City of Orange v. Valenti
| Decision Date | 17 January 1974 |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
| Parties | CITY OF ORANGE, a municipal corporation, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Pete C. VALENTI et al., Defendants and Respondents. Civ. 13132. |
The City of Orange brought this action to obtain an injunction compelling the State of California and Pete C. Valenti, Donald A. Bailey, Alex B. DeFiore, a Joint Venture (hereinafter 'VDB'), to comply with certain local ordinances and the California Environmental Quality Act. VDB owns an office building at 1524 East Mayfair Avenue in the City of Orange which it leased to the state for use as an unemployment insurance office; the Department of Human Resources Development was the first tenant to occupy the building. The office was opened to the public on May 22, 1972.
Shortly before the office opened, in response to protests by neighboring residents, the city passed two urgency ordinances regulating 'public service office buildings.' One established special parking requirements (ordinance 23--72), the other required a conditional use permit for such buildings even in zones where they are otherwise permitted (ordinance 24--72). The ordinances expressly recite that immediate enactment is necessary because of the impending opening of the office at 1524 East Mayfair. Pre-existing city ordinances specify the number of off street parking spaces required for particular uses (Orange Municipal Code section 9125.1) and provide that if the use is not mentioned, the city planner shall determine the requirements based on the requirements for the most comparable use which is described (Orange Municipal Code section 9125.2). The lease between VDB and the state provides that the premises must conform to all applicable codes, ordinances and zoning laws.
The complaint is divided into five causes of action, all seeking an injunction and a writ of mandate ordering the state and VDB to comply with particular laws and ordinances. The first cause of action alleges the enactment of the special parking ordinance (23--72); the second alleges enactment of the conditional use permit requirement (24--72). The third cause of action alleges that the unemployment insurance office use was not described in Orange Municipal Code section 9125.1, and that the city planner was not able to determine parking requirements pursuant to Orange Municipal Code section 9125.2 because the precise use was never described to the city planner by any of the defendants. The fourth and fifth causes of action allege failure to comply with the California Environmental Quality Act in that no environmental impact statement was prepared (Pub. Resources Code, § 21100) and there was no consultation with the city prior to making a detailed statement (Pub. Resources Code, § 21104). The trial court sustained the demurrers of all defendants to all causes of action in the second amended complaint without leave to amend and dismissed the action. (Demurrers to the first amended complaint had previously been sustained with leave to amend as to the first, second, and third causes of action, but overruled as to the fourth and fifth causes of action.)
The first and second causes of action refer to the two urgency ordinances adopted after the lease was signed and shortly before the opening of the office. These ordinances are clearly discriminatory; they are obviously aimed at stopping the establishment of the unemployment insurance office, even though the pre-existing zoning would permit the use. The ordinances themselves recite this in the urgency clause. As in Sunset View Cemetery Assn. v. Kraintz, 196 Cal.App.2d 115, 16 Cal.Rptr. 317, the only 'emergency' was the pending action which the legislative body wanted to prevent. The ordinances here were intended to frustrate the state's plans, which were perfectly proper when the lease was executed. This is the plain discrimination condemned in Sunset View Cemetery Assn. v. Kraintz, Supra; the trial court correctly determined that it could not enjoin the defendants to comply with these unconstitutional ordinances and properly sustained the demurrers without leave to amend.
The ordinances were discriminatory against both VDB and the state, so the city's argument that VDB cannot share in the state's exemption from compliance with zoning laws (Hall v. City of Taft, 47 Cal.2d 177, 302 P.2d 574; County of Los Angeles v. City of Los Angeles, 212 Cal.App.2d 160, 28 Cal.Rptr. 32) is immaterial in regard to these ordinances. The city's argument that the last minute ordinances would not have been necessary if the state or VDB had made their plans known earlier does not save the ordinances. They would still have been discriminatory if enacted several months earlier, because still designed to frustrate the legitimate purposes of the defendants, and aimed at them alone.
The pre-existing parking requirements (Orange Municipal Code sections 9125.1, 9125.2) do not suffer from the discriminatory defects of the urgency ordinances. The third cause of action attempts to allege non-compliance with this valid ordinance. 1
However, the ordinance cannot be applied against the state. When the state engages in such sovereign activities as the construction and maintenance of its buildings (and leasing of the building is no different), it is not subject to local regulations unless the Constitution says it is or the Legislature has consented to such regulations. (Hall v. City of Taft, Supra, 47 Cal.2d 177, 183, 302 P.2d 574; County of Los Angeles v. City of Los Angeles, Supra, 212 Cal.App.2d 160, 165, 28 Cal.Rptr. 32.) The parking ordinances apply solely to the state as the user of the building, not to the owners, because the number of spaces required is to be determined based on the Use of the property. If the ordinance were applicable, and if more spaces are required than are provided, the use of the building as an unemployment insurance office would have to be curtailed. This would have the effect of limiting the state's sovereignty by local regulation, which is prohibited by Hall v. City of Taft, Supra.
Hall specifically indicates that the Legislature may consent to regulations by local government. The city argues that it has done so here by the lease provision on compliance with applicable local ordinances, while the state contends that such consent must come from the Legislature by statute, not from the agreement of a leasing agent. Apparently no cases discuss the nature of the consent which would permit the state to be bound by local regulations.
In some circumstances, the Legislature has given this consent by statute. For example, Government Code sections 53090--53095 provide that local agencies which perform state functions (such as school districts) shall comply with city or county building and zoning ordinances. But the consent is limited; a school board may, by two-thirds vote, render a zoning ordinance inapplicable. (Gov.Code, § 53094.) The action of the Legislature in giving consent in some circumstances without giving it here, 2 leads to the possible inference that no consent was intended which was not granted by statute.
A stronger reason for holding that the Legislature's consent must be expressed in a statute can be drawn from the analogy to the state's sovereign immunity from damage claims. This immunity stems from the sovereignty of the state, as does the exemption from local regulations. And it is clear that no agent of the state can waive this immunity; liability may be derived only from an express statute. (Gov.Code, § 815.) So, just as an agent of the state may not waive statutory immunity, a leasing agent may not waive the state's right to be free from local regulations.
And even if an express statute is not necessary to find consent, it is doubtful consent could be found from this lease. The obligation to comply with zoning ordinances is an obligation of VDB, the lessor, rather than the state. The city was not a party to the lease. There is no reason why the state could not waive VDB's obligation if it became burdensome.
For these reasons, it would be impossible for the city to state a cause of action based on violation of Orange Municipal Code section 9125.2, and the court correctly sustained the demurrer without leave to amend in regard to the third cause of action.
The fourth and fifth causes of action attempt to allege a violation of the California Environmental Quality Act. (Pub. Resources Code, § 21000 et seq.) As it read when the office was opened in 1972, Public Resources Code section 21100 required all state agencies to include an environmental impact statement in any report on any project which could have a significant effect on the environment. (The section was amended in 1972 to require the preparation of an environmental impact report on such projects without regard to the preparation of any other report.) The complaint alleges that the use of the leased building by the state is a project which could have a significant effect on the environment, and that the state has not complied with the law requiring an environmental impact statement. 3 The principal adverse environmental effect alleged is increased traffic and parking problems.
The California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) is very similar in purpose and language to the...
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