City of Mascoutah v. Ill. Commerce Comm'n

Docket Number5-20-0386
Decision Date09 August 2021
Parties The CITY OF MASCOUTAH, an Illinois Municipal Corporation, Petitioner, v. The ILLINOIS COMMERCE COMMISSION; Carrie Zalewski, in Her Official Capacity as Commissioner; Sadzi Martha Oliva, in Her Official Capacity as Commissioner; D. Ethan Kimbrel, in His Official Capacity as Commissioner; Maria S. Bocanegra, in Her Official Capacity as Commissioner; Michael T. Carrigan, in His Official Capacity as Commissioner; Roy A. Waller, Individually and as Trustee of the Roy A. Waller Declaration of Trust Dated April 24, 1997; Mary Ann Waller, Individually and as Trustee of the Mary Ann Waller Declaration of Trust Dated April 24, 1997; and Ameren Illinois Company, Respondents.
CourtUnited States Appellate Court of Illinois

Gary L. Smith, of Loewenstein & Smith, P.C., of Springfield, for petitioner.

Robert W. Funk and Thomas R. Stanton, Special Assistant Attorneys General, of Chicago, for respondent Illinois Commerce Commission.

Mark S. Cochran and Andrew G. White, of Bellatti, Barton, Cochran & White, LLC, of Springfield, for respondents Roy A. Waller and Mary Ann Waller.

No brief filed for other respondents.

JUSTICE MOORE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 The petitioner, City of Mascoutah (City), an Illinois municipal corporation, petitions this court, pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 335 (eff. July 1, 2017) for direct review of the September 23, 2020, order of the Illinois Commerce Commission (Commission), which denied its petition for approval to acquire, by eminent domain, easements over the property of Roy A. Waller and Mary Ann Waller (the Wallers), individually and as trustees of the Roy A. Waller Declaration of Trust and Mary Ann Waller Declaration of Trust dated April 24, 1997, in order to construct a power line to connect the City's power supply to the electricity infrastructure of Ameren Illinois Company (Ameren). For the following reasons, we dismiss the appeal for a lack of appellate jurisdiction.

¶ 2 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 3 On October 16, 2018, the City filed a petition with the Commission, seeking authority, pursuant to section 11-117-1 of the Illinois Municipal Code ( 65 ILCS 5/11-117-1 (West 2018) ) to acquire, by eminent domain, easements over two adjacent lots, one owned by the Wallers, and the other owned by the Wallers as trustees of a declaration of trust (the Waller Real Estate), which is located outside of its city limits. The petition requested the approval of the Commission to proceed with an action in the circuit court of St. Clair County to acquire the easements by eminent domain, pursuant to the Eminent Domain Act ( 735 ILCS 30/1-1-1 et seq. (West 2018)). The Wallers and Ameren were granted leave to intervene in the proceedings before the Commission, and the parties and Commission staff (Staff) commenced a "paper hearing" as set forth in section 200.525 of Title 83 of the Illinois Administrative Code. 83 Ill. Adm. Code 200.525 (1996).1

¶ 4 After the City, Staff, and the Wallers submitted all their prefiled testimony, evidentiary hearings were held before the administrative law judge on April 30 and May 15, 2019. Following the evidentiary hearing, the record was marked "Heard & Taken." On December 27, 2019, the Commission issued a proposed order. Thereafter, the parties filed briefs on exceptions and the Commission heard oral argument on July 20, 2020, after several continuances attributable to the COVID-19 pandemic.

¶ 5 On September 23, 2020, the Commission entered its final order on the City's petition for eminent domain authority. The Commission found that, based on the language of section 11-117-1 of the Municipal Code ( 65 ILCS 5/11-117-1 (West 2018) ), for the Commission to reach a decision regarding the City's request "to acquire by eminent domain property without the corporate limits" of the City, the Commission must first determine "whether such acquisition is necessary and in the public interest. " (Emphases in original.) The Commission found that because the statute does not define "public interest" or "necessary" and does not offer a framework or guideline for making such a determination, the Commission has the sole discretion to make this determination. In exercising this discretion, the Commission found it prudent to review the City's request in the same manner as it reviews requests for eminent domain authority from public utilities under the Public Utilities Act ( 220 ILCS 5/1-101 et seq. (West 2018)). Based on this analysis, the Commission determined that the City's proposed use of its eminent domain authority was not in the public interest and denied the petition.

¶ 6 Following the Commission's order, the City filed a verified application for rehearing before the Commission, pursuant to section 10-113 of the Public Utilities Act. Id. § 10-113. In addition, the City filed a complaint for administrative review or a writ of certiorari in the circuit court of St. Clair County, stating that it also planned to file a petition for direct review to this court once the Commission ruled on its application for rehearing. According to the City's complaint for administrative review, the City filed the complaint "out of an abundance of caution to preserve subject matter jurisdiction whether it lies in the circuit court or the appellate court."

¶ 7 On November 5, 2020, the Commission denied the City's application for rehearing. On November 25, 2020, the City filed a petition for direct review of the Commission's order in this court pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 335 (eff. July 1, 2017). On December 14, 2020, the City filed another complaint for administrative review or a writ of certiorari in the circuit court of St. Clair County. On December 16, 2020, the City filed a motion for a jurisdictional ruling in this court, stating that this case presents a jurisdictional question of first impression as to the proper method of obtaining review of an order of the Commission pursuant to section 11-117-1(2) of the Municipal Code. 65 ILCS 5/11-117-1(2) (West 2018). The City requested that this court enter an order determining whether it has jurisdiction of this appeal. The Commission filed a response to the motion, urging this court to find that it has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Rule 335. On January 6, 2021, this court entered an order taking the motion for a jurisdictional ruling with the case.

¶ 8 This court entered its initial opinion dismissing this case for a lack of appellate jurisdiction on August 9, 2021. On August 30, 2021, the Commission filed a petition for rehearing, which this court has fully considered. We now enter this modified opinion upon the denial of rehearing.

¶ 9 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 10 A reviewing court has a duty to consider its jurisdiction and to dismiss the appeal if it determines that jurisdiction is wanting. Archer Daniels Midland Co. v. Barth , 103 Ill. 2d 536, 539, 83 Ill.Dec. 332, 470 N.E.2d 290 (1984). Our supreme court has described the principles applicable to the jurisdiction of the courts to review decisions of administrative agencies as follows:

"Illinois courts are courts of general jurisdiction and enjoy a presumption of subject-matter jurisdiction. [Citation.] That presumption is inapplicable, however, where administrative proceedings are involved. [Citation.] Illinois courts are empowered to review administrative actions only ‘as provided by law.’ Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, § 6 (appellate court), § 9 (circuit court). When the legislature has, through law, prescribed procedures for obtaining judicial review of an administrative decision, a court is said to exercise ‘special statutory jurisdiction’ when it reviews an administrative decision pursuant to that statutory scheme. [Citation.] Special statutory jurisdiction is limited by the language of the act conferring it. [Citation.] A court has no powers from any other source. [Citation.]" Ameren Transmission Co. of Illinois v. Hutchings , 2018 IL 122973, ¶ 13, 427 Ill.Dec. 931, 120 N.E.3d 998.

¶ 11 Here, the City seeks, pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 335 (eff. July 1, 2017), direct review of a decision of the Commission. While the Commission was created within the statutory scheme of the Public Utilities Act, primarily to regulate public utilities (220 ILCS 5/art. IV (West 2018)), a plethora of other statutes confer authority on the Commission to make decisions in a myriad of other matters as well. See, e.g. , 220 ILCS 30/1 et seq. (West 2018) (Electric Supplier Act); 625 ILCS 5/18a-100 et seq. (West 2018) (Illinois Commercial Relocation of Trespassing Vehicles Law); 625 ILCS 5/18c-1101 et seq. (West 2018) (Illinois Commercial Transportation Law); 65 ILCS 5/11-119.1-1 et seq. (West 2018) (Illinois Joint Municipal Electric Power Act). Thus, our supreme court has held that the procedures governing appeals from final administrative decisions of the Commission differ depending on the nature of the proceeding, as the terms of the statutes conferring decision-making authority on the Commission provide for differing methods of review. People ex rel. Madigan v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n , 2014 IL 116642, ¶ 11, 386 Ill.Dec. 655, 21 N.E.3d 418. When the decision or order is entered by the Commission under the Electric Supplier Act ( 220 ILCS 30/1 et seq. (West 2018)) or the Illinois Commercial Relocation of Trespassing Vehicles Law ( 625 ILCS 5/18a-100 et seq. (West 2018)), those statutes provide that the appeal is " ‘in accordance with the Administrative Review Law’ " ( 735 ILCS 5/3-101 et seq. (West 2018)), which provides for initial review in the circuit court. Madigan , 2014 IL 116642, ¶ 11, 386 Ill.Dec. 655, 21 N.E.3d 418. If the appeal is from a decision or order entered by the Commission pursuant to the Illinois Commercial Transportation Law ( 625 ILCS 5/18c-1101 et seq. (West 2018)) or the Public Utilities Act ( 220 ILCS 5/1-101 et seq. (We...

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