City of Jacksonville Fire & Rescue Dep't v. Battle
Decision Date | 19 September 2014 |
Docket Number | No. 1D14–1040.,1D14–1040. |
Citation | 148 So.3d 795 |
Parties | CITY OF JACKSONVILLE FIRE AND RESCUE DEPARTMENT and City of Jacksonville Risk Management, Appellant, v. Johnny BATTLE, Appellee. |
Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Michael Arington of Eraclides, Gelman, Hall, Indek, Goodman & Waters, Jacksonville, for Appellants.
John J. Schickel of Coker, Schickel, Sorenson & Posgay, P.A., Jacksonville, Bryan S. Gowdy and Jennifer Shoaf Richardson of Creed and Gowdy, P.A., Jacksonville, for Appellee.
In this workers' compensation case, the City of Jacksonville (the City) appeals an order from the Judge of Compensation Claims (JCC) finding compensable Appellee/Claimant's hypertension
and coronary artery disease (CAD), and awarding authorization of Dr. Castello to treat these conditions. We affirm.
The City argues that the JCC should not have found Claimant was entitled to rely on section 112.18, Florida Statutes (2012), which reads:
(1)(a) Any condition or impairment of health of any Florida state, municipal, county, port authority, special tax district, or fire control district firefighter or any law enforcement officer or correctional officer as defined in s.943.10(1), (2), or (3) caused by tuberculosis
, heart disease, or hypertension resulting in total or partial disability or death shall be presumed to have been accidental and to have been suffered in the line of duty unless the contrary be shown by competent evidence. However, any such firefighter or law enforcement officer must have successfully passed a physical examination upon entering into any such service as a firefighter or law enforcement officer, which examination failed to reveal any evidence of any such condition....
Section 112.18 creates a presumption of occupational causation for “any condition or impairment of health” for a claimant who meets the statutory prerequisites. The parties here stipulated to all prerequisites except disability; Claimant is a firefighter, Claimant has hypertension
and heart disease, and Claimant successfully passed a physical examination which failed to reveal any evidence of hypertension or heart disease.
To prove disability, Claimant presented medical evidence regarding his cardiac catheterization
, which occurred on December 11, 2012. The record shows that due to an abnormal stress test, Claimant was medically required to undergo catheterization to treat and diagnose Claimant's CAD.1 The procedure ended up being solely diagnostic (no stent was placed, although it could have been if determined necessary during the procedure). This catheterization, which Claimant was required to undergo as a result of the CAD and hypertension, confirmed that Claimant indeed has CAD, but did not result in any abnormal complications. Claimant was taken off work by a doctor for three days following the catheterization in order to recover from the procedure; had he not undergone the procedure, his hypertension and CAD would not have prevented him from working at that time.
The JCC found, and medical evidence (including doctor testimony) supports the findings, that the catheterization
“was directly related to [Claimant's] CAD and hypertension,” and that Claimant could not work during the procedure or for several days afterward in order to heal from the catheterization. To the extent the City challenges any inferences the JCC drew to make these findings, we see no error.
The City also challenges, however, the JCC's ruling that the time during which Claimant could not work (during and after the catheterization
) constitutes disability for the purposes of section 112.18. The JCC analogized this case to Rocha v. City of Tampa, 100 So.3d 138 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012), wherein Mr. Rocha's abnormal stress test resulted in his doctor-imposed work restrictions until he could undergo a cardiac assessment, associated with his hypertension. This court held Mr. Rocha had proven disability because his work restrictions were “legitimately imposed as medically necessary ‘because of the injury,’ ” and “created actual incapacity by interfering with his ability ‘to earn in the same or any other employment the wages which the...
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State v. Junod, CASE NO. 1D15–5259
...33 years. See Fuller v. Okaloosa Corr. Inst., 22 So.3d 803, 804–05 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009) (10 years); City of Jacksonville Fire & Rescue Dep't v. Battle, 148 So.3d 795, 796 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014) (33 years). Nevertheless, section 112.18 on its face does not impose an express tenure requirement. C......
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Friesen v. State of Fla. Highway Patrol
...abnormal stress test, Battle was "medically required to undergo catheterization to treat and diagnose" his coronary artery disease (CAD). Id. at 796 (emphasis added). The catheterization confirmed that Battle indeed had CAD, but it did not result in any abnormal complications. Id. Battle wa......