City of Jacksonville v. Continental Can Co., Inc.

Citation151 So. 488,113 Fla. 168
PartiesCITY OF JACKSONVILLE et al. v. CONTINENTAL CAN CO., Inc.
Decision Date06 December 1933
CourtFlorida Supreme Court

Bill for injunction by the Continental Can Company, Inc., against the City of Jacksonville, a municipal corporation, and Alexander Ray, as Treasurer and Tax Collector of the City of Jacksonville, a municipal corporation. From a decree granting the injunction, defendants appeal.

Affirmed. Appeal from Circuit Court, Duval County; D. T Gray, Judge.

COUNSEL

Austin Miller and Gov. Hutchinson, both of Jacksonville, for appellants.

Rogers & Towers, of Jacksonville, for appellee.

OPINION

ELLIS Justice.

The controversy in this case involves the construction of section 12 of article 9 of the Constitution of 1885 (adopted in 1930) as applied to the manufacture in the city of Jacksonville of metal containers, which are made from steel and tin in the proportion of 98 1/2 per cent. steel and 1 1/2 per cent. tin by the Continental Can Company of that city.

The company began the manufacture of its product in the city of Jacksonville about the latter part of the year 1930 and paid all taxes assessed against its property for that year and preceding years. For the year 1931 the city assessed against certain real property of the company, described as tract No 1, the sum of $167.70, upon certain real estate described as tract No. 2 the sum of $553.80, and upon the personal property of the company located upon that tract the sum of $392.

The company paid the taxes assessed upon tract No. 1, but has not paid the taxes assessed against tract No. 2, nor the taxes assessed upon the personal property located on that tract. The two assessments of the latter properties amounts to the sum of $945.80.

The company, by appropriate proceedings, sought a restraining order against the city to prevent the collection by it of the taxes assessed upon tract No. 2 and the personal property located upon that tract, upon the ground that the properties were occupied and used by the company in the manufacture of steel vessels; that such vessels are manufactured as containers for fruits, vegetables, meats, and other food products in which such commodities are marketed; that the vessels consist of steel and tin in the proportion stated, and are often called 'tin cans'; that the real estate referred to as tract No. 2 is used as the location for the company's industrial plant consisting of buildings, warehouses, trackage, and other facilities, and the personal property on which the tax is levied is used upon the premises in and about the manufacture of the products of the company; and that section 12, article 9, of the Constitution, exempts such properties from all taxation for a period of fifteen years.

The city moved to dismiss the bill. The court denied the motion and granted the injunction as prayed for in the bill. The city took an appeal from the decree.

The clause in the Constitution which is involved in this case is as follows:

'Section 12. For a period of fifteen years from the beginning of operation, all industrial plants which shall be established in this State on or after July 1, 1929, engaged primarily during said period in the manufacture of steel vessels, automobile tires, fabrics and textiles, wood pulp, paper, paper bags, fiber board, automobiles, automobile parts, aircraft, aircraft parts, glass and crockery manufacturers and the refining of sugar and oils, and including by-products or derivatives incident to the manufacture of any of the above products, shall be exempt from all taxation, except that no exemption which shall become effective by virtue of this amendment shall extend beyond the year 1948.
'The exemption herein authorized shall not apply to real estate owned and used by such industrial plants except the real estate occupied as the location required to house such industrial plants and the buildings and property situated thereon, together with such lands as may be required for warehouses, storage, trackage and shipping facilities and being used for such purposes.'

The able chancellor before whom the case was presented rested his conclusion upon the proposition that the words 'steel vessels,' appearing in the section of the Constitution above quoted, 'are to be given their ordinary and general meaning and not a limited or restricted meaning and that the word 'vessel' when so denied, means 'container."

In the nature of the circumstances and conditions necessarily arising in the administration of the affairs of the government, those who are charged with official duties of any character must construe the Constitution and laws in numerous instances. Every department of government must, in the first instance at least, be the judge of its powers. Only in that class of cases which is addressed to the discretion of other departments may no occasion arise for judicial construction. In a case like this, however, the question, which involves a private as well as a public right, may be brought to the attention of the judiciary. The Constitution is to be interpreted and effect given to it as a paramount law and is equally obligatory upon individual citizens and all departments of government.

General principles governing the construction of statutes are applicable to the construction of Constitutions with some modifications. A Constitution is the framework of the government. It contains the general principles on which the government must function. Technical rules of construction therefore are not to be applied so as to defeat the principles of government or the object of its establishment. The fundamental purpose in construing a constitutional provision is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the framers and the people who adopted it. The object sought to be accomplished, therefore, must be kept constantly in view. The provisions of a written Constitution are presumed to have been more carefully and...

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28 cases
  • State ex rel. West v. Gray
    • United States
    • Florida Supreme Court
    • 16 Febrero 1954
    ...Constitution. Amos v. Mathews, 99 Fla. 1, 126 So. 308; Sullivan v. City of Tampa, 101 Fla. 298, 134 So. 211; City of Jacksonville v. Continental Can Co., 113 Fla. 168, 151 So. 488; State v. City of Miami, 113 Fla. 280, 152 So. 6; City of Tampa v. Tampa Shipbuilding & Engineering Co., 136 Fl......
  • Advisory Opinion (Chief Justice), In re, 85-471-M
    • United States
    • Rhode Island Supreme Court
    • 4 Abril 1986
    ...constitution, we are guided by the same rules of construction that apply to the construction of statutes. City of Jacksonville v. Continental Can Co., 113 Fla. 168, 151 So. 488 (1933). See also Opinion to the Governor, 44 R.I. 275, 117 A. 97 (1922). The general rule is that where a statute ......
  • State ex rel. West v. Gray
    • United States
    • Florida Supreme Court
    • 16 Febrero 1954
    ...Constitution. Amos v. Mathews, 99 Fla. 1, 126 So. 308; Sullivan v. City of Tampa, 101 Fla. 298, 134 So. 211; City of Jacksonville v. Continental Can Co., 113 Fla. 168, 151 So. 488; State v. City of Miami, 113 Fla. 280, 152 So. 6; City of Tampa v. Tampa Shipbuilding & Engineering Co., 136 Fl......
  • Apportionment Law Appearing as Senate Joint Resolution 1 E, 1982 Special Apportionment Session; Constitutionality Vel Non, In re
    • United States
    • Florida Supreme Court
    • 26 Abril 1982
    ...consequently, must reject the position of the house. See Johnson v. McDonald, 269 So.2d 682 (Fla.1972); City of Jacksonville v. Continental Can Co., 113 Fla. 168, 151 So. 488 (1933). PART Objection to Geographic Separation of District 27. Certain residents in the eastern portion of house di......
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