Shortt v. New Milford Police Dept.

• Decision Date: 25 July 1989
• Docket Number: No. 13524,13524
• Citation: 212 Conn. 294,562 A.2d 7
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: , 29 Wage & Hour Cas. (BNA) 633, 115 Lab.Cas. P 56,212 David SHORTT v. NEW MILFORD POLICE DEPARTMENT.

Page 7

562 A.2d 7

212 Conn. 294, 29 Wage & Hour Cas. (BNA) 633,

115 Lab.Cas. P 56,212

David SHORTT v. NEW MILFORD POLICE DEPARTMENT.

No. 13524.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued June 9, 1989.

Decided July 25, 1989.

Jeffrey B. Sienkiewicz, with whom was Nancy R. Sienkiewicz, New Milford, for appellant (defendant).

Janet Bond Arterton, with whom was JoNel Newman, New Haven, for appellee (plaintiff).

Before PETERS, C.J., and CALLAHAN, GLASS, COVELLO and HULL, JJ.

PETERS, Chief Justice.

This appeal involves two questions of construction concerning the scope of General Statutes § 31-72 ¹: (1) whether a municipality constituted an "employer" for the purposes of this statute under the definition contained in General Statutes § 31-71a(1) prior to its amendment by Public Acts 1987, No. 87-366, § 2; ² and (2) whether this statute provides an independent substantive cause of action for the collection of wages that permits the bypass of otherwise applicable grievance procedures under a collective bargaining agreement. The trial court dismissed, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the action brought by the plaintiff, David Shortt, to collect wages allegedly owed to him by the defendants, the New Milford police department and the town of New Milford. The Appellate Court, finding error, sustained the plaintiff's appeal and remanded the case for further proceedings. Shortt v. New Milford Police Department, 16 Conn.App. 232, 547 A.2d 107 (1988). We granted the petition for certification filed by the defendant New Milford police department. Shortt v. New Milford Police Department, 209 Conn. 817, 550 A.2d 1085 (1988). ³ Because we disagree with the Appellate Court's resolution of the two issues that we certified, we now reverse.

The Appellate Court's opinion reveals the following factual and procedural history derived from the allegations in the plaintiff's complaint. The defendant New Milford police department hired the plaintiff, David Shortt, as a police officer. After completing his training, the plaintiff began working as a probationary patrol officer on July 23, 1984. Shortt v. New Milford Police Department, supra, 16 Conn.App. at 233, 547 A.2d 107. One month later, a required medical examination revealed that he had certain " 'extra heartbeats.' " Id. During a subsequent period of tests to determine the extent and the seriousness of his heart condition, the plaintiff continued to be employed as a police officer and received his salary. Id., at 233-34, 547 A.2d 107. On October 12, 1984, he was hospitalized for three days of further testing, for which he received sick pay. Id., at 234, 547 A.2d 107.

From October 15, 1984, to April 17, 1985, although the plaintiff nominally returned to work, he was not permitted to resume full active duties. He was allowed to carry his police badge but received no wages. He was not returned to active status until he executed a workers' compensation waiver of liability for his preexisting heart condition. Id.

As a member of the International Brotherhood of Police Officers, Local 361 (union), the plaintiff was subject to its collective bargaining agreement with the defendant, pursuant to the provisions of General Statutes §§ 7-467 through 7-477. Id. The collective bargaining agreement provided a three step process for the resolution of grievances and disputes arising out of the course of the employment relationship. On November 15, 1984, the plaintiff filed a claim for nonpayment of wages, in compliance with step one of the mandated grievance procedures. The defendant denied the claim because it considered him to be on " 'indefinite sick leave without pay.' " Id. When settlement discussions failed, the plaintiff abandoned further grievance proceedings and instead, just prior to the lapse of the two year statute of limitations, ⁴ commenced suit under § 31-72 to collect wages allegedly due him for the period commencing with his hospital discharge and ending with his execution of the workers' compensation waiver. Id., at 234-35, 547 A.2d 107.

In the trial court, the defendants moved to dismiss the plaintiff's action on the basis that the court lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter of the dispute. Id., at 235, 547 A.2d 107. They alleged, in a supporting affidavit, that the plaintiff had failed to pursue the further steps contained in the administrative grievance process set forth in article XXIII of the collective bargaining agreement between the town and the police union. ⁵ Id., at 235-36, 547 A.2d 107. In its memorandum of decision granting the defendants' motion to dismiss, the trial court concluded that the terms of the collective bargaining agreement mandated exhaustion of the three step grievance process before the plaintiff might invoke applicable law, in this instance § 31-72. For this reason, the court concluded that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to proceed. Id., at 236, 547 A.2d 107.

The Appellate Court, while recognizing the general rule that available administrative remedies must ordinarily be exhausted, declined to apply this rule to a statutory action for the collection of wages. Expressing the view that the collection of wages is not an appropriate subject for collective bargaining, the court ruled that the plaintiff's rights under § 31-72 were not preempted by the collective bargaining agreements. Id., at 236-38, 547 A.2d 107. The Appellate Court apparently assumed, without discussion, that municipalities were employers liable for defaulted wage payments under the terms of § 31-72. ⁶

Pursuing the two issues on which we granted certification, the defendant police department maintains that the Appellate Court erred in construing § 31-72 to permit the plaintiff to recover alleged unpaid wages from the defendant. First, the defendant argues that it was exempt from § 31-72 because municipal employers were not covered by that statute at the time when this lawsuit was commenced. Second, the defendant argues that the plaintiff was not entitled to invoke § 31-72 without having first exhausted the grievance process contained in the collective bargaining agreement that his union had negotiated. We agree with both of these claims of error.

I

We turn first to the issue of the applicability of § 31-72 to municipal employers prior to the 1987 amendment of § 31-71a(1). The unamended definition of "employer" in § 31-71a(1) expressly included "any ... corporation." ⁷ The amendment added "the state and any political subdivision thereof" to the categories of those encompassed by the term "employer." Public Acts 1987, No. 87-366, § 2. The dispositive question posed by this legislative history is whether the legislature intended by its 1987 amendment to clarify or to enlarge the definition of "employer" in § 31-71a(1).

As a point of departure, we note that the relationship between "corporation" and "municipal corporation" is not obvious on the face of the language of § 31-71a(1) as it existed before 1987. Our task, in resolving this ambiguity, is to construe § 31-72 so as to " ' "ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature." ' " Capalbo v. Planning & Zoning Board of Appeals, 208 Conn. 480, 486, 547 A.2d 528 (1988); State v. Champagne, 206 Conn. 421, 428, 538 A.2d 193 (1988); State v. Blasko, 202 Conn. 541, 553, 522 A.2d 753 (1987). In ascertaining that intent, we deem the legislature to have intended to harmonize its enactment with existing common law and statutory requirements. Commissioner v. Freedom of Information Commission, 204 Conn. 609, 621, 529 A.2d 692 (1987); Dart & Bogue Co. v. Slosberg, 202 Conn. 566, 575, 522 A.2d 763 (1987). Accordingly, the legislature must have understood that, although a municipality is a corporation for some purposes, such as its right to sue and be sued, its exercise of distinctive governmental functions has afforded it extensive immunity from civil liability. See, e.g., Roman v. Stamford, 211 Conn. 396, 397-98, 559 A.2d 710 (1989); Gordon v. Bridgeport Housing Authority, 208 Conn. 161, 165-70, 544 A.2d 1185 (1988). In this context, we would be reluctant to assume that the legislature intended to impose additional liability on municipal corporations without expressly saying so.

This conclusion finds further support in the provisions of the Municipal Employee Relations Act (MERA), General Statutes § 7-467 et seq. Extending the rights and obligations of collective bargaining to employees of local government, MERA "was designed to accomplish the salutary purpose of promoting harmony between local governments and their employees.... To effectuate these principles of collective bargaining, the MERA makes it mandatory for local governmental employers and their employees 'to meet at reasonable times ... and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours and other conditions of employment....' General Statutes § 7-470(c)." (Emphasis added.) New Haven v. State Board of Labor Relations, 36 Conn.Sup. 18, 24, 410 A.2d 140 (1979). Since the legislature is presumed to exercise its statutory authority with knowledge of existing relevant statutes and with the intention of creating one consistent body of law; Commissioner v. Freedom of Information Commission, supra, 204 Conn. at 621, 529 A.2d 692; Beloff v. Progressive Casualty Ins. Co., 203 Conn. 45, 57, 523 A.2d 477 (1987); it is reasonable to infer that the legislature would not have intended sub silentio to displace such a comprehensive regulatory scheme. In this regard, it is particularly noteworthy that General Statutes § 7-470 provides a comprehensive list of prohibited acts by employers and employee organizations. The existence of MERA, therefore, buttresses our conclusion that the term "employer" in § 31-72 before its amendment did not include municipal corporations.

In this context, the inferences to be drawn from the 1987 amendment to § 31-72 are readily ascertainable. We presume that, when the legislature amends the language of a statute, it...