City of Irondale v. City of Leeds

• Decision Date: 12 April 2013
• Docket Number: 1111347.
• Citation: 122 So.3d 1244
• Parties: CITY OF IRONDALE v. CITY OF LEEDS.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

122 So.3d 1244

CITY OF IRONDALE

v.CITY OF LEEDS.

1111347.

Supreme Court of Alabama.

Feb. 15, 2013.

Rehearing Denied April 12, 2013.

Jeffrey W. Brumlow and Gregory L. Morris of Morris & Brumlow, P.C., Trussville, for appellant.

Emily Sides Bonds and Edward J. Ashton of Jones, Walker, Waechter, Poitevent, Carrère & Denègre, LLP, Birmingham, for appellee.

STUART, Justice.

The City of Irondale appeals the summary judgment entered by the Jefferson Circuit Court declaring invalid Irondale's annexation of a parcel of property owned by the Black Warrior–Cahaba Rivers Land Trust (“the Land Trust”) adjacent to the Cahaba River at the point the Cahaba River intersects U.S. Highway 78, also known as Bankhead Highway, in Jefferson County (this property is hereinafter referred to as “the Land Trust property”). We affirm.

I.

On December 9, 2006, Jefferson County conveyed multiple parcels of property it owned along the Black Warrior River and the Cahaba River to the Land Trust, which covenanted to preserve and protect in perpetuity the water quality and habitat values of the property, which were declared in the deeds conveying the property to be “of great importance to [Jefferson County], the people of Jefferson County and the people of the State of Alabama.” Included in those parcels of property was the Land Trust property. On July 6, 2010, the Land Trust petitioned Irondale to annex the Land Trust property, which at that time did not lie within the corporate limits of any municipality, but fell within the police jurisdiction of both the City of Irondale and the City of Leeds. ¹ The Irondale City Council thereafter voted to grant the petition for annexation and, in August and September 2010, adopted a series of four ordinances annexing the property pursuant to § 11–42–20 et seq., Ala.Code 1975, the statutes governing annexation by municipalities having 2,000 inhabitants or more.

On April 29, 2011, the City of Leeds filed an action in the Jefferson Circuit Court, seeking a judgment declaring invalid the annexation of the Land Trust property and declaring the corporate limits of the City of Irondale to be the same as they were before the adoption of the annexing ordinances. Leeds argued that the Land Trust property was “not contiguous to any part of the corporate limits of Irondale” and that its annexation by Irondale was therefore improper because § 11–42–21, Ala.Code 1975, authorizes annexation by petition only when the subject property is “contiguous to the corporate limits” of the annexing municipality. See Fort Morgan Civic Ass'n v. City of Gulf Shores, 100 So.3d 1042, 1047 (Ala.2012) (“Annexation by petition is governed by § 11–42–21, Ala.Code 1975, which requires only that the annexed land be ‘contiguous to the corporate limits' of the annexing municipality.”).

On October 10, 2011, Irondale moved the trial court to enter a summary judgment in its favor, arguing that contiguity existed between the Land Trust property and property within the Irondale corporate limits, specifically along the east side of the Land Trust property where Irondale alleged there was contiguity in the center of the Cahaba River. On January 20, 2012, Leeds filed its own summary-judgment motion, arguing that the Land Trust property was separated from the corporate limits of Irondale by the Cahaba River, which Leeds alleged was a public waterway, and that a finding of contiguity across that waterway was inappropriate in light of this Court's decisions in City of Spanish Fort v. City of Daphne, 774 So.2d 567 (Ala.2000), City of Madison v. City of Huntsville, 555 So.2d 755 (Ala.1989), and Johnson v. Rice, 551 So.2d 940 (Ala.1989), cases in which this Court considered the circumstances in which the contiguity requirement of § 11–42–21 could be met notwithstanding the existence of a public waterway between the property to be annexed and the corporate limits of the municipality desiring the annexation. Leeds also argued that Irondale's annexation of the Land Trust property would adversely affect the proper and efficient functioning of the Leeds city government.

On February 10, 2012, the parties filed responses to each other's summary-judgment motions. At a hearing on those motions, the trial court ordered additional briefing from the parties addressing the question whether the Cahaba River was, in fact, a public waterway. On March 30, 2012, Leeds submitted a brief and evidentiary materials supporting its position that the Cahaba River was a public waterway because, Leeds alleged, the stretch of the Cahaba River at issue was navigable both in law and in fact. See, e.g., Ala. Const. 1901, Art. I, § 24 (“[A]ll navigable waters shall remain forever public highways, free to the citizens of the state and the United States, without tax, impost, or toll....”), and § 33–7–1, Ala.Code 1975 (“All navigable waters in this state are public thoroughfares.”). Irondale subsequently filed a response, arguing that the Cahaba River was not a public waterway because the deed conveying the Land Trust property to the Land Trust clearly indicated that the Land Trust owned the bed and bottom of the river up to its center and the State could not, therefore, simultaneously own that bed and bottom. Irondale further argued that the stretch of the Cahaba River at issue was not navigable under the federal test of navigability, which test, Irondale argued, was the only test that mattered. Evidence of individual opinions or state determinations of the navigability question were, Irondale argued, irrelevant. See United States v. State of Oregon, 295 U.S. 1, 14, 55 S.Ct. 610, 79 L.Ed. 1267 (1935) (“[T]he question, whether the waters within the state under which the lands lie are navigable or nonnavigable, is a federal, not a local, one. It is, therefore, to be determined according to the law and usages recognized and applied in the federal courts....”).

On June 6, 2012, the trial court ruled on the parties' summary-judgment motions, granting the motion filed by Leeds and denying the motion filed by Irondale. In entering a summary judgment in favor of Leeds, the trial court concluded that “the Cahaba River, under Alabama state law, is a public waterway” and that the conditions for finding contiguity across a public waterway were not met. Accordingly, the trial court concluded, Irondale's annexation of the Land Trust property was improper and void. On July 3, 2012, Irondale filed a timely notice of appeal to this Court.

II.

Irondale argues that the trial court erred in entering a summary judgment in favor of Leeds. We review this argument pursuant to the following standard:

“This Court's review of a summary judgment is de novo. Williams v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 886 So.2d 72, 74 (Ala.2003). We apply the same standard of review as the trial court applied. Specifically, we must determine whether the movant has made a prima facie showing that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56(c), Ala. R. Civ. P.; Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Alabama v. Hodurski, 899 So.2d 949, 952–53 (Ala.2004). In making such a determination, we must review the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. Wilson v. Brown, 496 So.2d 756, 758 (Ala.1986). Once the movant makes a prima facie showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact, the burden then shifts to the nonmovant to produce ‘substantial evidence’ as to the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. Bass v. SouthTrust Bank of Baldwin County, 538 So.2d 794, 797–98 (Ala.1989); Ala.Code 1975, § 12–21–12.”

Dow v. Alabama Democratic Party, 897 So.2d 1035, 1038–39 (Ala.2004).

III.

The trial court correctly identified the primary issue in this case: Whether the Cahaba River is a public waterway at the point it separates the Land Trust property from property within the corporate limits of Irondale. On appeal, Irondale emphasizes the fact that the deed conveying the Land Trust property to the Land Trust states on its face that the Land Trust owns the property to the center of the Cahaba River and argues essentially that this fact (1) forecloses a finding that the Cahaba River is a public waterway and (2) obviates the need to consider whether the Cahaba River is a public waterway because, even if it is, there is nevertheless contiguity between the Land Trust property and property in the corporate limits of Irondale where those properties meet in the bed at the center of the Cahaba River. In Johnson, however, this Court stated:

“ ‘ Annexation across a public waterway, in many respects, is substantially similar to annexation across a public road. The question is: “What did the legislature mean and intend when requiring that the parcel to be annexed be contiguous to the existing city limits?” Our Supreme Court, in answering that question, has said that two parcels of land are contiguous, within the meaning and intent of the legislature, if they lie on opposite sides of a public road. This finding does not, and should not, turn on an exhaustive analysis of who owns the underlying fee to, or who has reversionary rights to, the road right-of-way, or any similar principles of real estate law. Rather, the basis for this interpretation rests most comfortably upon a common sense recognition and understanding of what is necessary for the proper and efficient functioning of city government.’ ”

551 So.2d at 944 (quoting order of the trial court; emphasis added). Thus, in Johnson this Court recognized that whether there is contiguity between properties separated by a public road does not hinge on who owns the land underlying the public road; rather, common-sense principles should be applied. Similarly, if we hold the Cahaba River to be a public waterway in this case, we will apply the principles developed by this Court in Johnson,City of Madison, and City of Spanish Fort, and not base our conclusion on an analysis “of who owns the underlying fee to, or who has...