City of Jackson v. Holliday, 42576
| Decision Date | 11 February 1963 |
| Docket Number | No. 42576,42576 |
| Citation | 246 Miss. 412,149 So.2d 525 |
| Parties | CITY OF JACKSON v. Arthur S. HOLLIDAY et ux. |
| Court | Mississippi Supreme Court |
Watkins, Pyle, Edwards & Ludlam, John H. Stennis, E. W. Stennett, Jackson, for appellant.
Watkins & Eager, Jackson, for appellee.
This case involves application of the doctrine of res judicata to a municipal zoning ordinance for a particular lot. Previously, the city council rezoned the property from commercial to residential, and the circuit court reversed it, adjudicating the order was unreasonable and arbitrary. There was no further appeal. Subsequently, without any changed conditions, the city council again ordered the lot changed from commercial to residential, on the theory that the zoning map was erroneously composed. The Circuit Court of Hinds County, First District, held that its first judgment was res judicata as to use classification, absent changed conditions, and again reversed the city council. This appeal was taken from that second judgment, which we affirm.
Mr. and Mrs. Arthur S. Holliday own a corner lot on Clinton Boulevard in the City of Jackson. Adjacent on the west is a larger tract owned by Mrs. Mynelle Hayward, which has been used since 1923 for commercial purposes, and operated under the names of 'Mynelle's Gardens' and 'Mynelle's Interiors.' In August, 1958 this land was not within the city limits. The Board of Supervisors of Hinds County adopted a zoning map classifying the Holliday lot as commercial, and the Hayward tract as residential. In 1960 the City of Jackson extended its limits to include both lots. When it is taken into a city, property zoned by the county does not come in as unzoned property. The Holliday and Hayward lots remained zoned as prescribed by the county, but subject to a subsequent, proper change by the city. Highland Village Land Co. v. City of Jackson, 137 So.2d 549 (Miss.1962).
In January, 1961 Mrs. Hayward and others petitioned the city council to change the zoning of the Holliday property from commercial to residential, averring the area was predominately residential, and classifying it as commercial would affect adversely other property in the vicinity. Proper notice was given of the hearing on this petition before the city council. The Hollidays filed objections. Evidence reflected that there was considerable commercial development in the area, including extensive commercial use of the Hayward property, an antique shop across the street, to the east within 160 feet a beauty salon, and further east an animal clinic, doctors' offices, and on the next corner service stations.
Nevertheless, on February 15, 1961 the city council adopted an ordinance rezoning the Holliday lot from commercial to residential. It found the area was predominately residential, and the property itself was being used for residential purposes. A nonconforming use had existed on the Hayward property to the west for more than thirty years. There was not presently a demand for additional commercial development, and it would be detrimental to the residential property owners within the immediate vicinity for such development of the Holliday lot. Hence the city council sustained the petition for the Holliday rezoning, from commercial to residential.
The Hollidays appealed that order to the Circuit Court of Hinds County. It held that the burden of proof was on proponents of the proposed change to show the need of rezoning, and there was no evidence which would support the city ordinance, but all of it supported reasonableness of the commercial classification, as made by the Board of Supervisors in 1958; and that rezoning from commercial to residential was an unreasonable and arbitrary act. Hence the Circuit Court, on May 9, 1961, reversed the city council's ordinance changing Holliday from commercial to residential, and dismissed the petition. This is the judgment which the circuit court subsequently and correctly held to be res judicata of the later proceedings.
Seventeen days after this judgment, Mrs. Hayward and McMullen filed a 'Petition for Correction of Zoning Map', designed in part to re-determine and re-try exactly the same issues in the earlier proceedings. They asked the city council to rezone the Holliday lot from commercial to residential, and to rezone the Hayward property from residential to commercial. The petition said the prior zoning was through error in preparation of the Hinds County Zoning Map in 1958. Counsel for the Hollidays and Haywards stipulated that, at the hearing before the city council, the transcript of the 1961 hearing and related documents could be considered as evidence in these proceedings. No material changes in land use had occurred in the immediate vicinity of the involved tracts since the prior hearing. Affidavits of a member of the board of supervisors and two other men connected with the county map stated that in their opinions the Hinds County Board of Supervisors intended to zone the Holliday property as residential, and its zoning as commercial occurred through error in preparation of the use map. In February, 1962 the Hollidays granted an option to an oil company to purchase a part of their corner lot.
On May 29, 1962 the city council again attempted to rezone the Holliday lot from commercial to residential. It found there was an error made by the draftsman for the board of supervisors in preparation of the zoning use map. It also rezoned the Hayward lot from residential to commercial, but there is no issue on this latter action, and no appeal was taken from it.
The Hollidays appealed to the circuit court, which again reversed the city council, and held that its 1961 judgment was res judicata as to zoning of the Holliday property, unless there were a change of circumstances in the immediate area warranting an alteration, and there was none. Hence the circuit court's judgment of August 2, 1962 reversed the city council's order. This left the Holliday lot classified as commercial.
The common law doctrine of res judicata, including the subsidiary one of collateral estoppel, is designed to prevent relitigation by the same parties of the same claims or issues. The reasons behind the...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Mississippi Public Service Com'n v. Mississippi Power Co., 54059
...determination would be res judicata on the question of this portion of the Plant Daniel expenditures. See City of Jackson v. Holliday, 246 Miss. 412, 149 So.2d 525, 526 (1963), wherein we The common law doctrine of res judicata, including the subsidiary one of collateral estoppel, is design......
-
Hood v. Mississippi Dept. of Wildlife Conservation
...MESC, 437 So.2d at 396. This doctrine is essentially a subsidiary of the doctine of res judicata. City of Jackson v. Holliday, 246 Miss. 412, 419, 149 So.2d 525 (1963). Absent statute to the contrary, a chancery court is precluded by either doctrine once an administrative agency, acting in ......
-
South Bend Federation of Teachers v. National Ed. Association--South Bend
...241 Md. 187, 216 A.2d 149; State ex rel. Turnbladh v. District Court (1960), 259 Minn. 228, 107 N.W.2d 307; City of Jackson v. Holliday (1963), 246 Miss. 412, 149 So.2d 525; Lubliner v. Board of Alcoholic Beverage Control (1960), 33 N.J. 428, 165 A.2d In Easley v. Metropolitan Bd. of Zoning......
-
Young & Company v. Shea
...Lee Co. v. FTC, 8th Cir. 1940, 113 F.2d 583; A. D. Juilliard & Co. v. Johnson, S.D. N.Y.1957, 166 F.Supp. 577; City of Jackson v. Holliday, 246 Miss. 412, 149 So.2d 525 (1963). Because the basis for our decision was not considered in those decisions and because the policies of the Longshore......