Beaty v. Imperial IrrIGAtion Dist.

• Decision Date: 28 October 1986
• Citation: 231 Cal.Rptr. 128,186 Cal.App.3d 897
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: George F. BEATY et al., Petitioners and Appellants, v. IMPERIAL IRRIGATION DISTRICT et al., Respondents. D003325.

Page 128

231 Cal.Rptr. 128

186 Cal.App.3d 897

George F. BEATY et al., Petitioners and Appellants, v. IMPERIAL IRRIGATION DISTRICT et al., Respondents.

D003325.

Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division 1, California.

Oct. 28, 1986.

Review Denied Jan. 14, 1987.

Sutherland & Gerber and Randy J. Rutten, San Diego, for petitioners and appellants.

Jennings, Engstrand & Henrikson, Gregory V. Moser, Horton, Knox, Carter & Foote, San Diego, for respondent Imperial Irrigation District.

Redwine and Sherrill, Frederick A. Bryson and Gerald Shoaf, Riverside, for respondent Coachella Valley Water District.

STANIFORTH, Associate Justice. ^*

This case presents an issue of first impression: whether inverse condemnees are entitled to relocation assistance benefits under the Relocation Assistance Act (Gov. Code, § 7260 et seq.). ¹

Facts

The petitioners (hereafter sometimes collectively referred to as Beaty) owned land which was flooded by the rising level of the Salton Sea. They brought inverse condemnation actions against the Imperial Irrigation District and the Coachella Valley Water District alleging the Districts caused the flooding which resulted in a taking of property without just compensation. ² While these suits were pending, the petitioners vacated their property and sought relocation assistance benefits from the Districts. The Districts denied their requests.

In December 1984, Beaty petitioned the superior court for a writ of mandate to compel the Districts to set aside their decisions denying benefits. The petition was denied and Beaty appealed.

I

Under the Relocation Assistance Act (Act) (§ 7260 et seq.) a public entity "[a]s a part of the cost of acquisition of real property for a public use ... shall compensate a displaced person" for moving expenses and other costs of relocating. (§ 7262.) A "displaced person" is defined, in pertinent part, as:

"Any person who moves from real property, or who moves his personal property from real property, as a result of the acquisition of such real property, in whole or in part, by a public entity ... for public use." (§ 7260, subd. (c).)

"Public use" is defined as "... a use for which real property may be acquired by eminent domain." (§ 7260, subd. (g).)

The relocation assistance provided by the Act is separate from the "just compensation" required by the California and United States Constitutions. (City of Mountain View v. Superior Court, 54 Cal.App.3d 72, 79-80, 126 Cal.Rptr. 358.)

II

The fundamental rule of statutory construction is ascertaining the intent of the Legislature so as to effectuate the purpose of the law. (Moyer v. Workmen's Comp. Appeals Bd., 10 Cal.3d 222, 230, 110 Cal.Rptr. 144, 514 P.2d 1224.) The court looks first to the language of the statute, attempting to give effect to the usual, ordinary import of that language and seeking to avoid making any language mere surplusage. Significance if possible should be attributed to every word, phrase, sentence and part of an act in pursuance of the legislative purpose. (Ibid.) The various parts of a statutory enactment must be harmonized by considering the particular clause or section in the context of the statutory framework as a whole. (Select Base Materials v. Board of Equal., 51 Cal.2d 640, 645, 335 P.2d 672.) The provisions must be given a reasonable and common sense interpretation consistent with the apparent purpose and intention of the Legislature, practical rather than technical in nature, and which, when applied, will result in wise policy rather than mischief or absurdity. (United Business Com. v. City of San Diego, 91 Cal.App.3d 156, 170, 154 Cal.Rptr. 263; City of Costa Mesa v. McKenzie, 30 Cal.App.3d 763, 770, 106 Cal.Rptr. 569.)

III

Beaty contends since the Act applies to a condemnee in an eminent domain proceeding, it also applies to a condemnee in an inverse condemnation action and a denial of relocation assistance benefits to inverse condemnees would be an arbitrary and capricious denial of equal protection.

Both eminent domain proceedings and inverse condemnation actions rest on the constitutional requirement that the government must provide just compensation to a property owner when it takes his or her private property for a public use. (U.S. Const., 5th Amend.; Cal. Const., art. I, § 19; Baker v. Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport Authority, 39 Cal.3d 862, 866, 218 Cal.Rptr. 293, 705 P.2d 866, cert. denied --- U.S. ----, 106 S.Ct. 1200, 89 L.Ed.2d 314.) The principal procedural distinction between direct and inverse condemnation actions is that in a direct action the public entity takes the initiative while in an inverse action the property owner takes the initiative. (Klopping v. City of Whittier, 8 Cal.3d 39, 43, 104 Cal.Rptr. 1, 500 P.2d 1345.)

The Districts argue there are significant substantive differences between the two actions. We agree there are some significant differences between direct and inverse actions, including: (1) inverse condemnation actions have evolved to include a broader scope of governmental activity than is traditionally included within the eminent domain power and (2) not all inverse condemnation actions result in an acquisition of private property by a public entity.

While in eminent domain litigation, the focus is usually limited to the amount of compensation owed the property owner under the "just compensation" clause, in an inverse condemnation action, the property owner must first clear the hurdle of establishing the public entity has, in fact, taken his or her property before he or she can reach the issue of "just compensation." (People v. Ricciardi, 23 Cal.2d 390, 400, 144 P.2d 799; see also San Gabriel Valley Water Co. v. City of Montebello, 84 Cal.App.3d 757, 769, 148 Cal.Rptr. 830.) As the court noted in Taper v. City of Long Beach, 129 Cal.App.3d 590, 604-605, 181 Cal.Rptr. 169:

"The underlying consideration in an inverse condemnation action is the proper balance between the owner's private property rights and the public need for proper land use and fiscal planning and control. [Citations.] By contrast, in an eminent domain action, the public entity has already planned and decided to acquire the property and has instituted proceedings to do so, and the principal question is how much the property owner should have as 'just compensation.' [Citation.]"

To state a cause of action for inverse condemnation, the property owner must show there was an invasion or appropriation (a "taking" or "damaging") of some valuable property right which the property owner possesses by a public entity and the invasion or appropriation directly and specially affected the property owner to his injury. (Selby Realty Co. v. City of San Buenaventura, 10 Cal.3d 110, 119-120, 109 Cal.Rptr. 799, 514 P.2d 111; Rancho La Costa v. County of San Diego, 111 Cal.App.3d 54, 60, 168 Cal.Rptr. 491, cert. denied 451 U.S. 939, 101 S.Ct. 2020, 68 L.Ed.2d 326.)

In an inverse condemnation action, the property owner need not show the public entity intended to take or damage the property; inverse actions have been permitted when the invasion occurred as a result of negligence (see, e.g., McMahan's of Santa Monica v. City of Santa Monica, 146 Cal.App.3d 683, 194 Cal.Rptr. 582 [damage from 51-year-old water main which had an expected life of 40 years] ) or even when the public entity had absolutely no intent or "fault" (see Albers v. County of Los Angeles, 62 Cal.2d 250, 42 Cal.Rptr. 89, 398 P.2d 129) or lacks the power of eminent domain (see Baker v. Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport Authority, supra, 39 Cal.3d 862, 218 Cal.Rptr. 293, 705 P.2d 866). As the Supreme Court has explained:

" ' "All that is necessary to show is that the damage resulted from an exercise of governmental power while seeking to promote 'the general interest in its relation to any legitimate object of the government.' " ' " (Baker v. Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport Authority, supra, 39 Cal.3d 862, 867, 218 Cal.Rptr. 293, 705 P.2d 866.)

The Supreme Court has also held an inverse condemnation action will lie regardless of whether the physical injury to real property was forseeable or not so long as it was proximately caused by a public improvement as deliberately designed and constructed. (Albers v. County of Los Angeles, supra, 62 Cal.2d 250, 263-264, 42 Cal.Rptr. 89, 398 P.2d 129.)

Further, while an eminent domain proceeding contemplates a permanent acquisition of private property for a public use, an inverse condemnation action may be maintained for mere damage to property (see Holtz v. San Fransico Bay Area Rapid Transit Dist., 17 Cal.3d 648, 131 Cal.Rptr. 646, 552 P.2d 430), for temporary invasions (see Imperial Cattle Co. v. Imperial Irrigation Dist., 167 Cal.App.3d 263, 213 Cal.Rptr. 622) and even when the public entity does not physically possess the property (see Varjabedian v. City of Madera, 20 Cal.3d 285, 142 Cal.Rptr. 429, 572 P.2d 43 [sewage odors]; Parker v. City of Los Angeles, 44 Cal.App.3d 556, 118 Cal.Rptr. 687 [airport noise] ). Unlike an eminent domain proceeding, an inverse condemnation action does not always result in the public entity acquiring private property. (Contrast Orme v. State of California ex rel. Dept. of Water Resources, 83 Cal.App.3d 178, 147 Cal.Rptr. 735 and Shaeffer v. State of California, 3 Cal.App.3d 348, 352, 83 Cal.Rptr. 347 with Salton Bay Marina, Inc. v. Imperial Irrigation Dist., supra, 172 Cal.App.3d 914, 962, 218 Cal.Rptr. 839.)

Recently, in Imperial Cattle Co. v. Imperial Irrigation Dist., supra, 167 Cal.App.3d 263, 213 Cal.Rptr. 622, we observed there were two different types of inverse condemnation cases: (1) those "which are merely a substitute for direct condemnation, that is, where the government has intentionally taken or damaged a citizen's property interest without prior payment," and (2) those cases where the damage is "neither intentional nor immediate" but "which can be molded into an inverse condemnation rubric...." (Id. at pp. 273-274,...