City of Moline Acres v. Heidbreder, 49611
| Decision Date | 08 April 1963 |
| Docket Number | No. 49611,No. 2,49611,2 |
| Citation | 367 S.W.2d 568 |
| Parties | The CITY OF MOLINE ACRES, a Municipal Corporation, Respondent, v. Raymond L. HEIDBREDER and Marcella A. Heidbreder, Appellants |
| Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
Hamilton & Armstrong, Aubrey B. Hamilton, St. Louis, for appellants.
Val Terschluse and Frank J. Lane, Jr., St. Louis, for respondent.
In this proceeding the City of Moline Acres, a municipal corporation, sought to enjoin the defendants from operating a two-family or multiple dwelling unit in an area zoned for single-family dwellings. The trial court issued a permanent injunction accordingly, giving defendants 120 days in which to comply. After an unsuccessful motion for a new trial, defendants appealed. A constitutional question has been present in the case throughout its course, hence our jurisdiction.
The controversy here had its birth in the adoption by the Village of Moline Acres of Ordinance No. 21 as its Zoning Ordinance, on June 6, 1950. At that time this Village, in St. Louis County, consisted of an area running about a mile north and south along Missouri Highway No. 99 (now No. 67) and extending approximately 800 feet to the east and 450 feet to the west, although narrowing down toward the south. This area lay generally between Chambers Road and St. Cyr Road. The record shows that at the time there were about forty residences and one filling station in the area, the homes being along the highway. The Trustees of the Village, fearing expansion in some form by one or more of their neighbors, decided that they wanted a 'zoning ordinance' with the primary idea in mind that the entire territory should be maintained as a singlefamily residential district. Thereupon, the Trustees borrowed copies of some existing zoning ordinances, read them, and asked an attorney 'to submit to us a procedure'; thus, 'we came to the conclusion that we wanted the entire village zoned residential, single family residential.' No consultant was employed, no plans were developed as such, no reports received, and no study or plan of land uses was made. So far as shown, there was no zoning map prepared or filed until at least 1956 when, by ordinance, the Village adopted a 'new and reformed map.' A stipulation was made at the trial, however, 'that there is no zoning map presently in existence.' There is a necessary inference here that in 1960 or 1961 the Village was regularly reclassified as a city.
Ordinance No. 21 was obviously prepared from other Zoning Ordinances, but with radical changes. The preamble follows much of the wording of Secs. 89.020 and 89.030; 1 the ordinance placed 'all of the territory of the Village' in a single district, namely, 'District 'A', a Single Family Dwelling District,' except as it might be amended thereafter. The district was further defined as permitting churches, public schools, farms, parks and certain institutions. The same zoning was also applied to all annexed territory unless thereafter changed by amendment. The ordinance contained sundry definitions, regulations concerning subdivisions, miscellaneous regulations, and administrative provisions. There is nothing in the record to indicate that, prior to the adoption of the ordinance, the Trustees appointed a 'Zoning Commission' as required by Sec. 89.070, or that the procedure therein indicated was followed, i. e., a preliminary report, hearings, and final report. The ordinance itself contains several references to a 'Zoning Commission,' and to the fact that certain matters should be submitted to it.
In this situation, defendants bought from a builder a nearly completed fifteen-room house in the Village about the end of January 1953; they moved in, together with Mrs. Heidbreder's mother and father, in February. The house was planned and built for occupancy by two families or as two units; one unit consisted of eleven rooms, the other of four. Each had its own living room, kitchen, and bath facilities. There were separate outside entrances. There was a door in the common wall between the units; this was generally kept unlocked while defendants and Mrs. Heidbreder's parents lived there. The building permit issued for this house was for a 'single family dwelling,' but 'as described in Blue Prints attached to application * * *.' Defendants bought the house without any inquiry concerning the zoning, did not see the building permit, and merely relied on the fact that the blueprints provided for two units. Defendants moved out in August 1960; from that time on the separate units were rented to different families. The larger one was ordinarily leased, the smaller one rented from month to month. A night latch was placed on the common door and the units were thereafter operated as wholly separate. In the fall of 1960 the neighbors began to complain to the City of the unkempt condition of the premises, of beer bottles scattered around, cars parked on the lawn at times, trash cans left outside, and other similar annoyances. One of these neighbors testified that there had been a total of thirteen different tenants in the property within the past year and a half, which Mr. Heidbreder denied. Supposedly the conditions had been remedied somewhat by the time of trial, but the neighbors who testified were completely dissatisfied with the fact of the multiple occupancy.
Defendants received letters from the City dated October 10, 1960, December 20, 1960, and January 27, 1961, complaining of their violation of the Zoning Ordinance, requesting compliance, and finally giving notice of impending legal action. This suit was instituted on March 20, 1961. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss which, among other things, raised the contention that the ordinance was invalid as a deprivation of defendants' property contrary to the appropriate due process clauses. This defense was later preserved in an answer, as were also such other defenses as we shall discuss.
It has been more or less assumed in this record that plaintiff has made some annexation of territory since 1950, but the details are not shown. In order to complete the factual picture we should note the following amendments of the original 1950 Zoning Ordinance: 7 July 1953, County Zoning was adopted for any annexed areas, unless changed; 7 February 1956, an ordinance adopted a 'revised and reformed' zoning map, and zoned two specific lots to 'local business' or 'commercial' use; 3 April 1956, there was added to Ordinance No. 21 a new section creating a local business district, stating the uses permitted and setting out certain regulations; 3 April 1956, again adopts 'revised' map, and rezones a tract 405 feet X 575 feet from single family residence to local business (this was apparently, in whole or in part, within the original Village); 7 Aug. 1956, established several different classifications for the ground area of single family residences, and also a 'local business' district; 3 March 1959, adds 'retail gasoline station' to permitted business uses; 2 June 1959, rezones a tract 100 X 283 feet to local business (this was rather clearly a part of the original Village); 2 Feb. 1960, rezones 12 lots to local business (apparently in an annexed area); 7 Mar. 1961, certain permitted business uses added.
Essentially, the points made by defendants-appellants are: that the restriction of the whole of Moline Acres to a single use district, namely, single-family residences, was so arbitrary and unreasonable as to be violative of the due process clauses of the Federal and State Constitutions; that the ordinance was not adopted pursuant to a 'comprehensive' plan as required by Chapter 89, RSMo 1949, and that these statutes did not and do not authorize the adoption of such a plan; also, that the City's action is barred by laches and estoppel.
The City insists that it was incumbent upon defendants to prove that some part or parts of the territory were unsuited to residential uses and that they did not do so; that the plan adopted was 'comprehensive,' and that the creation of more than one use district is permissive under our statutes, but not mandatory; in short, that the ordinance as originally adopted was entirely valid. The City also asserts that the doctrines of laches and estoppel are not applicable. The contention concerning the failure to show any 'unsuitability' goes primarily to the question of reasonableness as opposed to arbitrary action on the part of the Trustees; and this, in turn, bears on the constitutionality of the ordinance, for the 'zoning power does not extend to unreasonable or arbitrary intermeddling with the private ownership of property.' 58 Am.Jur., Zoning, Sec. 21, p. 953. We shall not find it necessary to pass upon the constitutional question here, though incidental references will be made to certain cases in which the question was ruled.
We deem it unnecessary to recapitulate here the recognized principles which our courts follow in reviewing the validity of zoning ordinances. They are fully set out in the following cases: Downing v. City of Joplin, Mo., 312 S.W.2d 81; City of St. Louis v. Friedman, 358 Mo. 681, 216 S.W.2d 475; City of Richmond Heights v. Richmond Heights Memorial Post Benevolent Ass'n, 358 Mo. 70, 213 S.W.2d 479; Schell v. Kansas City, Mo., 226 S.W.2d 718; State ex rel. Christopher v. Matthews, 362 Mo. 242, 240 S.W.2d 934; Women's Kansas City St. Andrews Society v. Kansas City (C.A.8), 58 F.2d 593. The City insists, and properly so, that one attacking the reasonableness of a zoning ordinance has the burden of proving it unreasonable. Downing v. City of Joplin Mo., 312 S.W.2d 81. That point is, however, of no particular materiality in the view we take of the case.
There can be no doubt that our zoning enabling act, Secs. 89.010 to 89.140, inclusive, constitutes the sole source of power and the measure of authority for cities, towns and villages in...
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