City of Louisville v. Bryan S. McCoy, Inc.

Decision Date11 November 1955
Citation286 S.W.2d 546
PartiesCITY OF LOUISVILLE, Appellant, v. BRYAN S. McCOY, Inc., Appellee.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky

Henri L. Mangeot, Herman E. Frick, Louisville, for appellant.

J. W. Jones, Louisville, for appellee.

CULLEN, Commissioner.

In June 1954 the City of Louisville adopted an ordinance rezoning, from 'E' Commercial to 'B' Two-Family Residential, a small block of land, subdivided into 10 lots, on the outskirts of the city. In an action by Bryan S. McCoy, Inc., the owner of one of the lots, the court held the ordinance void, on the ground that it was arbitrary and unreasonable. The city has appealed.

The block in question in in the form of a trapezium, being bounded on the south by Taylorsville Road, on the west by Cannon's Lane, on the northwest by Janet Avenue, and on the northeast by the city boundary line. Seven of the lots face on Taylorsville Road; one faces Cannon's Lane at its intersection with Janet Avenue; and the other two face on Janet Avenue, which dead-ends at the city boundary line. Approximately 250 feet east of the block, Taylorsville Road intersects with the Watterson Expressway, which is now in the process of being constructed as a new major thoroughfare.

Aside from the question of whether the City of Louisville has any power at all to pass zoning ordinances, which is raised by the appellee and which will be discussed at a later point in this opinion, the parties are agreed that the sole question is whether the 1954 ordinance is arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals or general welfare.

The block in question, together with some adjacent land to the south and west, was annexed by the City of Louisville in June 1950. It came into the city with a commercial zoning classification, having been so zoned by the Louisville and Jefferson County Planning and Zoning Commission (which has jurisdiction outside of cities in Jefferson County) in August 1949. Prior to that time it had been zoned for single family residential use. Around the same time in 1949 the county zoning commission had rezoned, from single family residential to commercial, some adjacent property on the south and on the west. Immediately across the present city boundary line, to the east, there is a tract of vacant land, embracing some 25 acres, which since 1943 has continued to be in a single family residence classification. This tract lies between the block in question and the right of way of the Watterson Expressway. The appellee, Bryan S. McCoy, Inc., owns this tract.

When the block in question was annexed to Louisville, it was unimproved land. In 1951 and 1952, duplex apartment buildings, designed for use as two-family residences, were constructed on nine of the ten lots, and the lots so improved were sold to individual owners, who have occupied and used them as two-family residences. Only the easternmost lot facing on Taylorsville Road has remained unimproved. This lot, triangular in shape, was purchased by Bryan S. McCoy, Inc. on April 27, 1954, which was the day on which the rezoning ordinance here in question was introduced in the Board of Aldermen.

Within the city limits, to the west and northwest of the block in question, the development has been solely residential, with the exception of a gasoline service station at the northwest corner of the intersection of Taylorsville Road and Cannon's Lane. Across Taylorsville Road on the south there is an 11-acre tract which is zoned commercial but which is unimproved except for a gasoline service station at the west end. This station is within the right of way of the Watterson Expressway and will be removed in the construction of the expressway.

Those lots in the rezoned block that face on Taylorsville Road are subject to a plat reservation of a strip reserved for future widening of Taylorsville Road, and of a further strip reserved as an off-the-highway roadway and parking space.

The Watterson Expressway will cross Taylorsville Road on an overpass, connected with which there will be cloverleaf ramps. The ramp for westbound traffic leaving the expressway will run along the south side of the lots in the rezoned block that face on Taylorsville Road. Thus, there will be no direct access from the lots to Taylorsville Road.

In support of the rezoning ordinance, a number of witnesses were introduced. Their testimony was to the effect that the development in the area in recent years had been almost entirely residential; that the duplex apartment buildings in the rezoned block were not adaptable for commercial use; that the area on the north side of Taylorsville Road was not suitable for commercial use because it was on the going-to-work rather than the going-home side of the road, and because there would be no direct access to Taylorsville Road by reason of the expressway ramp; that the vacant property on the south side of Taylorsville Road would furnish adequate space for commercial development in the neighborhood; that the use of the rezoned block for commercial purposes would create a highway safety hazard; that the value of the area as a whole would be greater with the block in question restricted to residential use; that the one vacant lot in the block has no real value for either residential or commercial purposes; and that deed restrictions on some of the lots in this block prohibit commercial...

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9 cases
  • Boron Oil Co. v. Cathedral Foundation, Inc.
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky
    • 15 Noviembre 1968
    ...KRS 100.066 and KRS 100.540. See Hatch v. Fiscal Court of Fayette County, Ky., 242 S.W.2d 1018 (1951) and City of Louisville v. Bryan S. McCoy, Inc., Ky., 286 S.W.2d 546 (1956). It was only in cities of the second class that a change required the concurrence of the commission and the legisl......
  • Adams v. City of Richmond
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky
    • 11 Noviembre 1960
    ...the action. It is well settled that the courts will not inquire into the motives that impel legislative action. City of Louisville v. Bryan S. McCoy, Inc., Ky., 286 S.W.2d 546. So far in this opinion we have excluded from consideration the situation and conditions of use of the property out......
  • Morton v. Auburndale Realty Co.
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky
    • 18 Noviembre 1960
    ...under the 1930 statute (Kentucky Acts 1930, Chapter 86), even though the act has been conditionally repealed. City of Louisville v. Bryan S. McCoy, Inc., Ky., 286 S.W.2d 546. The zoning ordinance was enacted pursuant to the authority of the 1930 statute. The sign ordinance was enacted in 19......
  • Clark v. City of Paducah
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky
    • 28 Marzo 1969
    ...person attacking it to establish its invalidity. Hatch v. Fiscal Court of Fayette County, Ky., 242 S.W.2d 1018; City of Louisville v. Bryan S. McCoy, Inc., Ky., 286 S.W.2d 546. Appellants take the position that their lots were suitable for commercial development, which is true; that if this......
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