City of Mercer Island v. Crouch, 2546--I

• Decision Date: 06 January 1975
• Docket Number: No. 2546--I,2546--I
• Citation: 530 P.2d 344,12 Wn.App. 472
• Parties: CITY OF MERCER ISLAND, Appellant, v. Donald Holmes CROUCH, Respondent.
• Court: Washington Court of Appeals

Page 472

12 Wn.App. 472

530 P.2d 344

CITY OF MERCER ISLAND, Appellant, v. Donald Holmes CROUCH, Respondent.

No. 2546--I.

Court of Appeals of Washington, Division 1.

Jan. 6, 1975.

Montgomery, Purdue, Blankinship & Austin, Peter D. Jarvis, M. Wayne Blair, Seattle, for appellant.

William J. Morris, Bellevue, for respondent.

JAMES, Judge.

Defendant Donald Crouch allegedly drove an automobile which struck another vehicle, causing minor damage. A Mercer Island police officer was called to the scene and conducted an investigation. Later that day, Crouch went to the police station and picked up a copy of a Uniform Traffic Ticket and Complaint signed by the investigating officer which charged him with failure to yield the right-of-way from a stop sign. Five days later, the Uniform Traffic Ticket and Complaint was filed with the Mercer Island Justice Court and Crouch appeared and signed a personal recognizance bond.

Crouch was arraigned in justice court and pleaded not guilty. At trial, he moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the court had not acquired jurisdiction. The court denied the motion and found him guilty. He appealed to superior court for a trial de novo and moved to dismiss the charge again at the conclusion of the prosecution's evidence. The court granted the motion to dismiss. Mercer Island appeals assigning error to the court's dismissal of the case.

Mercer Island First argues that Crouch failed to raise his jurisdictional challenge Before trial in justice court and again Before trial in superior court and that this failure constitutes a waiver under JTR T3.01(f). ¹ Seattle v. Cisel, 1 Wash.App. 236, 460 P.2d 287 (1969). Mercer Island did not make this challenge before the superior court, however, and we are therefore precluded from considering it on appeal. Felsman v. Kessler,2 Wash.App. 493, 468 P.2d 691 (1970).

Mercer Island primarily argues that the court erred in dismissing the complaint for want of jurisdiction. We agree.

The Traffic Rules for Justice Court require that in traffic cases, a standardized form known as the Uniform Traffic Ticket and Complaint be used. JTR T2.01(a). The Uniform Traffic Ticket and Complaint is sponsored by the American Bar Association to simplify the processing of traffic cases by the use of one form to serve various purposes. The original of the form, when filled out, serves as the complaint to initiate the criminal action against the accused. One of the carbon copies of the form serves to notify the accused of the action, while other copies serve as reports to the state licensing authority and as a police record. ²

In support of the trial court's conclusion, Crouch raises a number of related arguments. He first argues that the officer investigating the accident arrested him and that because he was arrested for a misdemeanor which was not committed in the presence of the officer, the arrest was invalid. He contends that this invalid arrest deprived the court of jurisdiction over him. Crouch's argument is not well taken. Assuming for purposes of argument that the officer actually did arrest Crouch at the scene of the accident, ³ the unlawful arrest did not affect the validity of the subsequent proceedings. The record reflects that Crouch entered a plea of not guilty and was present for the trial. The rule in Washington, as elsewhere, is that:

Where, for any reason, an arrest is invalid, but the defendant enters a plea of not guilty and is in court on the day of trial, the court has jurisdiction of his person. State v. Melvern, 32 Wash. 7, 72 P. 489 (1903). Where the court has jurisdiction of the person of a defendant, it is not a ground for quashing or dismissing a criminal prosecution that he was not lawfully arrested. State v. Melvern, Supra; State v. Ditmar, 132 Wash. 501, 232 P. 321 (1925).

State v. Ryan, 48 Wash.2d 304, 305, 293 P.2d 399 (1956). See also In re Ollison v. Rhay, 68 Wash.2d 137, 412 P.2d 111 (1966); Irwin v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 10 Wash.App. 369, 517 P.2d 619 (1974); and 21 Am.Jur.2d Criminal Law § 380 (1965). Compare St. Paul v. Webb, 256 Minn. 210, 97 N.W.2d 638, 76 A.L.R.2d 1423 (1959).

Further, a court's jurisdiction arises from the filing of a valid complaint, not from an arrest. Orting v. Rucshner, 66 Wash.2d 732, 404 P.2d 983 (1965). See Duncan v. Brothers, 344 S.W.2d 398 (Ky.App.1961). Therefore, the jurisdiction of the court was not destroyed by an invalid arrest.

Crouch next argues that the Complaint is invalid because it was signed by an officer who did not witness the alleged misdemeanor. This argument confuses an officer's authority to arrest for a misdemeanor not committed in his presence with his authority to make a complaint in a criminal action.

It is a rule of the common law of immemorial origin that in the absence of statutory requirement to the contrary, all (criminal) complaints may be made by any person who can legally be a witness and who has knowledge or information of any violation of the criminal law. 1 Bishop, Cr.Proc. section 896.

State v. Giles, 101 Me. 349, 352, 64 A. 619, 620 (1906). See also 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 305 (1961). Thus, an officer who has investigated an accident, seen the physical evidence and talked to the accused is competent to make a complaint against the accused, even though the crime charged is a misdemeanor which was not committed in his presence. People v. Belcher, 302 N.Y. 529, 99 N.E.2d 874 (1951); State v. Steele, 95 Ohio App. 107, 117 N.E.2d 617 (1952); E. Fisher, Laws of Arrest § 191 (1967); 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 305 (1961); R. Donigan & E. Fisher, Know the Law 303--305 (1958).

Crouch contends, however, that the proviso in RCW 46.64.015 limits the authority of an officer to make a complaint in a case where the alleged misdemeanor was not committed in his presence. RCW 46.64.015 provides in part Whenever any person is arrested for any violation of the traffic laws or regulations which is punishable as a misdemeanor, the arresting officer may serve upon him a traffic citation and notice to appear in court. . . . The arrested person, in order to secure release, and when permitted by the arresting officer, must give his written promise to appear in court as required by the citation and notice by signing in the appropriate place the written citation and notice served by the arresting officer. Upon the arrested person's failing or refusing to sign such written promise, he may be taken into custody of such arresting officer and so remain or be placed in confinement: Provided, That an officer shall not serve or issue any traffic citation or notice for any offense or violation except when said offense or violation is committed in his presence. (Italics ours.)

The purpose of the statute is clear: A citation is issued

to avoid the unceremonious removal, perhaps in the middle of the night, of the responsible citizen from the highway and his subsequent incarceration in a local jail in lieu of bail.

State v. Doolittle, 69 Wash.2d 744, 749, 419 P.2d 1012, 1015 (1966). The statute, by its plain words, is directed to the authority of an officer to issue a Citation for a misdemeanor. It does not limit an officer's authority to make a Complaint, for the signing and filing of a complaint does not involve the potential 'unceremonious removal' from the highway. ⁴

Crouch argues, however, that the officer's issuance of a citation at the police station violated the statutory proviso and requires dismissal of this action. The jurisdiction of a court is conferred by the filing of a valid complaint, not by the arrest or citation of the accused. Orting v. Rucshner, Supra. In the traffic case context, this principle is illustrated by Seattle v. Reel, 69 Wash.2d 227, 418 P.2d 237 (1966). In Reel the court held that alleged errors in the citation portion of a uniform citation and complaint did not deprive the court of jurisdiction because an admittedly valid complaint had been filed. See also Solt v. People, 130 Colo. 1, 272 P.2d 638 (1954); State v. Melanson, 152 Me. 168, 126 A.2d 278 (1956); Fisher, Traffic Complaints, Traffic Dig. & Rev. 18--20 (Feb., 1968).

(U)ntil a court acquires jurisdiction of a case through the filing of a legal complaint, affidavit or other form of charge, neither it nor anyone else has power or authority to issue its process. Legal process is issued by courts, not police officers. Entitling a paper a 'summons' (or citation) does not invest it with the efficacy and legal status of such process, nor does its title transform it into something which it is not.

Donigan & Fisher, Courts View the Uniform Citation & Complaint, Traffic Dig. & Rev. 32, at 38 (July, 1961). Where jurisdiction is properly obtained by the filing of a valid complaint, a violation of RCW 46.64.015 does not require dismissal of the charge.

Next, Crouch argues that JTR T2.01(d)(1) restricts the authority of officers to make complaints for misdemeanors which were not committed in the officers' presence. JTR T2.01(d)(1) states:

The complaint shall contain a form of certificate by the Citing official to the effect that he certifies, under penalties of perjury, as provided by RCW 3.50.140, and any law amendatory thereof, he has reasonable grounds to believe, and does believe, the Person cited committed the offense(s) contrary to law. The certificate need not be made before a magistrate or any other person. Such complaint when signed by the citing officer and filed with a court, or traffic violations bureau, of competent jurisdiction shall be deemed a lawful complaint for the purpose of prosecuting the traffic offenses charged therein. (Italics ours.)

Quoting from dicta in State v. Doolittle, Supra 69 Wash.2d at 749, 419 P.2d at 1015, ⁵ Crouch argues that the 'citing official' referred to in JTR T2.01(d) (1) can only be an officer who has made an arrest. Crouch reasons therefore that a 'citation' can be 'issued' only after 'an arrest has already occurred.' He concludes that an...