City of Lake St. Louis v. City of O'Fallon, No. ED 93289 (Mo. App. 1/26/2010)
| Decision Date | 26 January 2010 |
| Docket Number | No. ED 93289.,ED 93289. |
| Parties | CITY OF LAKE ST. LOUIS, MISSOURI, Appellant, v. CITY OF O'FALLON, MISSOURI, Respondent. |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
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v.
CITY OF O'FALLON, MISSOURI, Respondent.
NOTE: THIS OPINION IS SUBJECT TO MODIFICATION OR TRANSFER TO THE SUPREME COURT.
Appeal from the Circuit Court of St. Charles County, Honorable Ted C. House, Cause No. 0911-CV03131.
GEORGE W. DRAPER III, Judge.
The City of Lake Saint Louis (hereinafter, "Lake St. Louis") appeals the trial court's judgment dismissing its petition for declaratory judgment with respect to a boundary dispute and alleged annexation against the City of O'Fallon (hereinafter, "O'Fallon"). Lake St. Louis argues on appeal the trial court erred in dismissing its petition because the petition stated a cause of action and was not barred by the statute of limitations or laches. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.
This case comes to us after the trial court granted O'Fallon's motion to dismiss. When reviewing a trial court's dismissal of a declaratory judgment action, we must construe the petition liberally, take the statements of fact in the petition as true, and grant the plaintiff the benefit of every favorable inference that can be reasonably drawn from
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the facts pleaded. Dodson v. City of Wentzville, 133 S.W.3d 528, 533 (Mo. App. E.D. 2004). The facts as gleaned from the petition are as follows:
In 1982, Lake St. Louis annexed property to establish its northern boundary as the northern right-of-way line of Interstate 70 from O'Fallon Drive westward. Lake St. Louis alleged a dispute arose with O'Fallon as to the northern boundary of Lake St. Louis. O'Fallon disputes the location of the boundary and claims to have subsequently annexed property, issued permits, and taken other actions within the boundary of Lake St. Louis. On October 31, 2008, O'Fallon's city counselor wrote to St. Charles County officials to dispute the northern boundary of Lake St. Louis, stating in part the adjudication of the dispute between O'Fallon and Lake St. Louis should be resolved in circuit court.
Lake St. Louis filed its declaratory judgment action against O'Fallon on March 26, 2009, challenging the boundary location and alleged annexation. Lake St. Louis attached to its petition the annexation ordinance, a current plat depicting the boundaries, and a narrative description of the property. In its petition, Lake St. Louis averred it had a legally protectable interest in enforcing its ordinances, collecting and administering taxes, and protecting the rights of the city and its residents. As such, Lake St. Louis requested the trial court to enter judgment declaring the northern boundary as depicted in the exhibits and as it has been since 1982. Further, Lake St. Louis asked the trial court to declare O'Fallon has not annexed property within that boundary.
O'Fallon filed a motion to dismiss Lake St. Louis' petition. O'Fallon argued Lake St. Louis lacked the capacity, authority, and standing to sue because the exclusive remedy to resolve jurisdiction over disputed territory, an alleged annexation, or to oust a
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city was through a writ of quo warranto. O'Fallon also asserted Lake St. Louis' allegations were barred by the statute of limitations and laches. The trial court granted O'Fallon's motion without comment. Lake St. Louis appeals.
In its sole point on appeal, Lake St. Louis argues the trial court erred when it dismissed its petition seeking a declaratory judgment action with respect to its boundary dispute with O'Fallon. Lake St. Louis argues its petition states a cause of action and is not barred by the statute of limitations or laches.
A motion to dismiss is an attack on the petition and is solely a test of the adequacy of that pleading. Reynolds v. Diamond Foods & Poultry, Inc., 79 S.W.3d 907, 909 (Mo. banc 2002); Moynihan v. City of Manchester, 203 S.W.3d 774, 775 (Mo. App. E.D. 2006). This Court does not endeavor to determine whether the alleged facts are credible or persuasive. Hallquist v. Midden, 196 S.W.3d 601, 603 (Mo. App. E.D. 2006). "Instead, the petition is reviewed in an almost academic manner, to determine if the facts alleged meet the elements of a recognized cause of action, or of a cause that might be adopted in that case." Nazeri v. Missouri Valley College, 860 S.W.2d 303, 306 (Mo. banc 1993). We will affirm the order of dismissal if any ground supports the motion, regardless of whether the trial court actually relied upon that ground in making its ruling. Johnson v. Vee Jay Cement, 77 S.W.3d 84, 88 (Mo. App. E.D. 2002).
Lake St. Louis argues its petition does not seek to oust O'Fallon from the disputed property. Rather, Lake St. Louis frames the issue as "merely seek[ing] a declaration of where the boundary lies between the two cities" which it believes can be resolved through a declaratory judgment action. O'Fallon disagrees, arguing the only reasonable construction of the allegations in Lake St. Louis' petition can be that O'Fallon has
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engaged in a de facto annexation of undescribed property within Lake St. Louis' boundaries and should be ousted. Thus, O'Fallon claims the exclusive remedy is through a writ of quo warranto.
The petition set forth one pertinent paragraph with respect to Lake St. Louis' purported claim for relief. It states in part: "A dispute exists between the parties as to the northern boundary of Lake St. Louis. O'Fallon disputes the northern boundary of Lake St. Louis and claims to have subsequently annexed property, issued permits, and taken other actions within the boundary of Lake St. Louis...." The petition prayed for the trial court to enter judgment declaring the northern boundary of Lake St. Louis as depicted in the exhibits and as originally annexed by Lake St. Louis in 1982, and to declare O'Fallon has not annexed property within that boundary.
Taking these averments as true, we find Lake St. Louis' petition set forth a cause of action by articulating a dispute with respect to where the boundary lies between the two municipalities. Moreover, the petition averred O'Fallon has annexed property Lake St. Louis believes it has exclusive jurisdiction over. As such, the petition averred more than a "mere boundary dispute" as Lake St. Louis argues, albeit somewhat inartfully.
Moreover, there are insufficient facts contained on the face of the petition to determine whether Lake St. Louis' claim is barred by the statute of limitations or laches. "When an affirmative defense such as the statute of limitations is asserted in support of a motion to dismiss, the petition may not be dismissed unless it clearly establishes on its face and without exception that it is barred." Hemar Ins. Corp. of Am. v. Ryerson, 108 S.W.3d 90, 92 (Mo. App. E.D. 2003); Sheehan v. Sheehan, 901 S.W.2d 57, 59 (Mo. banc 1995). The only date referenced in the petition is Lake St. Louis' initial annexation of
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property in 1982. Lake St. Louis has not specified when O'Fallon took steps to purportedly annex property within its jurisdiction. As such, the petition does not clearly establish on its face and without exception that Lake St. Louis' action is barred.
We turn to the crux of the parties' dispute, namely which remedy is available to Lake St. Louis to resolve its boundary dispute with O'Fallon. Lake St. Louis believes declaratory judgment is an appropriate remedy, relying principally upon Walker Reorganized School District R-4 v. Flint, 303 S.W.2d 200 (Mo. App. K.C. Dist. 1957), Reorganized School District R-I of Crawford County v. Reorganized School District R-III of Washington County, 360 S.W.2d 376 (Mo. App. St. L. Dist. 1962), and State ex rel. Junior College District of Sedalia v. Barker, 418 S.W.2d 62 (Mo. banc 1967). O'Fallon disagrees, arguing Lake St. Louis' exclusive remedy is through quo warranto, citing State ex inf. Sanders ex rel. City of Lee's Summit v. City of Lake Lotawana, 220 S.W.3d 794 (Mo. App. W.D. 2007), and the cases it relies upon, State ex rel. Kansas City v. Harris, 212 S.W.2d 733 (Mo. 1948), and State ex rel. Members of Board of Education of Everton R-III School District v. Members of Board of Education of Greenfield R-IV School District, 572 S.W.2d 899 (Mo. App. Spring. Dist. 1978) in support of its argument.
It is well-settled that "[t]he corporate existence of a municipal or public corporation, in the de facto exercise of corporate life, must be challenged by the [S]tate itself by an information in the nature of a quo warranto, and collateral attacks thereon ought not to be tolerated." Spiking Sch. Dist. No. 71, DeKalb County v. Purported "Enlarged Sch. Dist. R-11, DeKalb County, Mo.", 245 S.W.2d 13, 21 (Mo. banc 1952). This rule contemplates that "corporate franchises are grants of sovereignty only, and, if the [S]tate acquiesces in their usurpation, individuals will not be heard to complain."
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Junior College of Sedalia, 418 S.W.2d at 65-66. Moreover, public policy dictates an emphasis on "the importance of stability and certainty in such matters, and the serious consequences which might follow if the existence of a public corporation could be called in question by persons who do not have an interest in the matter separate and distinct from that of the State itself." Id. at 66.
Lake St. Louis acknowledges these general propositions; yet, it argues declaratory judgment is an appropriate remedy based upon a series of cases it believes carves out an exception when disputes arise between two or more governmental entities. In Walker Reorganized School District R-4 v. Flint, the Walker Reorganized School District filed a declaratory judgment action to determine whether the Coal Creek Common School District had become part of Walker's school district by annexation. Walker, 303 S.W.2d at 201. Walker filed its action against individual members of Coal Creek's board of directors and the Vernon County Board of Education. The individual defendants...
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