City of Phoenix v. Nutt

• Decision Date: 24 March 1930
• Docket Number: Civil 2859
• Parties: CITY OF PHOENIX, a Municipal Corporation, Appellant, v. T. W. NUTT, Appellee
• Court: Arizona Supreme Court

286 P. 371

36 Ariz. 405

CITY OF PHOENIX, a Municipal Corporation, Appellant, v. T. W. NUTT, Appellee

Civil No. 2859

Supreme Court of Arizona

March 24, 1930

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of the County of Maricopa. M. T. Phelps, Judge. Affirmed.

Mr. C H. Young, City Attorney, for Appellant.

Messrs Sloan, Holton, McKesson & Scott, for Appellee.

OPINION

LOCKWOOD, C. J.

T. W Nutt, hereinafter called appellee, brought suit against the City of Phoenix, a municipal corporation, hereinafter called appellant, for personal injuries alleged by him to have been received through the negligence of appellant. The case was tried to a jury which returned a verdict in favor of appellee in the sum of three thousand dollars; and, after the usual motion for new trial was overruled, appellant brought the matter before us for review.

There is but one question for us to consider on this appeal, and that is whether or not the verdict of the jury is excessive. The evidence taken in its most favorable aspect on behalf of appellee, as it must be under such an assignment, shows substantially the following facts: Appellee fell into a hole in one of the sidewalks of the City of Phoenix. He was taken to a hospital where he remained for a period of some six weeks, expending approximately two hundred dollars for hospital fees and medical attendance. The medical testimony shows that appellee was a man seventy years of age afflicted with chronic arthritis and arteriosclerosis, and that an accident of the kind in question to a man of that age and condition is very slow in healing. The fall caused a severe sprain in the right ankle, tearing the ligaments, muscles and nerves of his leg. Prior to that time he was able to do expert finishing or any other skilled work as a carpenter or builder, and until shortly before his accident had been earning as high as eight dollars and a half per day. Ever since he left the hospital, and up to the time of trial, he has been unable to accept any employment on a daily wage basis, for the reason that he suffers such severe pain in his ankle and back that he is unable to do a full day's work. Under these circumstances, can we say that the damages are so excessive that the verdict should be set aside?

The rule for determining such a question has been laid down in this jurisdiction in the case of United Verde Copper Co. v. Wiley, 20 Ariz. 525, 183 P. 737, 738. Therein we stated as follows:

" . . we think the rule laid down by Chancellor KENT in Coleman v. Southwick, 9 Johns. (N.Y.) 45, 6 Am. Dec. 253, is controlling. He said:

"'The damages, therefore, must be so excessive as to strike mankind, at first blush, as being beyond all measure, unreasonable, and outrageous, and such as manifestly show the jury to have been actuated by passion, partiality, prejudice, or corruption. In short, the damages must be flagrantly outrageous and extravagant, or the court cannot undertake to draw the line, for they have no standard by which to ascertain the excess.'

"After quoting Chancellor KENT as above, in Chicago, R.I & P. Ry. Co. v. De Vore, 43 Okl. 534, L.R.A. 1915F 21, 143 P. 864, the court made the following comment, in which we fully concur:

"'We think this rule is sound, for the reason the jury and the trial judge have a much better opportunity than do the appellate judges to measure the actual...