 135 S.W.3d at 894 ("Jackson II"). Jackson did not seek review of the court of appeals' decision. We granted the City's petition for review to consider Section 143.134(h)'s application and related issues.

II. Analysis

A. Overview of the Grievance Process

Chapter 143 of the Local Government Code establishes the four-step grievance process that governs this case. See TEX. LOC. GOV'T CODE §§ 143.127-35. The Code covers a broad range of grievances:

The fire fighter or police officer may file a grievance that relates to the same aspects of the person's employment over which the civil service commission for the employees of the municipality who are not subject to this chapter would have lawful jurisdiction, including but not limited to a written or oral reprimand, transfers, job performance reviews, and job assignments.

Id. § 143.127(a).² To initiate a grievance, the fire fighter must file a Step I grievance form with the department head or departmental grievance counselor. Id. § 143.128(a). Thereafter, the departmental grievance counselor schedules a Step I meeting with the fire fighter, the fire fighter's immediate supervisor or other appropriate supervisor, or both, and the person against whom the grievance is lodged. Id. § 143.128(b). The Step I procedure attempts to resolve the complaint informally and encourages the supervisor to "openly discuss the grievance with the fire fighter or police officer in a sincere attempt to resolve it." Id. § 143.128(c). The fire fighter's supervisor must provide an evaluation and proposed recommendation for solution of the Step I grievance. Id. § 143.128(d). If the proposed solution is not acceptable, the fire fighter may file a Step II grievance form within fifteen calendar days after receiving the supervisor's proposed Step I solution. Id. § 143.129(a). If the fire fighter fails to timely file a Step II grievance form, the Step I solution is considered accepted. Id. § 143.128(e).

The Step II proceeding requires a meeting of all Step I participants, as well as the department head or the department head's representative. Id. § 143.129(b). The department head or representative is required to provide a proposed recommendation for solution to the fire fighter. Id. § 143.129(c). If the proposed solution is not acceptable, the fire fighter has the option to appeal along one of two tracks. The fire fighter may: (1) "submit a written request stating the person's decision to appeal to an independent third party hearing examiner pursuant to the provisions of Section 143.057," or (2) "file a Step III grievance form with the director in accordance with Section 143.130," in which event the Commission appoints a grievance examiner to oversee the appeal. Id. §§ 143.129(d), 143.132(a). The difference between these two tracks is significant, with each having perceived advantages and disadvantages that we will later describe.

An independent third party hearing examiner has the same duties and powers as the Commission, including the right to issue subpoenas, and issues a decision that is "final and binding on all parties." See id. §§ 143.057(c), 143.057(f). Although the Code governs the hearing conducted by an independent third party hearing examiner, a fire fighter who opts for this alternative in effect removes the grievance outside the influence of the Commission and its appointees.

The other choice afforded a...