City of Miami v. Rosen

• Decision Date: 03 November 1942
• Citation: 10 So.2d 307,151 Fla. 677
• Parties: CITY OF MIAMI v. ROSEN et al.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

10 So.2d 307

151 Fla. 677

CITY OF MIAMI v. ROSEN et al.

Florida Supreme Court

November 3, 1942

Appeal from Circuit Court, Dade County; Ross Williams Judge.

J. W Watson, Jr., and Wm. W. Charles, both of Miami, for appellant.

David B Newsom, of Miami, for appellees.

WHITFIELD, Justice.

Property owners sought and obtained injunctive relief from a zoning ordinance alleged to be discriminatory and unconstitutional as it affects described property of plaintiffs below in Class B-1 of the zoning ordinance, which property, it is claimed should have a zoning status as favorable as property in Class B-3.

The prayer is:

'That an interlocutory injunction issue, restraining and enjoining the defendant, City of Miami, its agents, officers, servants and employees from interfering with or in any wise attempting to restrict the use of the above described property to the uses of classification B-1 of the aforesaid ordinance, of to any classification less liberal than B-3 thereof, and that upon final hearing said injunction be made perpetual.

'That the Court will make and enter its permanent order declaring that ordinance number 1682 of the City of Miami, Florida, insofar as it purports to restrict the use of plaintiffs' property to B-1 classification, or to any classification less liberal than B-3, as defined in said ordinance, is arbitrary unwarranted, unconstitutional and void, and canceling the aforesaid restrictions imposed against the lands described as clouds upon plaintiffs' title, and that this Court will further, by its mandatory order, direct that the City of Miami, its agents, officers, servants and employees, permit the use of plaintiffs' property above described under the B-3 classification, for use for liberal business and commercial purposes, providing that the plans and specifications for such structures, otherwise comply with the building code of the City of Miami, as it now exists, or as hereafter may reasonably be adopted.'

The decree of the Circuit Court contains the following:

'2. That the zoning of plaintiffs' property described as follows, to-wit: 'Lot Two (2) less West thirty (30) feet thereof of Block Two (2) San Jose, a subdivision of the north half of the north half of the north quarter of section 36, Township 53 South, Range Forty-one (41) East, according to the plat thereof recorded in Plat Book 3, Page 158 of the Public Records of Dade County, Florida, also excepting therefrom those portions thereof which have heretofore been dedicated to the City of Miami for the widening of N. E. 19th Terrace.' under the B-1 classification of ordinance No. 1682 of the City of Miami, Florida, is arbitrary, discriminatory, unreasonable, unjust and unconstitutional and bears no substantial relation to public morals, health, safety and welfare and is confiscatory in character and is an arbitrary exercise of the zoning power possessed by said city.

'3. That the zoning of the above described property under any classification less liberal than the B-3 classification of said ordinance is unreasonable.

'4. That the defendant City of Miami, its officers, agents and employees are hereby perpetually restrained and enjoined from restricting the use of the above described property to any classification less liberal than B-3 classification under said ordinance No. 1682.

'5. That the restrictions of said ordinance No. 1682 of the City of Miami, Florida, insofar as it purports to restrict the use of plaintiffs' said property to B-1 classification or to any classification less liberal than B-3 as defined in said ordinance, constitutes a cloud upon plaintiffs' title to said property, and are hereby cancelled.

'6. That said defendants City of Miami, its agents, officers, servants and employees are hereby directed to permit the use of plaintiffs' above described property under the B-3 classification of said ordinance for use for liberal business and commercial purposes, as set forth in said classification in said ordinance No. 1682.'

The City appealed.

Municipalities in Florida are not subdivisions of the State as are counties. Secs. 1, 2, 3, Art. VIII, constitution. Municipalities are established in separately described areas containing inhabitants whose interests require special local governmental activities not afforded by State and county units. Municipalities have limited governmental authority and may have corporate functions under statutory regulations. See sec. 8, Art. VIII, sec. 34, Art. V. Upon appropriate statutory authority, municipalities may by ordinances duly adopted provide municipal governmental regulations, define municipal offenses and prescribe penalties by fine and imprisonment for violations of city ordinances and regulations. Such ordinances generally have the force of law within the limits of statutory and applicable organic limitations.

A city ordinance is municipal legislation that is authorized by statute under section 8 of Article VIII of the State constitution. Municipal ordinances do not have the governmental dignity and force of legislative enactments, but when they are duly adopted under legislative authority and do not in their enactment, their terms or their operation violate applicable provisions of organic or statutory law or public policy and are reasonable, such ordinances are of greater governmental force and efficacy than are the acts and orders of municipal administrative boards that may be created or regulated by municipal ordinances pursuant to valid legislative authority.

When a municipal ordinance is duly challenged as to the legality of its provisions, such validity is determined by due consideration of the authority under which it is adopted, and, if need...