City of LaPorte v. Barfield

• Decision Date: 08 June 1995
• Docket Number: Nos. D-3733,D-3836,s. D-3733
• Citation: 38 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 533,898 S.W.2d 288
• Parties: 10 IER Cases 986, 38 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 533 CITY OF LaPORTE, Texas, Petitioner, v. William BARFIELD, Respondent. CITY OF LaPORTE, Texas, Petitioner, v. Allen Ray PRINCE, Respondent.
• Court: Texas Supreme Court

Page 288

898 S.W.2d 288

10 IER Cases 986, 38 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 533

CITY OF LaPORTE, Texas, Petitioner, v. William BARFIELD, Respondent.

CITY OF LaPORTE, Texas, Petitioner, v. Allen Ray PRINCE, Respondent.

Nos. D-3733, D-3836.

Supreme Court of Texas.

Argued Nov. 4, 1993.

Decided April 27, 1995.

Rehearing Overruled June 8, 1995.

James P. Wallace, Austin, C. Charles Dippel, Houston, for petitioner.

Dale W. Felton, Houston, Timothy Andrew Hootman, La Porte, for respondent.

HECHT, Justice, delivered the opinion of the Court, in which PHILLIPS, Chief Justice, HIGHTOWER, CORNYN, GAMMAGE, ENOCH, SPECTOR and OWEN, JJ., join.

By statute, a person may not discharge or discriminate against an employee for filing a workers' compensation claim in good faith or hiring legal representation in such a claim. TEX.LABOR CODE § 451.001. Remedies for such retaliation include reasonable damages resulting to the employee, reinstatement to the former position of employment, and injunctive relief. Id. §§ 451.002-.003. The two cases before us which we have consolidated for decision raise the issue whether governmental entities' immunity from liability for their actions has been waived for violations of this statute. We hold that immunity has been waived, but only for limited relief.

I

William Barfield was employed by the City of La Porte as a paint-and-body repairman. He was injured in 1983 and after several weeks returned to work, restricted to lifting no more than fifteen pounds. He filed for and received workers' compensation benefits. His injury was aggravated in 1986, and he again claimed compensation. Fourteen months later, in early 1988, the City terminated his employment. Barfield sued the City for actual and punitive damages, alleging that the City fired him for claiming compensation benefits. The City contends that Barfield was terminated because he was permanently disabled from doing his job, and that he was employed under a contract which provided for termination in such circumstances. The City also contends that it is protected from liability for such claims by governmental immunity, and it moved for summary judgment on this basis. The trial court granted the City's motion in 1992, but the court of appeals reversed, holding that immunity had been waived by statute. Barfield v. City of La Porte, 849 S.W.2d 842 (Tex.App.--Texarkana 1993).

Allen Ray Prince was employed by the City of La Porte as a sewer lift-station operator. He, too, was injured in 1983, undergoing hernia repair surgery as a result. Prince claimed compensation benefits, which the City's carrier denied. Before he was released to return to work, his department superintendent fired him. Later that year Prince sued the City, claiming he was discharged in retaliation for filing a compensation claim. The City contended that Prince was fired for incapacity and misconduct toward other employees. The case was tried in late 1991, nearly eight years after it was filed. The jury found in Prince's favor and assessed actual damages at $100,000. The jury also found that the City was grossly negligent, that such conduct was imputed directly to its governing body, and that punitive damages of $1 million should be assessed. The trial court rendered judgment against the City for damages and interest totaling $1,235,177.82. A divided court of appeals affirmed, holding as in Barfield that the City's immunity has been waived. City of La Porte v. Prince, 851 S.W.2d 876 (Tex.App.--Waco 1993).

The Texarkana Court of Appeals followed its Barfield decision in Vaughan v. Roy H. Laird Memorial Hospital, 856 S.W.2d 256 (Tex.App.--Texarkana 1993, no writ). The Dallas Court of Appeals reached the opposite conclusion in Classen v. Irving Healthcare System, 868 S.W.2d 815 (Tex.App.--Dallas 1993), rev'd, 898 S.W.2d 300 (Tex.1995) (per curiam). To the extent that Vaughan conflicts with our decision in this case, we disapprove that opinion.

II

A

A city is immune from liability for its governmental actions, unless that immunity is waived. City of Round Rock v. Smith, 687 S.W.2d 300, 302 (Tex.1985); see City of Austin v. Daniels, 160 Tex. 628, 335 S.W.2d 753, 754 (1960). As Barfield and Prince concede, the hiring and firing of city employees is clearly a governmental function. See City of Dallas v. Moreau, 718 S.W.2d 776, 779 (Tex.App.--Corpus Christi 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.); see also Town of S. Padre Island v. Jacobs, 736 S.W.2d 134, 144 (Tex.App.--Corpus Christi 1987, writ denied) (quoting Moreau ). Therefore, the City of La Porte is immune from liability for the retaliatory termination claims of Barfield and Prince unless that immunity has been waived.

"[T]he waiver of governmental immunity is a matter addressed to the Legislature." Guillory v. Port of Houston Auth., 845 S.W.2d 812, 813 (Tex.1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 820, 114 S.Ct. 75, 126 L.Ed.2d 43 (1993); Lowe v. Texas Tech Univ., 540 S.W.2d 297, 298 (Tex.1976). "It is a well-established rule that for the Legislature to waive the State's sovereign immunity, it must do so by clear and unambiguous language." Duhart v. State, 610 S.W.2d 740, 742 (Tex.1980); accord Welch v. State, 148 S.W.2d 876, 879 (Tex.Civ.App.--Dallas 1941, writ ref'd); Texas Prison Bd. v. Cabeen, 159 S.W.2d 523, 527-528 (Tex.Civ.App.--Beaumont 1942, writ ref'd). The same rule applies, of course, to the waiver of immunity for other governmental entities. See, e.g., Mount Pleasant Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Estate of Lindburg, 766 S.W.2d 208, 211 (Tex.1989). Thus, we must determine whether the Legislature has by clear and unambiguous language waived municipal immunity for the retaliatory termination claims made in these cases. Unless it has done so, the City is entitled to prevail.

One might suppose that this determination would be a relatively easy matter, and it would be, of course, had the Legislature ever stated, to take one extreme, that governmental immunity for retaliatory discharge claims is waived--in those exact words--just as it would be if, to take the other extreme, the Legislature had never broached the issue at all. In fact, however, what the Legislature has done is somewhere in between. As we shall see, it has used language strongly suggesting a waiver of immunity in contexts in which any other intention is hard to discern. The rule requiring a waiver of governmental immunity to be clear and unambiguous cannot be applied so rigidly that the almost certain intent of the Legislature is disregarded. Legislative intent remains the polestar of statutory construction. Monsanto Co. v. Cornerstones Mun. Util. Dist., 865 S.W.2d 937, 939 (Tex.1993); Harris County Dist. Attorney's Office v. J.T.S., 807 S.W.2d 572, 574 (Tex.1991). We will not read statutory language to be pointless if it is reasonably susceptible of another construction. Chevron Corp. v. Redmon, 745 S.W.2d 314, 316 (Tex.1987); Perkins v. State, 367 S.W.2d 140, 146 (Tex.1963). If a statute leaves no reasonable doubt of its purpose, we will not require perfect clarity, even in determining whether governmental immunity has been waived.

With these rules to guide, we examine the history of workers' compensation as it applies to governmental entities.

B

A few months after the workers' compensation act was first passed in 1913, ¹ First Assistant Attorney General C.M. Cureton issued an opinion stating that "[t]he Employees' Compensation Act is not applicable to municipal corporations, and municipal corporations can not become 'subscribers' under the act." Op.Tex.Att'y Gen. (to the Industrial Accident Board, Sept. 23, 1913), 1912-1914 TEX.ATT'Y GEN.BIENNIAL REP. 437. This opinion was later confirmed by the Commission of Appeals in City of Tyler v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 288 S.W. 409, 412-413 (Tex.Comm'n App.1926, holding approved), and its recommendation was adopted by the Supreme Court, presided over by C.M. Cureton, who had by that time become Chief Justice.

In 1936, article III, section 59 was added to the Texas Constitution, authorizing the Legislature to provide workers' compensation to state employees. ² This amendment did not affect other political subdivisions, however. Op.Tex.Att'y Gen. No. O-779 (1939); Op.Tex.Att'y Gen. No. O-5315 (1943); Op.Tex.Att'y Gen. No. O-5360 (1943). In 1948, article III, section 60 of the Texas Constitution was adopted, authorizing the Legislature to enable counties to provide workers' compensation, ³ and in 1952, article III, section 61 was adopted, making similar provision for cities. ⁴ Finally, in 1962, article III, section 60 was amended to include political subdivisions other than counties, so that it also now applies to cities. ⁵ See generally 1

GEORGE D. BRADEN ET AL., THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF TEXAS: AN ANNOTATED AND COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 284-292 (1977).

The Legislature first allowed cities to provide workers' compensation benefits to their employees in 1969. ⁶ Cities were not required to provide such benefits until 1973. ⁷ This latter provision, which we refer to as the "Political Subdivisions Law", is now codified as chapter 504 of the Texas Labor Code. ⁸

C

In 1971, two years after cities were permitted to provide compensation benefits to their employees and two years before they were required to do so, the Legislature enacted what we will refer to as the "Anti-Retaliation Law". ⁹ The provision has never been amended but has since been recodified without substantive change as sections 451.001-.003 of the Texas Labor Code. ¹⁰ Although the former codification was in effect at all times material to this litigation, since its provisions are substantively identical to the new Labor Code sections, we refer to the latter, which state:

Sec. 451.001. DISCRIMINATION AGAINST EMPLOYEES PROHIBITED. A person may not discharge or in any other manner discriminate against an employee because the employee has:

(1) filed a workers' compensation claim in good faith;

(2) hired a lawyer to represent the employee in a claim;

(3) instituted or caused...