City of Missoula v. Sadiku

• Citation: 498 P.3d 765,406 Mont. 271
• Decision Date: 16 November 2021
• Docket Number: DA 19-0689
• Parties: CITY OF MISSOULA, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Faton SADIKU, Defendant and Appellant
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Montana

406 Mont. 271

498 P.3d 765

CITY OF MISSOULA, Plaintiff and Appellee,

v.Faton SADIKU, Defendant and Appellant,

DA 19-0689

Supreme Court of Montana.

Submitted on Briefs: September 29, 2021

Decided: November 16, 2021

For Appellant: Chad Wright, Appellate Defender, Alexander H. Pyle, Assistant Appellate Defender, Helena, Montana

For Appellee: Austin Knudsen, Montana Attorney General, Brad Fjeldheim, Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana, Jim Nugent, Missoula City Attorney, Douglas Schaller, Deputy City Attorney, Missoula, Montana

Justice Beth Baker delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶1 Fanton Sadiku violated a condition of his deferred six-month sentence for misdemeanor sexual assault when he violated an order of protection. The City of Missoula Municipal Court revoked his deferred sentence and imposed a six-month suspended sentence. The Fourth Judicial District Court affirmed. On appeal from the District Court, Sadiku raises the following two issues:

1. Did the Municipal Court fail to make the required findings under § 46-18-203, MCA, before revoking Sadiku's deferred sentence for an alleged compliance violation?

2. Did the Municipal Court abuse its discretion when it revoked Sadiku's six-month deferred sentence and imposed a six-month suspended sentence?

We affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 In August 2017, P.K. filed a police report alleging that Sadiku, her former spouse, groped and kissed her without consent in a Missoula, Montana grocery store. The City of Missoula charged Sadiku with misdemeanor sexual assault, which carries a maximum jail sentence of six months. Sadiku pleaded nolo contendere in exchange for a deferred six-month sentence. His deferred sentence was contingent on his compliance with an order of protection that prohibited him from travelling within 1,500 feet of P.K.’s residence or place of employment, subject to only a few exceptions. The travel provision in the order stated:

The Respondent is allowed to travel I-90, the frontage road, Duncan Street, and Rattlesnake Drive which are within the 1500’ restriction of the Petitioner's residence and is allowed to go to businesses such as Eastgate Albertson's and the Pressbox as long as the Petitioner is not at that business. The Respondent is also allowed to travel South Avenue and Brooks Street which are within the 1500’ restriction of the Petitioner's work place and is allowed to go to businesses such as Tremper Shopping Center as long as the Petitioner is not at that business.

¶3 In April 2018, Sadiku travelled on Bancroft Street, which is within 1,500 feet of P.K.’s place of employment, while driving his son to high school. The school is outside the 1,500-foot zone, and Sadiku could have taken an alternate route that would not have violated the travel provision. The City filed a petition to revoke Sadiku's deferred sentence and charged him separately for violation of an order of protection.

¶4 In March 2019, a jury found Sadiku not guilty of violating the order of protection. The Municipal Court subsequently held a revocation hearing. The court took judicial notice of trial testimony and exhibits, including P.K.’s testimony that Sadiku pulled in front of her on Bancroft and "brake checked" her. Sadiku argued that he did not violate the order when he drove his son to school because he was permitted to travel to "businesses such as" Tremper Shopping Center, Albertson's, and the Pressbox. The Municipal Court found that the school was not a similar business and determined, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Sadiku violated the order of protection. The court revoked Sadiku's deferred sentence and sentenced him to six months in jail with six months suspended.

¶5 On Sadiku's appeal, the District Court affirmed, reasoning that, regardless of whether the school is similar to the enumerated businesses in the order of protection, Sadiku violated the travel provision when he drove on Bancroft Street.

STANDARDS OF REVIEW

¶6 On Sadiku's appeal from the Municipal Court, the District Court acted "as an intermediate appellate court." City of Missoula v. Pope , 2021 MT 4, ¶ 5, 402 Mont. 416, 478 P.3d 815 (citation omitted). On appeal here, we review the case "as if the appeal originally had been filed in this Court." Pope , ¶ 5.

¶7 Sadiku's first contention is a question of statutory interpretation, which we review de novo. See State v. Brooks , 2010 MT 226, ¶ 11, 358 Mont. 51, 243 P.3d 405 (citation omitted). We review Sadiku's second contention to determine whether the Municipal Court abused its discretion and whether its decision to revoke his sentence was supported by a preponderance of the evidence. See State v. Beam , 2020 MT 156, ¶ 6, 400 Mont. 278, 465 P.3d 1178 (citation omitted).

DISCUSSION

¶8 1. Did the Municipal Court correctly apply the law when it revoked Sadiku's sentence?

¶9 In 2017, as part of a criminal justice reform effort led by the 2015 Commission on Sentencing, the Montana Legislature amended § 46-18-203, MCA. Pope , ¶¶ 6-7 (citing State v. Oropeza , 2020 MT 16, ¶¶ 3-4, 398 Mont. 379, 456 P.3d 1023 ). The Legislature established a system known as the Montana Incentives and Interventions Grid (MIIG), which is a Department of Corrections (DOC) guide to "community supervision of offenders on parole or with deferred or suspended sentences." Pope , ¶ 6 (citation omitted).

¶10 Before 2017, § 46-18-203, MCA, "permitted a court to revoke a suspended sentence ... [if an] offender violated [any] condition of her suspended sentence." Pope , ¶ 8 (citing § 46-18-203(7)(a), MCA (2015) ). As amended, however, § 46-18-203, MCA, distinguishes between "compliance violations" and "non-compliance violations." Pope , ¶ 7. An offender commits a non-compliance violation when he commits a new criminal offense; possesses a firearm in violation of a condition of probation; stalks, harasses, or threatens a victim; absconds; or fails to comply with sexual or violent offender treatment. Section 46-18-203(11)(b), MCA. An offender commits a compliance violation, on the other hand, when she violates any other condition of supervision. Section 46-18-203(11)(b), MCA. Although non-compliance violations allow for immediate revocation of a suspended or deferred sentence, compliance violations do not. Section 46-18-203(7)(a)(iii), (8)(b)-(c), MCA. If an offender commits a compliance violation, the presiding judge may revoke the suspended or deferred sentence only if the judge determines that the DOC has exhausted the MIIG procedures and "the offender will not be responsive to further efforts under the [MIIG]." Section 46-18-203(8)(b)-(c), MCA ; Pope , ¶ 7.

¶11 Prior to its 2017 amendment, § 46-18-203, MCA, applied equally to felony offenders and misdemeanor offenders. Pope , ¶ 8 (citation omitted). We held in Pope , however, that the 2017 MIIG requirements apply only to felony revocations and not to misdemeanor revocations. Pope , ¶¶ 8, 19.

¶12 Sadiku argues that violating the order of protection was a compliance violation and that the court therefore should have required exhaustion of the MIIG procedures pursuant to § 46-18-203(8)(b)-(c), MCA, before revoking his sentence. Its failure to do, Sadiku contends, renders his sentence illegal. Sadiku first argues that Pope should be overruled because (1) the plain language of § 46-18-203, MCA, states that the statute applies to "any offender"; and (2) there is no statutory authority to revoke misdemeanor sentences unless § 46-18-203, MCA, applies to misdemeanants. Sadiku contends, alternatively, that Pope is distinguishable because the 2017 amendments to § 46-18-203, MCA, took effect before his offense occurred and, unlike Pope, he did not have adequate notice that his deferred sentence could be revoked for a compliance violation.

a. Our decision in Pope is not manifestly wrong

¶13 Stare decisis is a fundamental doctrine that "reflects our concerns for stability, predictability, and equal treatment[.]" Formicove, Inc. v. Burlington N., Inc. , 207 Mont. 189, 194, 673 P.2d 469, 472 (citations omitted). Although stare decisis does not require that we follow a "manifestly wrong decision," Formicove , 207 Mont. at 194-95, 673 P.2d at 472, it is this Court's "preferred course." Certain v. Tonn , 2009 MT 330, ¶ 19, 353 Mont. 21, 220 P.3d 384 (citation and quotation omitted). Sadiku asserts that Pope is manifestly wrong because § 46-18-203(12), MCA, states that the statute applies to "any offender." We considered and rejected this argument in Pope . Pope , ¶ 14. We held that, when § 46-18-203, MCA, is read in conjunction with other related statutes, it is clear that "the MIIG is used only in the DOC's supervision of felons." Pope , ¶ 15 (citations omitted). We explained that only felony probation and parole is within the province of the DOC, with counties and municipalities responsible for supervising misdemeanor offenders. Pope , ¶ 15 (citations omitted). We pointed out that the MIIG guidelines are referenced only in connection to the DOC probation and parole officers and do not mention or purport to direct misdemeanor probation officers. Pope , ¶ 15 (citations omitted). We also considered the legislative intent of the statute and concluded that the Legislature intended to apply the 2017 amendments to felony revocations only. Pope , ¶ 19.

¶14 Sadiku takes the Court to task for considering the statute's structure and intent in Pope , asserting that the plain language of § 46-18-203, MCA, is "clear and unambiguous on its face." See State v. Felde , 2021 MT 1, ¶ 16, 402 Mont. 391, 478 P.3d 825 (citation omitted). Sadiku correctly points out that "[l]egislative intent is to be ascertained, in the first instance, from the plain meaning of the words used by the Legislature." State v. Alpine Aviation, Inc. , 2016 MT 283, ¶ 11, 385 Mont. 282, 384 P.3d 1035 (citation and quotation omitted). We are obligated, nonetheless, to "construe a statute as a whole and in light of its surrounding sections to avoid conflicting interpretations." Fel...