City of Missoula v. Starr
| Decision Date | 13 April 2021 |
| Docket Number | DA 19-0413 |
| Citation | 2021 MT 90 N,484 P.3d 947 (Table) |
| Parties | CITY OF MISSOULA, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Aaron Dean STARR, Defendant and Appellant. |
| Court | Montana Supreme Court |
For Appellant: William Boggs, Attorney at Law, Missoula, Montana
For Appellee: Austin Knudsen, Montana Attorney General, Damon Martin, Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana James P. Nugent, Missoula County Attorney, Keithi Worthington, Chief Prosecuting Attorney, Missoula, Montana
¶1 Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court Internal Operating Rules, this case is decided by memorandum opinion and shall not be cited and does not serve as precedent. Its case title, cause number, and disposition shall be included in this Court's quarterly list of noncitable cases published in the Pacific Reporter and Montana Reports.
¶2 Aaron Dean Starr appeals from an order entered in the Fourth Judicial District Court, Missoula County, affirming the Missoula City Court's denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. We affirm.
¶3 On November 16, 2017, Missoula police officers responded to Starr's residence after his girlfriend, Stephanie Bean, reported an altercation with Starr. Bean told officers that Starr had thrown her to the ground, kicked her in the ribs, and stomped on her throat. Starr was charged with Partner Family Member Assault (PFMA), Resisting Arrest, and Assault. He made his initial appearance on these charges by video from the Missoula County Detention Center on November 17, 2017. No representative from the Public Defender's Office was present, and Starr did not consult with an attorney before his plea.
¶4 Nonetheless, the record reflects that the Municipal Court Judge explained Starr's rights and how Starr's case would proceed. The Judge explained to Starr that he had the right to plead not guilty and that doing so would allow him time to consult with an attorney and evaluate the evidence against him. The Judge explained the State's burden of proof at trial, that Starr would have the right to confront and cross-examine any witnesses called against him, and that Starr had the right to remain silent or testify on his own behalf should the matter proceed to trial. The Judge explained that Starr had a right to counsel if he could not afford counsel, or he could hire his own attorney. The Judge also advised Starr that if he was not a citizen and was convicted, he might be deported, and if convicted and failed to follow court orders, he could lose his driving privileges. Starr was then advised of the specific charges filed against him and the allegations made as to those charges. The Judge advised Starr of the maximum and minimum penalties for each offense.
¶5 Starr stated that he understood these rights but wanted to plead guilty to Resisting Arrest and PFMA. The City informed the Municipal Court that it would dismiss the Assault charge if Starr was pleading guilty to the other offenses. The Judge asked Starr if he understood what the City was offering, and Starr replied that he did. The Judge then asked: "And you understand that you do have the right to meet with counsel prior to entering a plea in this case?" Starr responded that he understood. The Judge asked: "And you would be waiving that right?" to which Starr replied: "Yes I am." The Judge then reiterated and confirmed that Starr understood the rights he was giving up by pleading guilty. Starr stated that he understood.
¶6 Upon the Judge's request, Starr then explained what had occurred on November 16, 2017. At one point during the colloquy, Starr stated the following:
Then I agreed to have the cops come to maybe assist me, because I was protecting my children and my house, and I'm a single father, and I have that right to protect their safety, when somebody gets violent toward me like that ... I felt attacked or violated ... so that led to harming a family member ....
The Judge asked Starr whether he believed his actions were done in self-defense. Starr responded that he "just didn't want an altercation with [Bean] and tried [his] best to avoid it." The Judge further clarified: "OK, but it nonetheless turned physical, and you were the one that then caused injury to her?" Starr responded: "Yes." Following additional questions regarding his plea to Resisting Arrest, the Municipal Court accepted Starr's guilty pleas, imposed a sentence on both counts and, per the City's offer, dismissed the Assault charge.
¶7 For the PFMA charge, the Municipal Court imposed a sentence of 12 months jail time, all suspended except two days (with credit for the two days served), a fine of $1,000, with $800 suspended, a $200 credit for time served, and a $110 surcharge fee. For Resisting Arrest, the court imposed a 6-month suspended jail term, along with a $100 fine and a $100 surcharge. The court ordered Starr to avoid alcohol and bars, to avoid contacting Bean, and to complete a chemical dependency evaluation, anger management program, and a two-hour family violence educational session.
¶8 On August 27, 2018, the City filed an Affidavit for Leave to File an Information charging Starr with two additional counts of PFMA. On November 16, 2018, Starr filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea from the 2017 PFMA conviction. After the Municipal Court denied the motion, Starr appealed to the District Court. The District Court affirmed the Municipal Court. Starr appeals from the District Court's decision.
¶9 Starr argues on appeal that the factual basis for his plea was ambiguous as to a possible justifiable use of force claim; the colloquy was deficient in ascertaining whether Starr understood the direct consequences of his plea; and the plea was coerced. Starr argues each rendered his plea involuntary and constitutes good cause for withdrawal. We address each argument in turn.
¶10 On Starr's appeal from the Municipal Court, the District Court functioned as an intermediate appellate court. See §§ 3-5-303 and 3-6-110, MCA. On Starr's appeal to this Court, we review the case as if Starr had originally filed his appeal in this Court. City of Bozeman v. Cantu , 2013 MT 40, ¶ 10, 369 Mont. 81, 296 P.3d 461 (citations omitted). We examine the record independently of the District Court's decision, applying the appropriate standard of review. Cantu , ¶ 10 (citation omitted). Our ultimate determination is whether the District Court, in its review of the trial court's decision, reached the correct conclusions under the appropriate standards of review. Stanley v. Lemire , 2006 MT 304, ¶ 26, 334 Mont. 489, 148 P.3d 643. We review the trial court's findings of fact to determine whether they are clearly erroneous and its conclusions of law to determine if they are correct. State v. Newbary , 2020 MT 148, ¶ 5, 400 Mont. 210, 464 P.3d 999 (citation omitted). Whether a plea is voluntary is a mixed question of law and fact that this Court reviews de novo for correctness. Newbary , ¶ 5 (citation omitted).
¶11 Section 46-16-105(2), MCA, permits a defendant to withdraw a previously entered guilty plea for good cause. " ‘Good cause’ includes the involuntariness of the plea, but it may include other criteria." State v. Warclub , 2005 MT 149, ¶ 16, 327 Mont. 352, 114 P.3d 254 (). A plea must be voluntary because the defendant is waiving his constitutional rights to not incriminate himself and to a trial by jury or judge. State v. Prindle , 2013 MT 173, ¶ 17, 370 Mont. 478, 304 P.3d 712 (citing Brady v. U.S. , 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970) ).
¶12 This Court has adopted the Brady standard to determine if a plea was voluntarily made. State v. Hendrickson , 2014 MT 132, ¶ 15, 375 Mont. 136, 325 P.3d 694 (citation omitted). Under the Brady standard, a plea is considered voluntary if the defendant is fully aware of the direct consequences, including the actual value of any commitments the court, prosecutor, or the defendant's own counsel made to the defendant. Hendrickson , ¶ 15 (citing Brady , 397 U.S. at 755 ). We "will not overturn a district court's denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea if the defendant was aware of the direct consequences of such a plea, and if his plea was not induced by threats, misrepresentation, or an improper promise such as a bribe." Hendrickson , ¶ 15 (quoting Warclub , ¶ 32 (citing Brady , 397 U.S. at 755 )).
Determining whether a defendant entered a plea voluntarily and whether a district court erred in denying a motion to withdraw a plea requires case-specific considerations, including ‘the adequacy of the district court's interrogation, the benefits obtained from a plea bargain, the withdrawal's timeliness, and other considerations that may affect the credibility of the claims presented.’
Hendrickson , ¶ 17 (quoting State v. McFarlane , 2008 MT 18, ¶ 17, 341 Mont. 166, 176 P.3d 1057 ).
¶13 Starr first argues that the factual basis for his plea was ambiguous as to a possible justifiable use of force claim. Starr maintains he raised a self-defense claim when he stated during the colloquy: "I was being attacked, so that's where she might have suffered some injury." ... and later "because I was protecting my children and my house, and I'm a single father, and I have that right to protect their safety, when somebody gets violent toward me like that ... I felt attacked or violated ...." However, when the Municipal Court Judge attempted to clarify with Starr whether there was a viable self-defense claim, ("you're not saying that ... physically she was coming at you") Starr answered: "No." Starr argues on appeal that he was attempting to prevent Bean's violence to protect his children. However, as the District Court pointed out, it is apparent after reviewing the audio recording that the children were not awake during this argument.
¶14 The Municipal Court reviewed this issue, read the briefs, listened...
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