City of Marianna v. Davis

Decision Date17 April 1936
PartiesCITY OF MARIANNA et al. v. DAVIS et al.
CourtFlorida Supreme Court

On Rehearing June 25, 1936.

Suit by Gussie Davis and another against the City of Marianna and others. From a decree making a temporary restraining order permanent, defendants appeal.

Reversed without prejudice, with directions.

WHITFIELD C.J., and BROWN, J., dissenting in part.

On Rehearing. Appeal from Circuit Court, Jackson County; E C. Welch, Judge.

COUNSEL

James H. Finch, of Marianna, for appellants.

Robert S. Pierce, Jr., and B. L. Soloman, both of Marianna, for appellees.

OPINION

PER CURIAM.

This was a suit to enjoin the enforcement and application of House Bill No. 749, chapter 17405, Acts 1935, providing for the creation of municipal delinquent tax adjustment boards. Mr Presiding Justice ELLIS, Mr. Justice TERRELL, and Mr. Justice BUFORD vote in favor of reversal of the decree below, for the reasons stated in their several expressions of opinion filed herewith. Mr. Chief Justice WHITFIELD, Mr. Justice BROWN, and Mr. Justice DAVIS are of the opinion that chapter 17405, Acts 1935, is unconstitutional for the reasons stated in the opinion of Mr. Chief Justice WHITFIELD, which opinion is concurred in by Mr. Justice BROWN and Mr. Justice DAVIS. Mr. Justice DAVIS in a separate opinion votes for the reversal of the decree appealed from for the reasons assigned by him in the separate opinion he has prepared and filed herein, but concurs with Mr. Chief Justice WHITFIELD in the view that chapter 17405, supra, is unconstitutional.

The decree is accordingly reversed without prejudice, with directions to dismiss the bill of complaint in the court below. See Lee, Comptroller, v. Bond-Howell Lumber Co. (Fla.) 166 So. 733, opinion filed March 10, 1936.

Reversed without prejudice, with directions.

WHITFIELD, C.J., and ELLIS, TERRELL, BROWN, BUFORD, and DAVIS, JJ., concur.

CONCURRING

WHITFIELD, Chief Justice.

Regulations for the imposition of taxes and for the enforcement of tax collection of are legislative functions; the execution of the regulations are by administrative or ministerial officials or bodies. Tax levies are required to be 'uniform and equal' in the tax unit. Valuations for taxation are required to be 'just.' Section 1, art. 9, Const. The levy and enforcement of tax collections must not be so prescribed or executed as to deny due process or equal protection of the laws. The collection of delinquent tax levies is an essential part of the taxation system, and is governed by the same mandatory organic requirement of 'uniform and equal' levies, 'just valuations,' and due process and equal protection of the laws.

Where discretionary authority in the levy of taxes or in the enforcement of tax collections are by valid statutory enactments delegated to or conferred upon official or official bodies, the enactments should (1) announce the legislative policy in the premises, (2) prescribe the limitations of the authority conferred, with definite stand ards which are to control the exercise of the delegated authority, and (3) provide for a finding of the facts upon which the delegated discretionary authority is exercised. The action taken is subject to appropriate judicial or other legal review. See Florida Motor Lines v. Railroad Commissioners, 100 Fla. 538, 129 So. 876; McMullen v. Newmar Corporation, 100 Fla. 566, 129 So. 870; State v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 56 Fla. 617, 47 So. 969, 32 L.R.A. (N.S.) 639; Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 55 S.Ct. 241, 79 L.Ed. 446; State ex rel. v. Green, 95 Fla. 117, 116 So. 66; State v. Fowler, 94 Fla. 752, 114 So. 435.

Chapter 17405, Acts 1935, purports to authorize a designated official body, viz., a 'Board to Adjust, Settle and Compromise Taxes.' By section 4: 'THE SAID BOARD IS AUTHORIZED IN ITS SOUNd dIscretioN to compromise and adjust the amount required to be paid for the redemption, settlement and liquidation of any municipal tax sale certificate, or of any delinquent city taxes held, owned or controlled by the city or any attorney or agent thereof for the year 1933 or prior years upon any property within the said city, including the omitted subsequent taxes upon such property upon principles of fairness to the city and to the owners of such property.' No policy of the Legislature in the premises is stated.

No standards to control the delegated 'sound discretion to compromise and adjust the amounts required to be paid' for past-due taxes are prescribed, except 'principles of fairness to the city and to the owners of such property,' which statement of applicable 'principles' is too vague and indefinite, at least in cases of this nature, to be a legal guide in the exercise of discretionary authority affecting the rights of all taxpayers in the taxing unit as well as of the taxing unit and the delinquent taxpayers. Those who have paid their taxes have a right to require the delinquent taxpayers to pay their just share of the tax levied on the properties of all of them.

Section 1 of the act provides that the secretary of the board 'shall keep proper and accurate minutes and records of the meetings of the said Board.' But there is nothing to indicate what standards or considerations shall govern the board, and the 'minutes and records of the meetings of the said Board' are not required to contain anything showing the Board acted within the delegated authority, or the facts and considerations upon which the board did 'compromise and adjust the amount required to be paid for' delinquent taxes that were duly assessed. Requiring delegated authority to be exercised with 'sound' discretion has no definite significance in cases of this character when no standards of action or decision are prescribed in delegating the authority or by other enactments.

Constitutional statutory provision may be made for administrative determinations whether delinquent tax assessments are upon excessive valuations as compared with valuations of other property assessed in the same unit for the same purpose, and for adjustments of delinquent tax payments upon definite standards or principles applicable alike to all who are affected by the tax as levied in the taxing unit for the same purpose; but chapter 17405, Acts 1935, is not an act of that nature. Because of the material differences in the two statutes, the above discussion is not in conflict with the decision in State ex rel. Dowling v. Butts, 111 Fla. 630, 149 So. 746, 89 A.L.R. 946, where chapter 16252, Acts 1933, was considered.

BROWN and DAVIS, JJ., concur.

TERRELL Justice.

The Legislature of 1935 enacted chapter 17405, providing for the creation of municipal tax adjustment boards in cities, towns, and villages, and authorizing them to settle, redeem, or compromise any municipal tax sale certificates or delinquent city taxes held, owned, or controlled by the city or any attorney or agent thereof for the year 1933 or prior years.

In June, 1935, the city council of Marianna, pursuant to the aforesaid act, resolved itself into a municipal tax adjustment board and proceeded to hear applications from property owners for the adjustment of their delinquent taxes. A settlement whereby certain property owners agreed to pay the full amount of the principal of all delinquent taxes due by them, and the city agreed to remit all interest, costs, and penalties, was agreed on.

Before this settlement was consummated appellees, as complainants below, filed their bill of complaint against the city council seeking to restrain its execution. A temporary restraining order was granted, motion to dismiss was overruled, answers were filed, testimony was taken, and on final hearing chapter 17405 was held to be invalid and the temporary restraining order was made permanent. From that final decree the instant appeal was prosecuted.

It is first contended that chapter 17405 is ineffectual and void because it abrogates the rule of equality and uniformity in taxation as required in sections 1 and 5 of article 9 of the Constitution of Florida, and the rule of equal protection as provided in section 1, article 14 of the Amendments to the Federal Constitution.

Section 4 of chapter 17405 defines the powers of municipal tax adjustment boards, and the applicable part of it to this case is as follows: 'The said Board is authorized in its sound discretion to compromise and adjust the amount required to be paid for the redemption, settlement and liquidation of any municipal tax sale certificate, or of any delinquent city taxes held, owned or controlled by the city or any attorney or agent thereof for the year 1933 or prior years upon any property within the said city, including the omitted subsequent taxes upon such property upon principles of fairness to the city and to the owners of such property.'

Section 7 of said act, terminating the tenure of municipal tax adjustment boards, is as follows: 'The said Board's power to adjust, settle and compromise delinquent taxes and special assessments shall terminate and expire twelve months from the date of holding of its first meeting and no applications shall be considered thereafter, provided that applicants upon whose applications orders have been entered during the last thirty days of the Board's existence shall be entitled to thirty days from the time of notice of said order within which to comply with same as hereinbefore provided.'

We construe this act to apply only to tax certificates maturing in 1933 or prior years, the date of maturity being on or before that on which the two-year period of redemption expires. All boards organized under the act become functus officio one year after organization except as to those applications for redemption filed during the last thirty...

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