City of New Haven v. Connecticut State Bd. of Labor Relations

• Decision Date: 05 October 1979
• Docket Number: No. 170612,170612
• Citation: 36 Conn.Supp. 18,410 A.2d 140
• Court: Connecticut Superior Court
• Parties: CITY OF NEW HAVEN et al. v. CONNECTICUT STATE BOARD OF LABOR RELATIONS.

Page 140

410 A.2d 140

36 Conn.Supp. 18

CITY OF NEW HAVEN et al. v. CONNECTICUT STATE BOARD OF LABOR RELATIONS.

No. 170612.

Superior Court of Connecticut, Judicial District of New Haven.

Oct. 5, 1979.

Frederick W. Danforth, Jr., New Haven, for plaintiffs.

William S. Zeman, West Hartford, and William R. Darcy, Wethersfield, for defendant.

BERDON, Judge.

This is an appeal by the city of New Haven and the New Haven board of education (both hereinafter referred to as the municipal employer) from a decision and orders of the Connecticut state board of labor relations (the labor board). Four labor unions (unions) which represent some of the employees of the municipal employer had filed complaints ¹ with the labor board, alleging that the municipal employer had unilaterally and without good faith bargaining enacted an amended residency ordinance requiring its prospective employees and those employees transferred in the future to positions outside their bargaining units to become residents of the city of New Haven. The labor board held that the municipal employer, by adopting the ordinance without first bargaining in good faith with the unions, violated § 7-470 of the General Statutes, part of the municipal employee relations act.

The labor board found the following facts which are not disputed. Since February 24, 1966, the municipal employer has by ordinance required its employees to live within the greater New Haven area, which is defined as New Haven and those six towns and cities which are contiguous to New Haven. On March 15, 1976, a petition was filed to amend the residency ordinance to require employees to reside within the city. A public hearing was held on the proposed amendment at which time the unions argued against it, claiming that its adoption would be in violation of state labor laws. The issue of whether the residency requirement was a mandatory subject for good faith bargaining was clearly raised at the public hearing. ²

The union heard nothing further on the proposed amendment until April 21, 1977, when a revised draft was again submitted. On November 15, 1977, the legislation committee submitted the majority and minority reports on the issue to the board of aldermen. On November 29, 1977, an informal hearing was held on the revised proposal and the unions again protested its adoption. On December 5, 1977, the board of aldermen enacted, and on December 19, 1977 the mayor approved, the amendment to the residency ordinance which became effective January 1, 1978. The pertinent parts of the amendment to the residency ordinance provided that "as a condition for employment" all persons employed after January 1, 1978 must become residents within six months of employment, and that those who were employed before January 1, 1978 and who are appointed, transferred or promoted outside their bargaining units must comply with the ordinance in the same manner as those who were hired after January 1, 1978. ³

At no time while the amendment to the residency ordinance was in the legislative process, including that period of time during which the parties negotiated new collective bargaining agreements, ⁴ did the unions or the municipal employer ever request to bargain as to the change in residency requirements. In the current collective bargaining agreements, there is no residency requirement.

The labor board concluded the following: that requiring those employed after January 1, 1978 and those employed before January 1, 1978 who are permanently appointed, transferred or promoted into a bargaining unit to establish residence in the city within six months thereafter is a condition of employment and therefore a mandatory subject of collective bargaining; that the unilateral change of such a condition of employment without collective bargaining is a practice prohibited by § 7-470 of the General Statutes; and that the failure of the unions to request bargaining on the residency requirement while the matter was in the legislative process did not constitute a waiver of their statutory right to bargain over the subject in good faith. ⁵ Pursuant to the jurisdiction conferred upon it under § 7-471 of the General Statutes, the labor board issued appropriate remedial orders. ⁶

I Issues

The municipal employer in this administrative appeal raises two issues, to wit: whether the residency requirement for new and transferred employees was a condition of employment and therefore a mandatory subject of collective bargaining; and if it was, whether the unions, by failing to demand that the municipal employer bargain on the issue during the twenty-one months it took to adopt the ordinance, waived their right to have the municipal employer bargain in good faith with them over the subject.

II Jurisdiction

In deciding this administrative appeal, the limit of the court's jurisdiction is set by statute. The Uniform Administrative Procedure Act; General Statutes §§ 4-166 et seq.; ⁷ provides in part for the following: "The court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact. The court may affirm the decision of the agency or remand the case for further proceedings. The court may reverse or modify the decision if substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions or decisions are: (1) In violation of constitutional or statutory provisions; (2) in excess of the statutory authority of the agency; (3) made upon unlawful procedure; (4) affected by other error of law; (5) clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record; or (6) arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion." General Statutes § 4-183(g). If the labor board's findings are supported by substantial evidence, ⁸ they cannot be disturbed. Madow v. Muzio, 176 Conn. 374, 376, 407 A.2d 997.

III Municipal Employee Relations Act

The labor board acted on the unions' complaints pursuant to the jurisdiction conferred upon it by the Municipal Employee Relations Act (the MERA); §§ 7-467 et seq. of the General Statutes; which was adopted in 1965 by the legislature. Public Acts, 1965, No. 159. The MERA extended the rights and obligations of collective bargaining to employees of local government. The act was designed to accomplish the salutary purpose of promoting harmony between local governments and their employees. The basic theme of this type of legislation "was that through collective bargaining the passions, arguments, and struggles of prior years would be channeled into constructive, open discussions leading, it was hoped, to mutual agreement." H. K. Porter Co., Inc. v. N. L. R. B., 397 U.S. 99, 103, 90 S.Ct. 821, 823, 25 L.Ed.2d 146; West Hartford Education Assn., Inc. v. DeCourcy, 162 Conn. 566, 584-85, 295 A.2d 526. "(L)abor relations acts are remedial enactments and as such should be liberally construed in order to accomplish their objectives . . . ." Connecticut State Board of Labor Relations v. Board of Education of the Town of West Hartford, 177 Conn. 68, 74, 411 A.2d 28, 31. "In furtherance of that principle, exemptions or exclusions are to be strictly construed." Success Village Apartments, Inc. v. Local 376, 175 Conn. 165, 168, 397 A.2d 85, 87.

To effectuate these principles of collective bargaining, the MERA makes it mandatory for local governmental employers and their employees "to meet at reasonable times . . . and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours and other conditions of employment . . . ." General Statutes § 7-470(c). The duty to bargain collectively and in good faith takes on more important dimensions in the public sector of employment because employees of government are denied the right to strike. General Statutes § 7-475.

The language of the MERA regarding the duty to confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours and conditions of employment is similar to that contained in the National Labor Relations Act. This federal act provides that it shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of its employees "in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of employment." 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(5), 159(a). "For this reason, the judicial interpretation frequently accorded the federal act is of great assistance and persuasive force in the interpretation of our own act." Imperial Laundry, Inc. v. State Board of Labor Relations, 142 Conn. 457, 460, 115 A.2d 439, 441; New Canaan v. State Board of Labor Relations, 160 Conn. 285, 291, 278 A.2d 761; Windsor v. Windsor Police Department Employees Assn., Inc., 154 Conn. 530, 536, 227 A.2d 65.

The legislature has assigned to the labor board the primary task of construing the provisions of the MERA. General Statutes § 4-178; Local 1219 v. Connecticut Labor Relations Board, 171 Conn. 342, 351, 370 A.2d 952. Accordingly, great weight must be given to the labor board's construction of the act. See Ford Motor Co. v. N. L. R. B., 441 U.S. 488, 99 S.Ct. 1842, 1849, 60 L.Ed.2d 420; Connecticut State Board of Labor Relations v. Board of Education of the Town of West Hartford, supra. Of course, notwithstanding this deference to the decisions of the agency charged with the responsibility of administering the law, the court will judicially review the agency's decisions to determine if it acted arbitrarily, unreasonably, or contrary to law. Seattle, First National Bank v. N. L. R. B., 444 F.2d 30, 33 (9th Cir.); Norwich v. Norwich Fire Fighters, 173 Conn. 210, 214, 377 A.2d 290.

A requirement of residency at the time of or during employment has passed constitutional muster. ⁹ It has been held that an ordinance requiring police officers to maintain a particular residence during the period they are employed is not irrational and therefore does not violate the equal protection clause...