City of La Porte v. Prince

• Decision Date: 24 February 1993
• Docket Number: No. 10-92-076-CV,10-92-076-CV
• Citation: 851 S.W.2d 876
• Parties: CITY OF LA PORTE, Texas, Appellant, v. Allen Ray PRINCE, Appellee.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

Page 876

851 S.W.2d 876

CITY OF LA PORTE, Texas, Appellant, v. Allen Ray PRINCE, Appellee.

No. 10-92-076-CV.

Court of Appeals of Texas,

Waco.

Feb. 24, 1993.

Concurring and Dissenting Opinion of Justice Vance March 3, 1993.

Rehearing Denied April 28, 1993.

James P. Wallace and W. Charles Campbell, Soules & Wallace, Austin, C. Charles Dippel, Law Office of C. Charles Dippel, Houston, for appellant.

Dale W. Felton, Felton & Associates, Houston, for appellee.

Before THOMAS, C.J., and CUMMINGS and VANCE, JJ.

OPINION

THOMAS, Chief Justice.

The jury found that the City of La Porte fired Allen Prince, one of its employees, because he filed a claim for workers' compensation. The City appeals a judgment in Prince's favor for $100,000 in actual damages and $1,000,000 in exemplary damages. It argues that the court erred by not granting it a directed verdict based on the defense of governmental immunity, by awarding exemplary damages, and by submitting a question to the jury when there was no evidence or insufficient evidence to support its submission. The City also contends that the court erroneously excluded the testimony of two witnesses and wrongfully awarded prejudgment interest. We affirm.

Allen Prince was employed by the City of La Porte as a sewer lift-station operator. On June 10, 1983, he was injured on the job and reported his injury to his foreman. He then went to the doctor who diagnosed the injury as a hernia. Prince had hernia-repair surgery on June 23. His doctor told him that he should expect to be off work for six to eight weeks after surgery. Prince told his foreman and the City's personnel coordinator the length of time he expected to be off work. He filed a claim for workers' compensation benefits, but it was denied by the insurance carrier. He then filed a claim with the Industrial Accident Board.

On July 27 Prince told his foreman that he should be released to return to work in two or three weeks. The foreman told him to go see Luther Maxey, the department superintendent. Maxey fired Prince. Ten days later Prince was released by his physician to return to work.

The City claims to have a personnel policy that incapacity will result in a nondisciplinary termination of employment if the employee is incapable of returning to work within thirty days following the use of sick-leave benefits. The City argues that Prince's termination is justified under this policy because he was absent from work for more than thirty days and would not be able to work for at least another week following his termination. It introduced into evidence the termination document relating to Prince that states he was terminated for two reasons: incapacity and misconduct towards other employees. Prince argued, however, that he was fired because he filed a workers' compensation claim against the City, and that City employees were afraid to file such claims because many who did were fired from their jobs.

The jury found that Prince was wrongfully discharged. In addition, it found that the wrongful conduct in discharging him was imputed directly to the governing body of the City and assessed $100,000 in actual damages and $1,000,000 in exemplary damages against the City.

GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY

The City, in its first point, argues that the court erred in denying its motion for an instructed verdict based on governmental immunity. Prince brought suit for wrongful discharge under article 8307c:

Sec. 1. No person may discharge or in any other manner discriminate against any employee because the employee has in good faith filed a claim, hired a lawyer to represent him in a claim, instituted, or caused to be instituted, in good faith, any proceeding under the Texas [Workers]' Compensation Act, or has testified or is about to testify in any such proceeding.

Sec. 2. A person who violates any provision of Section 1 of this Act shall be liable for reasonable damages suffered by an employee as a result of the violation, and an employee discharged in violation of the Act shall be entitled to be reinstated to his former position. The burden of proof shall be upon the employee.

See TEX.REV.CIV.STAT.ANN. art. 8307c (Vernon Pamph.1993). This article provides a terminated employee a cause of action if he was discharged for pursuing a workers' compensation claim. See Azar Nut Co. v. Caille, 734 S.W.2d 667, 668 (Tex.1987). Such a discharge gives rise to the recovery of all damages suffered by the employee, plus exemplary damages. Id.

The Texas Constitution authorizes the Legislature to make municipalities subject to the Workers' Compensation Act. TEX. CONST. art. III, § 61. Article III, section 61, gives the Legislature the power to enact laws to enable cities to provide workers' compensation insurance for all employees and to pass laws for the administration of this insurance.

The Legislature amended the Workers' Compensation Act to require political subdivisions to extend workers' compensation benefits to their employees and to make certain provisions of the Act applicable to political subdivisions. TEX.REV.CIV.STAT.ANN. art. 8309h (Vernon Pamph.1993); Lyons v. Texas A & M University, 545 S.W.2d 56, 58 (Tex.Civ.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Article 8309h specifically provides that "political subdivisions" are subject to the prohibitions of article 8307c. TEX.REV.CIV.STAT.ANN. art. 8309h § 3. A "political subdivision" includes a "home-rule city, a city, town, or village." Id. § 1(1). Thus, the City of La Porte is an employer that is prohibited from discharging an employee for filing or pursuing a workers' compensation claim.

In addition, the Texas Tort Claims Act provides that a governmental unit that accepts the workers' compensation laws is entitled to the same privileges and immunities granted by the workers' compensation laws to private individuals and corporations. TEX.CIV.PRAC. & REM.CODE ANN. § 101.028 (Vernon 1986) (formerly TEX.REV.CIV.STAT.ANN. art. 6252-19 (Vernon 1970)). A private individual or corporation is not immune from the prohibitions in article 8307c. Therefore, only enjoying the same immunities as private individuals or corporations, a city is subject to the prohibitions in article 8307c, the same as private individuals and corporations. Governmental immunity does not protect a city against a cause of action under article 8307c, and the court properly denied the City an instructed verdict on that ground. See Barfield v. City of La Porte, 849 S.W.2d 842 (Tex.App.-Texarkana, 1993, n.w.h.). We overrule point one.

EXEMPLARY DAMAGES

The City, in its second through sixth points, complains that the award of exemplary damages is not supported by legally--or factually--sufficient evidence. We apply the rules for reviewing these evidentiary complaints on appeal. See Croucher v. Croucher, 660 S.W.2d 55, 58 (Tex.1983); Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex.1986).

As a general rule, a municipality may not be held liable for exemplary damages; however, if the plaintiff can prove that there is intentional, willful, or grossly negligent conduct that shows an entire want of care for his rights and that such conduct can be imputed to the governing body of the municipality, exemplary damages may be recovered. City of Gladewater v. Pike, 727 S.W.2d 514, 522 (Tex.1987). By requiring a plaintiff to show both wanton, malicious, or grossly negligent behavior and imputation of that conduct to the city's leadership, recovery of exemplary damages is limited to only those exceedingly few situations where the actions of persons in authority show utter disdain for the protection of citizens' rights. Id. at 524. Under these circumstances, a jury can consider awarding exemplary damages against a municipality. Id.

Essentially, the first requirement in City of Gladewater is to determine whether the municipal agent acted with a culpable state of mind that resulted in injury. Id. 727 S.W.2d at 522-23. Thus, the plaintiff must first show that the actor engaged in willful, wanton, malicious or grossly negligent conduct. Id. at 523. In other words, a plaintiff must show "that entire want of care which would raise the belief that the act or omission complained of was the result of conscious indifference to the right or welfare of the person or persons to be affected." Id. (quoting Burk Royalty Co. v. Walls, 616 S.W.2d 911, 920 (Tex.1981)).

The jury found that the City of La Porte and Maxey, the department superintendent, acted with such conduct. Maxey was aware that Prince would be unable to work for six to eight weeks. He also knew at the time he fired him that Prince would be able to return to work within two weeks. Furthermore, Maxey fired Prince immediately after asking him if he had filed a workers' compensation claim against the City, or as Maxey put it, "What's this bullshit I hear about you filing a lawsuit on the City?" Maxey admitted that he was referring to Prince's workers' compensation claim. Several witnesses also claimed that City employees were afraid to file a workers' compensation claim because many who did so lost their jobs. This evidence is both legally and factually sufficient to support findings that the City had an official, but unwritten, policy to terminate employees for filing a workers' compensation claim; that Maxey's conduct was wilful and malicious and in furtherance of that policy; that he fired Prince for having pursued a worker's compensation claim against the City and not for physical incapacity; and that he acted with conscious indifference to Prince's rights and welfare.

The second element in City of Gladewater requires Maxey's wrongful conduct to be imputed to the leadership of the City. See id. 727 S.W.2d at 523. To impute tortious actions to the City, the evidence must show that the acts were expressly authorized by the City. See id. The court in City of Gladewater remarked that:

Liability must rest on official policy, meaning the city government's policy, and not on the policy of...