Medlock v. Florlan, Civil 3339

• Decision Date: 15 January 1934
• Docket Number: Civil 3339
• Parties: FLOYD MEDLOCK, Appellant, v. IVY A. FLORLAN, Doing Business Under the Firm Name and Style of BARKER BAKERY, Appellee
• Court: Arizona Supreme Court

28 P.2d 621

42 Ariz. 558

FLOYD MEDLOCK, Appellant, v. IVY A. FLORLAN, Doing Business Under the Firm Name and Style of BARKER BAKERY, Appellee

Civil No. 3339

Supreme Court of Arizona

January 15, 1934

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of the County of Maricopa. Dave W. Ling, Judge. Judgment affirmed.

Messrs Hayes, Stanford, Walton, Allee & Williams, for Appellant.

Messrs Eillinwood & Ross and Mr. Norman S. Hull, for appellee.

OPINION

LOCKWOOD, J.

This is an appeal by Floyd Medlock, hereinafter called plaintiff from a judgment of the superior court of Maricopa county which was rendered in his favor in an action which he brought against Ivy A. Florian, hereinafter called defendant, for damages which plaintiff alleged occurred to him and to his automobile as the result of a collision caused by the negligence of one of Florian's employees.

The plaintiff claimed damages of $51,500 for personal injuries and of $110.75 for injuries to his automobile. The case was tried to a jury, which returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff in the sum of $360.75. Defendant did not contend during the trial that the accident was not caused by the negligence of his employee, but took the position that if plaintiff had sustained any injuries to his person as a result of the accident, they were trivial, and that if his health was not good after the accident, it was the result of matters which antedated the accident and were in no way caused or increased by it. After the verdict and judgment thereon, the usual motion for new trial was filed, among the grounds being that the damages awarded were insufficient and appeared to have been given under the influence of passion and prejudice. This motion was overruled by the trial court.

There is but one question raised on the appeal and that is as to the adequacy of the verdict. The question of the amount of damages is generally a matter for the jury. A trial judge may under our statute twice set aside a verdict if in his opinion it is contrary to the weight of the evidence. Section 3849, Rev. Code 1928. And we have said that this power should be exercised liberally in the interests of justice. Dennis v. Stukey, 37 Ariz. 299, 294 P. 276. But this tribunal has laid down as a universal rule, never departed from for many years, that if there is a material conflict in the evidence, so that the verdict depends upon the belief of the jurors as to the credibility of any of the witnesses and the probability or improbability of their testimony, it will not be disturbed by us unless it appears affirmatively that it must have been the result of an error of law or of passion and prejudice on the part of the jury. Kjerschow v. Daggs, 24 Ariz. 207, 207 P. 1089. Particularly is this true as to the amount of damages. City of Phoenix v. Nutt, 36 Ariz. 405, 286 P. 371; United Verde Copper Co. v. Wiley, 20 Ariz. 525, 183 P. 737.

The trial court having denied the motion for a new trial, we cannot substitute our opinion of what would have been adequate damages on our theory of what were the actual injuries sustained by plaintiff, and can only set aside the verdict if there is no reasonable evidence found in the record to support it. We therefore consider the evidence. It would serve...