City of Jackson v. Lewis
Decision Date | 04 December 2014 |
Docket Number | No. 2011–CT–00787–SCT.,2011–CT–00787–SCT. |
Citation | 153 So.3d 689 |
Court | Mississippi Supreme Court |
Parties | CITY OF JACKSON, Mississippi, v. Lee B. LEWIS, Oda Mae Green, and Sonya Stephens, on Behalf of the Wrongful Death Beneficiaries of Margaret E. Stephens, Deceased. |
Lara E. Gill, Ridgeland, Pieter John Teeuwissen, attorneys for appellant.
Bo Roland, Dennis C. Sweet, III, Jackson, Dennis Charles Sweet, IV, Terris Caton Harris, Jackson, attorneys for appellee.
EN BANC.
ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI
¶ 1. The motion for rehearing is granted. The original opinions are withdrawn, and these opinions are substituted therefor.
¶ 2. After observing LaMarcus Butler1 turn off the lights of his vehicle and make a u-turn in an apparent effort to avoid a police roadblock, Officer Gregory Jackson engaged the blue lights and siren of his patrol car and pursued Butler, at varying speeds, until Jackson's superior officer instructed him by radio to desist. The fleeing Butler collided with a vehicle occupied by Margaret Stephens, Lee B. Lewis, and Oda Mae Green. Stephens died as a result of the crash, and Lewis and Green suffered severe injuries. Plaintiffs Lewis and Green, individually, and Sonya Stephens, on behalf of Margaret Stephens's wrongful-death beneficiaries, filed suit in the Circuit Court of the First Judicial District of Hinds County against the City of Jackson, Mississippi. Following a bench trial in 2008, the trial court assessed 100 per cent of the fault to the City and entered judgment in favor of the Plaintiffs.2 The Court of Appeals reversed and rendered the circuit court's holding, finding that Officer Jackson had not acted in “reckless disregard for the safety and well being of persons not engaged in criminal conduct,” and therefore, governmental immunity shielded the City from liability. City of Jackson v. Lewis, 2013 WL 2303391, at *1, 153 So.3d 714, 715–16 (Miss.Ct.App.2013).
¶ 3. Aggrieved, the plaintiffs sought review by this Court, asserting that the Court of Appeals: (1) misinterpreted the factors for determining reckless disregard by law enforcement personnel applied by this Court in City of Ellisville v. Richardson, 913 So.2d 973 (Miss.2005) ; (2) improperly weighed the evidence on appeal, made credibility determinations, and improperly rejected evidence that supports or reasonably tends to support the findings of the trial court; and (3) improperly substituted its judgment for the trial court's credibility determination regarding expert testimony. We find dispositive the question of whether the Court of Appeals misinterpreted and misapplied the Richardson factors for determining reckless disregard by law enforcement officers. M.R.A.P. 17(h). Finding that the Court of Appeals erred, we reverse its judgment. We reverse the judgment of the Circuit Court of the First Judicial District of Hinds County and remand the case for an apportionment of damages.
¶ 4. “A circuit court judge sitting without a jury is afforded the same deference as a chancellor.” City of Jackson v. Sandifer, 107 So.3d 978, 983 (Miss.2013) (citing City of Jackson v. Powell, 917 So.2d 59, 68 (Miss.2005) ). This Court leaves undisturbed a circuit court's findings following a bench trial unless the findings “are manifestly wrong, clearly erroneous, or an erroneous legal standard was applied.” Sandifer, 107 So.3d at 983 (quoting Powell, 917 So.2d at 68 ). The circuit court's findings “are safe on appeal where they are supported by substantial, credible, and reasonable evidence.” City of Jackson v. Law, 65 So.3d 821, 827 (Miss.2011) (quoting City of Ellisville v. Richardson, 913 So.2d 973, 977 (Miss.2005) ). “Although reasonable minds might differ on the conclusion of whether or not the officer in question acted in reckless disregard, it is beyond this Court's power to disturb the findings of the trial judge if supported by substantial evidence.” Richardson, 913 So.2d at 978 (citing City of Jackson v. Brister, 838 So.2d 274, 277–78 (Miss.2003) ).
¶ 5. The Mississippi Tort Claims Act (MTCA) shields the government from liability based on “any act or omission of an employee of a governmental entity engaged in the performance or execution of duties or activities relating to police or fire protection unless the employee acted in reckless disregard of the safety and well-being of any person not engaged in criminal activity at the time of injury....” Miss.Code Ann. § 11–46–9(1)(c) (Rev. 2012). “Reckless disregard,” according to this Court, denotes “more than mere negligence, but less than an intentional act.” Law, 65 So.3d at 826 (quoting Miss. Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Durn, 861 So.2d 990, 994 (Miss.2003) ). Further, this Court “find[s] reckless disregard when the ‘conduct involved evinced not only some appreciation of the unreasonable risk involved, but also a deliberate disregard of that risk and the high probability of harm involved.’ ” Durn, 861 So.2d at 995 (quoting Maldonado v. Kelly, 768 So.2d 906, 910–11 (Miss.2000) ).
¶ 6. In Brister, 838 So.2d at 280, this Court held that the standard articulated by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia “is instructive” in determining “whether a police chase constitutes reckless disregard.” The following six factors were considered: “(1) length of chase; (2) type of neighborhood; (3) characteristics of the streets; (4) the presence of vehicular or pedestrian traffic; (5) weather conditions and visibility; and (6) the seriousness of the offense for which the police are pursuing the vehicle.” Id. (citing District of Columbia v. Hawkins, 782 A.2d 293 (D.C.Ct.App.2001) ). Justice McRae, concurring in result only in Johnson v. City of Cleveland, 846 So.2d 1031 (Miss.2003), included four additional factors: “(7) [w]hether the officer proceeded with sirens and blue lights; (8)[w]hether the officer had available alternatives which would [have] led to the apprehension of the suspect besides pursuit; (9)[t]he existence of police policy which prohibits pursuit under the circumstances; and (10)[t]he rate of speed of the officer in comparison to the posted speed limit.” Richardson, 913 So.2d at 977, 978 (citing Johnson, 846 So.2d at 1037 (McRae, P.J., concurring in result only)). In Richardson, this Court held that “it is appropriate for trial courts to consider all ten factors, and to look to the totality of the circumstances when analyzing whether someone acted in reckless disregard.” Richardson, 913 So.2d at 978.
¶ 7. At the time of Officer Jackson's pursuit of Butler, the Jackson Police Department had in place policies regarding initiating and terminating pursuits, listed in General Order 600–20. With regard to the initiation of pursuits, General Order 600–20(2)(b) required that, “[b]efore initiating a pursuit the risks to society must be weighed against the benefits of apprehending the suspect.” General Order 600–20(2)(d) further provided that, “[o]fficers will initiate or continue a pursuit, of a law violator in a motor vehicle, only when the pursuit will be executed with caution so as not to create extreme or unreasonable danger for either the officer or the public.” (Emphasis added.)
¶ 8. General Order 600–20(5)(d)(1) provided:
Pursuits may be initiated when the officer knows that a felony has been committed and the officer has probable cause to believe that the individual committed the felony and the suspect's escape is more dangerous to the community than the risks posed by the pursuit and the suspect clearly exhibits an intent to avoid arrest by using a vehicle to flee.
General Order 600–20(5)(d)(2) provided:
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