City of Rockland v. Farnsworth

• Decision Date: 18 December 1913
• Citation: 111 Me. 315,89 A. 65
• Parties: CITY OF ROCKLAND v. FARNSWORTH.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

89 A. 65

111 Me. 315

CITY OF ROCKLAND

v. FARNSWORTH.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Dec. 18, 1913.

Report from Supreme Judicial Court, Knox County, at (Law.

Action by the City of Rockland against Lucy C. Farnsworth, executrix. Report from Supreme Judicial Court Judgment for plaintiff.

Argued before SAVAGE, C. J., and SPEAR, CORNISH, KING, BIRD, and PHILBROOK, JJ.

E. K. Gould, of Rockland, for plaintiff.

J. H. Montgomery, of Camden, for defendant.

CORNISH, J. Action of debt to recover the state, county, and city taxes of 1907, 1908, and 1909, alleged to have been duly assessed against the defendant, as representative of the estate of James R. Farnsworth, deceased.

As was said by this court in the recent case of Greenville v. Blair, 104 Me. 444, 72 Atl. 177: "This not being a case where the defendant's person or property is levied upon by direct warrant from the assessors, but being, instead, an action for the tax, the action will not be defeated by any mere irregularities in the election of assessors or collector, or in the assessment itself, but only by such omissions or defects as go to the jurisdiction of the assessors, or deprive the defendant of some substantial right, or by some omission of an essential prerequisite to the bringing of the action." The absence of forfeiture has given rise to this liberal rule, which is adhered to in the collection of taxes by suit.

The defendant urges the following points:

1. Wrong characterization of person assessed.

In 1907, the assessment is against "Lucy C. Farnsworth, executrix est. James R. Farnsworth," in 1908, "Lucy C. Farnsworth Executrix," and in 1909, "Lucy C. Farnsworth executrix estate of James R, Farnsworth." In fact she was administratrix of the estate, with will annexed.

So far as the years 1907 and 1909 are concerned the variance is immaterial. The identity is admitted and the intention of the assessors to assess Lucy C Farnsworth, as legally representing the estate of James R. Farnsworth, is not controverted. This being so, the error in characterization is no defense. Farnsworth Co. v. Rand, 65 Me. 19; Bath v. Reed, 78 Me. 276, 4 Atl. 688. It was an error made harmless by R. S. c. 10, § 31.

The assessment list of 1908 contained simply the designation, "Executrix," without naming the estate. We do not think this is fatal. R. S. c. 10, § 31, above referred to provides: "Nor shall any error, mistake, or omission by the assessors, collector or treasurer, render it (the assessment) void." This is construed with great liberality, because it is important that all persons and estates liable to taxation should pay their just proportion of the public charges, and not escape because of harmless errors and frivolous objections.

The omission where neither goes to the question of jurisdiction, nor does it deprive the defendant of any substantial right.

Under the statute "the personal property of deceased persons in the hands of their executors or administrators not distributed, shall be assessed to the executors or administrators." R. S. c. 9, § 13, par. 8. This gives the required jurisdiction. The assessors acted within their legal rights and powers in assessing the personal estate of the late James R. Farnsworth to the legal representative.

So far as the defendant's substantial rights are concerned, they were in no wise affected by the omission, in the assessment roll, of the name of the estate. The tax was a matter between the city and herself. The city knew of what estate she was executrix. The assessment of 1908 was only a repetition of the assessment of the preceding year in which the estate was named. Moreover, the inventory of the polls and estates for this same year 1908, gave the full designation "Lucy C. Farnsworth executrix estate of James R. Farnsworth." The error crept in when the transcription was made from the inventory to the assessment roll; and the statute before referred to was broad enough to cover errors of omission as well as of commission. Tyler v. Inhabs. of Hardwick, 6 Mete. (Mass.) 470. The defendant could have had no doubt as to the estate for which she was taxed; and, had she been in doubt, an examination of the city records would have given her the desired Information.

The requirements are that the person shall be liable to taxation, and be in fact the person intended to be taxed under that designation. The defendant was personally liable for the tax (Fairfield v. Woodman, 76 Me. 550; Dresden v. Bridge, 90 Me. 489-493, 38 Atl. 545), and the indentity was admitted. The slight omission complained of was, under the facts of this case, entirely harmless.

2. Insufficient designation of property assessed.

The assessment each year was simply on "personal estate $10,000." But, in this method of collection, we think that is sufficient. The record shows the amount of personal estate liable to taxation to have been far in excess of the amount stated. Were it otherwise, that fact would not be available to the defendant in this form of action. Bath v. Whitmore, 79 Me. 182, 9 Atl. 119; Rockland v. Rockland Water Co., 82 Me. 188, 19 Atl. 163.

Her right of appeal is also gone because she had not handed in the preliminary list of taxable property which is made by law a prerequisite to such appeal. What difference does it make in this suit whether the $10,000 of personal estate consisted of notes, or bonds, or cash, or a certain portion of each? She owes this debt none the less, and the characterization of that property could neither add to nor take from her legal rights, nor increase nor diminish her legal buruens. Moreover she, and not the assessors, knew of what it did consist. It is with ill grace that she complains of the meagerness of the description when she, and not the assessors, had it in her power to make it accurate and complete by filing the list required by law.

In the case of assessment of tax upon real estate, neither a description of the property, nor a separate valuation in case of various parcels is necessary under like circumstances. Tobey v. Wareham, 2 Allen (Mass.) 594; Cressey v. Parks, 76 Me. 534; Rockland v. Ulmer, 84 Me. 503, 24 Atl. 949; Foxcroft v. Campmeeting Association, 86 Me. 78, 29 Atl. 951.

For even stronger reasons an assessment of personal property in gross should not be held to invalidate a tax. The assessors might perhaps, by searching the Registry of Deeds, obtain a description of real estate, but the description of the classes of personal property owned by a taxpayer is almost wholly inaccessible to them, and lies in the knowledge of the taxpayer. In Dresden v. Bridge, 90 Me. 489, 38 Atl. 545, the personal estate was assessed and valued in gross in the original assessment, and the supplemental assessment was also in gross. The court held that the former covered the latter, but raised no objection to the assessment made in gross. The precise question arose in Noyes v. Hale, 137 Mass. 266, and the assessment was held valid. Sweetsir v. Chandler, 98 Ma 145, 56 Atl. 584, cited by the defendant involves a different question. The original assessment in that case specified 92 shares of national bank stock (return of which had been made to the assessors by the officers of the bank), and "money at interest in excess of debts." A supplemental tax was afterwards laid upon certain specified bonds, stock, and scrip, contained in an inventory filed in the probate court. The court held that the supplemental assessment for stock and scrip would lie, but not for bonds, as they were included in the original assessment under the phrase "money at interest." "This record shows," reads the opinion, "that money at interest was assessed, and we think such an expression was broad enough to cover all forms of interest-bearing securities, whether represented by notes or bonds or otherwise." This was a partial grouping of items, and, so far as it goes, sustains rather than contravenes our view of the law.

Precisely the same language, "money at interest in excess of debts," was used in the inventory in the case at bar in each year, but was condensed to "personal estate" in the assessment record.

The second point cannot be sustained.

3. Interlineation in the assessment of 1907.

This was made in the handwriting of one of the assessors, who was out of the state at the time of the trial, and therefore did not explain it; but the explanation is obvious. The inventory is in evidence, and is in regular form and order. In copying from the inventory to the assessment record it is evident that this tax was omitted, and when the mistake was discovered, the interlineation was made in accordance with the facts. This was all done before the commitment to the collector. Such errors are correctlble. Eliot v. Prime, 98 Me. 48, 56 Atl. 207.

4. No personal property of James R. Farnsworth shown to have been in the hands of the defendant.

It appears that James R. Farnsworth died on May 9, 1905. The defendant was appointed administratrix of his estate June 20, 1905, and gave bond, but filed neither inventory nor account. Litigation arising, and a will apparently having been discovered, Joseph E. Moore was...