City of Little Rock v. Quindley

• Decision Date: 01 February 1896
• Citation: 33 S.W. 1053
• Parties: CITY OF LITTLE ROCK et al. v. QUINDLEY et al.
• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Page 1053

33 S.W. 1053

CITY OF LITTLE ROCK et al. v. QUINDLEY et al.

Supreme Court of Arkansas.

February 1, 1896.

Appeal from circuit court, Pulaski county; Joseph Willartin, Judge.

Petition by the city of Little Rock and James O'Brien, as collector of the city of Little Rock, for a writ of mandamus to compel A. J. Quindley, as collector, and certain others, as commissioners, of the Scott street paving district No. 46, to deliver to petitioner the tax books of such district. From a judgment sustaining a demurrer to and dismissing the petition, petitioners appeal. Reversed.

J. W. Blackwood, City Atty., for appellants. Whipple & Whipple, for appellees.

RIDDICK, J.

This action arose upon a petition of James O'Brien, as collector for the city of Little Rock, for a writ of mandamus to compel A. J. Quindley, as collector, and certain others, as commissioners, of the Scott street paving district No. 46, to deliver the tax books for said district to said petitioner. The only question before us is whether the act of the legislature approved April, 1895, entitled "An act to provide for the collection of assessments by the local improvement districts in cities of the first class," is a valid law or not. The act in question requires that "in the collection of all assessments in local improvement districts in cities of the first class the assessment shall be payable to the city collector," etc. Under this act, the appellant, as city collector, claims the right to possession of the tax books for certain improvement districts in the city of Little Rock.

It is contended by the appellee that the act is in conflict with section 23 of article 5 of the state constitution, which provides that "no law shall be revived, amended or the provisions thereof extended or conferred by reference to its title only; but so much thereof as is revived, amended, extended or conferred shall be re-enacted and published at length." It is argued that the statute in question is amendatory of certain sections of the Digest relating to the levying and collecting of assessments for local improvements in towns and cities, and that it is void because it does not re-enact and publish at length the sections as amended. After a consideration of the question, our conclusion is that this position is not tenable. The act in question does not expressly amend any section of the statute. Whatever amendatory effect it had upon the law existing at the time of its passage was by implication only. The rule is settled by a decided weight of authority that repeals by implication are not within the meaning of this provision of the constitution, and it is not essential that they should re-enact or even refer to the acts or sections which, by implication, they repeal or amend. Watkins v. Eureka Springs, 49 Ark. 134, 4 S. W. 384; Scales v. State, 47 Ark. 480, 1 S. W. 769; People v. Mahaney, 13 Mich. 484; Cooley, Const. Lim. 182, 185; Suth. St. Const. § 135, and cases cited. The purpose of such a provision in the constitution has seldom been better expressed than by Mr....