City of Mountain View v. Superior Court

• Decision Date: 29 December 1975
• Citation: 54 Cal.App.3d 72,126 Cal.Rptr. 358
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: CITY OF MOUNTAIN VIEW, a Municipal Corporation, Petitioner, v. SUPERIOR COURT of the State of California FOR the COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA, Respondent; Thomas BARNES, doing business as Daisy Diaper Service, Real Party in Interest. Civ. 36941.

Page 358

126 Cal.Rptr. 358

54 Cal.App.3d 72

CITY OF MOUNTAIN VIEW, a Municipal Corporation, Petitioner, v. SUPERIOR COURT of the State of California FOR the COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA, Respondent Thomas BARNES, doing business as Daisy Diaper Service, Real Party in Interest.

Civ. 36941.

Court of Appeal, First District, Division 4, California.

Dec. 29, 1975.

Bruce W. Liedstrand, City Atty., Mountain View, for petitioner.

Michael Atherton, a Professional Corp., Mountain View, for real party in interest.

RATTIGAN, Associate Justice.

This proceeding involves the problem of an apparent overlap between the eminent domain law and the relocation assistance law. ¹ A person sued by a public entity in a condemnation action, brought under the eminent domain law for the acquisition of his real property for a public use, may plead and recover the 'just compensation' to which he is entitled for the loss of the property. (Cal.Const., former § 14 and present § 19 (see fn. 1, ante); Code Civ.Proc. §§ 1246, 1264.7.) If the acquisition has physically 'displaced' him from the property, the relocation assistance law may entitle him to receive certain specified benefits from the condemning public entity. These benefits may include payment of his actual moving expenses or related losses caused by the acquisition of the property, or a 'fixed relocation payment' in lieu of such moving expenses or losses. ² The question presented here is whether he may seek to recover a 'fixed relocation payment' in the public entity's condemnation action itself, as part of--or in addition to--the 'just conpensation' which he is entitled to recover therein under the eminent domain law.

The question arises from the following procedural sequence: Petitioner, the City of Mountain View (hereinafter 'the City'), commenced an action under the eminent domain law for the acquisition of certain described and enumerated parcels of land for street and related purposes. Thomas Barnes, real party in interest herein, was named among some 60 condemnee defendants in the action, by his true name and under his business name of 'Daisy Diaper Service.'

Barnes filed an answer in which he alleged (or 'admitted'), in paragraph II, that he was a lessee of parcel 18 as described in the City's complaint; in paragraph III, that he owned 'certain equipment designed for industrial purposes and istalled for use in a fixed location,' ³ which equipment had a fair market value of $35,000; in paragraph IV, that the fair market value of his leasehold interest in parcel 18 was $15,000, and that the City was taking both the equipment and the leasehold interest in its condemnation action; and, in paragraph V, that 'as a result of the taking of the property described as parcel 18, he has been compelled to discontinue his business, known as Daisy Diaper Service, and is therefore entitled to in lieu moving expenses in the sum of $10,000.00, which has been neither tendered nor paid. . . .'

The City demurred to the answer upon the ground that paragraph V was uncertain for failure to allege any 'basis' for Barnes' 'entitlement' to recover $10,000.00 for 'in lieu moving expenses," and moved to strike paragraph V for the same reason. The trial court granted the motion to strike upon the ground that Barnes had not alleged in paragraph V that he had 'exhausted his administrative remedies' in connection with the 'in lieu moving expenses' mentioned, but ruled in effect that such expenses were recoverable in the City's condemnation action and granted him leave to amend his answer. ⁴ Barnes then filed an amended answer in which he reiterated paragraphs, II, III and IV of his answer and restated paragraph V as follows:

'V. This answering defendant alleges that as the result of the taking of the property described (in the City's complaint) as Parcel 18, he has been compelled to discontinue his business, known as Daisy Diaper Service. Pursuant thereto, defendant requests (sic) plaintiff to pay to him in-lieu moving expenses, pursuant to Government Code, Section 7262(c), but plaintiff has refused, and continues to refuse to pay said benefits. Defendant requested a hearing, which was held on September 16, 1974, to review the decision of plaintiff to deny defendant's request for in-lieu moving expenses. Defendant has exhausted his administrative remedy. Further, as part of the administrative procedure, defendant provided to plaintiff evidence of average annual net earnings, and defendant alleges that his business could not have been relocated without a substantial loss of patronage. Therefore, defendant alleges he is entitled to in-lieu moving expenses in accordance with Government Code Section 7262(c) in an amount to be determined by the Court, but not less than $2,500.00, nor more than $10,000.00.'

The City filed a general demurrer to the amended answer upon the ground that it did 'not state facts sufficient to constitute a defense' to its action, and moved to strike paragraph V as amended. The trial court overruled the demurrer and denied the motion to strike.

The City thereupon commenced the present proceeding by filing with this court a 'Petition For Writ of Prohibition And/Or, In The Alternative, Mandate' which would (1) restrain the trial court 'from proceeding further on the relocation benefit issue in the eminent domain action' upon the ground that it lacks jurisdiction to do so, and, or in the alternative, (2) direct the court to set aside its order overruling the City's general demurrer to paragraph V of Barnes' answer, as amended, and denying the motion to strike the paragraph from the pleading.

For purposes of this proceeding, and within the meaning of the relocation assistance law in each instance, it is undisputed that the City is a 'public entity' (Gov.Code, § 7260, subd. (a)); that the street and related purposes for which it is acquiring parcel 18 in its condemnation action involve a 'public use' for which it may take private property under the eminent domain law (Id., subd. (g); Sts. & Hy.Code, § 4090); that, in paragraph V of his answer as amended, Barnes has pleaded that he is a 'displaced person' (Gov.Code, § 7260, subd. (c)); and that he has further pleaded that, as such, he is entitled to recover a 'fixed relocation payment' (Id., § 7262, subds. (a) and (c)), which he styles 'inlieu moving expenses,' because the City's acquisition of parcel 18 has compelled him to discontinue his business. (Ibid.)

The question thus presented, as previously stated in the abstract, is whether Barnes may seek to recover the 'fixed relocation payment' in the City's condemnation action. We hold that he may do this, but that he may and must proceed by way of cross-complaint rather than by the allegations of paragraph V of his amended answer alone; we accordingly grant peremptory relief as prayed, but qualify it as appropriate.

The City challenges the trial court's action by arguing that Barnes may not seek to recover the payment, in the City's condemnation action brought under the eminent domain law, because legislative intent to the contrary is indicated by the wholly separate formats in which the respective laws appear; because the benefits afforded by the relocation assistance law are fundamentally different from the 'damages' which are recoverable by a defendant condemnee in an action brought under the eminent domain law; and because the judicial remedies available under each law are fundamentally different as well. These contentions are essentially correct, but they do not control here. They nevertheless require discussion, as follows:

The Separate Statutory Formats

Although the eminent domain law has existed in California for more than a century (see Cal.Const. (1849), art. I, § 8; Cal.Const. (1879), art. I, former § 14 and present § 19 (see fn. 1, Ante); Code Civ.Proc. (1872), part 3, title 7 ('Of Eminent Domain'), commencing with § 1237), the relocation assistance law was not enacted until 1969 (Stats.1969, ch. 1489, § 1, p. 3043) and was then limited to acquisitions of real property for public use in Los Angeles County only. (See Gov.Code, § 7260, subd. (a), as added Ibid.; Parking Authority v. Nicovich (1973) 32 Cal.App.3d 420, 425--427, 108 Cal.Rptr. 137; Id., at pp. 432--433 (dissenting opinion).)

In 1970, the Congress enacted the federal Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act of 1970. (Pub.L. 91--646, title I (commencing with § 101); 42 U.S.C. § 4601 et seq.) This enactment required that the federal government provide relocation advisory and financial assistance to affected persons, and that it follow uniform acquisition policies, whenever it acquired real property under its power of eminent domain. (Comment, Relocation Assistance in California (1972) 3 Pac.L.J. 114, 115.) By its terms, the federal enactment became binding upon all the states in any instance where, on or after July 1, 1972, a state acquired land under its power of eminent domain in connection with a federal or federally-assisted project. (Pub.L. 91--646, § 221, subd. (a); 42 U.S.C. §§ 4630, 4655; Comment, Supra, 3 Pac.L.J. at p. 115.)

Thereupon, in 1971, the California Legislature amended and augmented the relocation assistance law with the obvious intent to implement the 1970 federal enactment And to extend comparable benefits, statewide and payable by the State and its political subdivisions, to persons disaffected by any acquisition of land under the eminent domain law after July 1, 1972. (Stats.1971, ch. 1574, p. 3154, § 1 et seq. For a history of the 1971 legislation, in combination with a prior enactment in the same year, see Comment, Supra, 3 Pac.L.J. 114 at pp. 115--116. See also CEB, § 4.53, pp. 76--78.)

Despite its clear purpose in thus developing and enacting the relocation assistance law in its present form, the Legislature did not include in it any provision for judicial relief to a party who is denied relocation benefits claimed under it. Although the...