City of Princeton v. Stamper

• Decision Date: 13 December 1995
• Docket Number: Nos. 22853,22880,s. 22853
• Citation: 195 W.Va. 685,466 S.E.2d 536
• Court: West Virginia Supreme Court
• Parties: CITY OF PRINCETON, Appellant, v. Samantha STAMPER, Appellee, and CITY OF PRINCETON, Appellant, v. John B. CONLEY and Garnett Conley, Appellees. CITY OF PRINCETON, Appellee, v. Samantha STAMPER, Appellant, and CITY OF PRINCETON, Appellee, v. John B. CONLEY and Garnett Conley, Appellants.

Page 536

466 S.E.2d 536

195 W.Va. 685

CITY OF PRINCETON, Appellant, v. Samantha STAMPER, Appellee, and CITY OF PRINCETON, Appellant, v. John B. CONLEY and Garnett Conley, Appellees.

CITY OF PRINCETON, Appellee, v. Samantha STAMPER, Appellant, and CITY OF PRINCETON, Appellee, v. John B. CONLEY and Garnett Conley, Appellants.

Nos. 22853, 22880.

Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.

Submitted Sept. 19, 1995.

Decided Dec. 13, 1995.

[195 W.Va. 686] Syllabus by the Court

1. A municipality acts reasonably in the exercise of its plenary power and authority under W.Va.Code 8-13-13 (1971), when it enacts an ordinance imposing a residential refuse collection and disposal fee which by implication classifies residents as users.

2. An ordinance imposing a mandatory service fee on the collection and removal of residential refuse regardless of actual use, in order to prevent a health menace from imperiling an entire community, is a reasonable and valid exercise of the police powers granted to the City of Princeton under W.Va.Code 8-13-13 (1971).

3. The City of Princeton is not the exclusive agency for the collection and disposal of residential refuse within the plain language of Article 1131 of the Princeton City Code.

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Mercer County; John R. Frazier, Judge.

Anthony Bisaha, Princeton, for City of Princeton.

Danny W. Barie, Athens, for Stamper and Conleys.

RECHT, Justice:

This appeal involves the interpretation of an ordinance (herein the "Ordinance") enacted by the City of Princeton (herein "City") providing a comprehensive system for the collection and disposal of garbage, refuse and waste within the city limits of Princeton.

The genesis of this case was the attempt by the City of Princeton to collect unpaid refuse disposal charges against Samantha Stamper and John B. and Garnett Conley (herein "appellants"), residents of the City of Princeton. The appellants justify their non-payment of the collection charges by contending that because they did not use the refuse collection service provided by the City, they should be exempt from paying any charge. Specifically, Ms. Stamper elected to use the collection services of a private hauler, and Mr. and Mrs. Conley chose to self-dispose their refuse.

The Circuit Court of Mercer County granted summary judgment to the City, concluding that the payment of the refuse collection fee was not dependent on use. A corollary to the City's efforts to charge a fee for refuse collection and disposal from a non-using resident is whether a resident has a right to use an alternative method of collecting and disposing of refuse, or is the City of Princeton the exclusive agency to collect and dispose of refuse within the city. The circuit court held that the Ordinance does not provide such exclusivity.

We are invited then to address two discrete but interrelated questions. The first question involves whether the City of Princeton can extract a charge from all residents for refuse removal even though a resident chooses not to use the municipal service. ¹ The second question addresses whether the Ordinance empowers only the City of Princeton with the authority to remove all residential refuse to the exclusion of any private refuse collector or self-disposal by a resident. ²

Both questions associated with this appeal require an analysis of Article 1131 of the Princeton City Code, entitled "Refuse Disposal." ³ The language of the Ordinance is not helpful in the resolution of the first question. Instead, the first question is answered by a determination that the charge for refuse removal is not dependent on actual use, but is a reasonable exercise of municipal police power which elevates the preservation of public health of an entire community over a resident's right to avoid payment of a critical municipal service by electing not to use that service. The second question may be answered within the clear meaning of the Ordinance.

The City of Princeton derives its power to impose a fee for the collection and disposal of refuse by virtue of W.Va.Code 8-13-13 (1971). ⁴ Municipalities have broad plenary power to impose fees for the collection and disposal of garbage. W.Va.Code 8-13-13 (1971). "Under the police power of the State, the Legislature has power to provide for the protection of the safety, health, morals and general welfare of the public, and may delegate such powers to municipalities created by it." Syllabus Point 1, Hayes v. Town of Cedar Grove, 126 W.Va. 828, 30 S.E.2d 726 (1944), overruled on other grounds by Long v. City of Weirton, 158 W.Va. 741, 774, 214 S.E.2d 832, 854 (1975).

This analysis develops that the City of Princeton has the power to enact an ordinance regulating the collection and disposal of refuse. We now will examine the two questions raised in this appeal within the context as to whether it is reasonable for the City of Princeton to collect a fee for a municipal service relating to the disposal of refuse from a resident who chooses not to use that service. Also, is it reasonable to permit the City of Princeton to be the exclusive residential refuse disposal agent within the city? "The standard of review of an ordinance exercising such power as that granted by [W.Va.Code 8-13-13 (1971) ] is the reasonableness of the ordinance." Ellison v. City of Parkersburg, 168 W.Va. 468, 472, 284 S.E.2d 903, 906 (1981).

EXEMPTION FROM PAYMENT OF REFUSE CHARGE

We begin this analysis by recognizing that the Ordinance is silent as to whether any resident of the City of Princeton can escape paying the residential refuse fee by choosing not to use the municipal service.

The City asserts that there is a mandatory charge for refuse collection and disposal regardless of actual use, and that the compulsory nature of the charge is a reasonable and valid exercise of the City's police power.

The appellants argue that because their refuse collection and disposal is not performed by the City of Princeton and they do not use the service for which they are billed, the Ordinance is unreasonable as it applies to them. The appellants fail to recognize that the municipal charge is not just for collecting and disposing of refuse from their places of residence. The sum of all charges are marshalled and designed to defray the expense of a systemic refuse disposal scheme within the City of Princeton. In other words, the purpose of the Ordinance is to protect the health, safety and welfare of the entire community.

An argument similar to that made by the appellants was addressed in Craig v. City of Macon, 543 S.W.2d 772 (Mo.1976) (en banc). In upholding the validity of a mandatory fee regardless of actual use, the court in Craig reasoned:

Nonetheless, appellants contend that because they do not have their garbage removed, they do not use the service for which they are billed, and therefore, the ordinances are unreasonable. Appellants, however, erroneously assume that the only benefit conferred by the statute is the removal of one's own garbage. The legislative intent and the purpose of the city's ordinances are not primarily to remove waste from the community for the convenience of residents, but rather to protect the public health by regulating the collection and disposal of garbage, and thereby minimizing or eliminating a source of disease. Although the appellants may not have waste to be collected, the regulatory scheme protects the entire public, not just those who have waste for disposal, by responsibly removing a source of disease from the community.

Id. at 774-75.

The appellants attempt to emphasize that a service fee cannot be imposed against a non-user. ⁵ The fallacy in this reasoning is that the appellants are users of the municipal service, in a real sense, regardless of how they choose to dispose of refuse because they receive the benefit from the general disposal system. All residents, regardless of how they personally choose to dispose of their refuse, receive a benefit in the collection and disposal of refuse from other premises in the community. The City of Princeton enacted the Ordinance under the plenary power and authority of W.Va.Code 8-13-13 (1971) and charges all residents the service fee because residents are the primary users of the refuse collection and disposal service. ⁶

An ordinance which provides for a fee assessment to users of a special service must reasonably classify the users, and the services for such a charge must be in conformity with state laws. City of Moundsville v. Steele, 152 W.Va. 465, 164 S.E.2d 430 (1968). We hold that a municipality acts reasonably in the exercise of its plenary power and authority under W.Va.Code 8-13-13 (1971), when it enacts an ordinance imposing a residential refuse collection and disposal fee which by implication classifies residents as users.

Other jurisdictions have similarly concluded that a municipality is justified in collecting a service fee for refuse collection and disposal regardless of whether a resident actually uses the municipal service. City of Portsmouth v. McGraw, 21 Ohio St.3d 117, 488 N.E.2d 472 (1986); Craig v. City of Macon, 543 S.W.2d 772 (Mo.1976) (en banc); City of Glendale v. Trondsen, 48 Cal.2d 93, 308 P.2d 1, 5-6 (1957) (en banc); Cassidy v. City of Bowling Green, 368 S.W.2d 318, 319-20 (Ky.1963); City of Hobbs v. Chesport, Ltd., 76 N.M. 609, 417 P.2d 210, 214 (1966); Owens v. City of Beresford, 87 S.D. 8, 201 N.W.2d 890, 891, 894 (S.D.1972).

The City of Princeton has enacted an ordinance which is designed to address a public health problem, and the solution to the problem for the benefit of all citizens of Princeton binds the entire community to subsidize a uniform and efficient system of refuse collection and disposal. We conclude that an Ordinance imposing a mandatory service fee on the collection and removal of residential refuse regardless of actual use, in order to prevent a health menace from imperiling an entire community, is a reasonable and...