Noyes v. Hale

Decision Date23 June 1884
Citation137 Mass. 266
CourtUnited States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
PartiesRaymond Noyes v. Ruth C. Hale & others, executors

Argued November 8, 1883 [Syllabus Material] [Syllabus Material]

Essex. Contract, by the collector of taxes of Haverhill, for the amount of a tax assessed, in 1881, upon the estate of Ezekiel J. M. Hale, the defendants' testator. Trial in the Superior Court, without a jury, before Brigham, C. J., who allowed a bill of exceptions, in substance as follows:

The defendants' testator was, on May 1, 1881, and for many years previously had been, an inhabitant of Haverhill, where he died on June 4, 1881. The defendants were appointed executors of his will in August, 1881, and filed an inventory of the estate on November 1, 1881, in the Probate Court.

The assessors of Haverhill for the year 1881, before proceeding to make an assessment of taxes for that year, caused seasonable and sufficient notice thereof to be given to the inhabitants of said city, such notice requiring said inhabitants to bring in to the assessors true lists of all their polls, and estates both real and personal, not exempted from taxation, by publication of said notice daily from the first of April to the last of May, 1881, in two daily newspapers, and on four successive weeks, from May 6 to May 27, 1881, in a weekly newspaper, published and circulated in said city.

The testator, within the time specified in a notice of a previous year, had brought in to the assessors a list of his real and personal property, accompanied by the following statement "This is all the property upon which I am liable to pay taxes in Haverhill." Said list and statement were not accompanied by any oath or offer to make oath to the same nor did the assessors require him to make oath to the same.

In 1881, the testator brought in to the assessors no statement of his estate taxable in Haverhill. The assessors valued his real estate at $ 35,650 and his personal estate at $ 14,250, and assessed thereon to him a tax of $ 840.32, which was demanded by the plaintiff, and was paid by the defendants, on September 2, 1881.

The assessment of taxes on the real and personal estate was entered in a list of valuations of, and assessment of taxes on, estates of inhabitants of Haverhill, for the year 1881, before the taxes so assessed were committed for collection; and said list, contained in books, exhibited said valuations and assessments, and was deposited for public inspection, as required by the Gen. Sts. c. 11, § 34.

The assessment on the estate of the testator was exhibited in a part of said list appropriated by the assessors to the valuations of, and assessments on, estates of inhabitants of the city in the ward of which the testator was, on May 1, 1881, an inhabitant. At the close of said list, all of the assessors, on September 12, 1881, subscribed and took the oath required by the Gen. Sts. c. 11, § 36, and thereupon, on the same day, committed said taxlist, and a warrant signed by all of the assessors, and in form as required by the Gen. Sts. c. 11, § 39, to the plaintiff.

On the evening of September 12, 1881, and immediately after said list had been subscribed and sworn to, and the warrant had been committed to the plaintiff, the assessors proceeded to make "additional" valuations of, and "additional" assessments of taxes upon, estates of thirty-four persons, who were inhabitants of Haverhill on May 1, 1881, and the assessors made and included therein an additional valuation of the personal estate of the testator at $ 390,000, and an additional assessment of taxes thereon, to him, and not to the defendants as executors of his will, of $ 6,552, which is sought to be recovered in this action. The only record made by the assessors, at the time of said additional valuations and assessments, was a memorandum, written partly in ink and partly in pencil, which was then delivered to and afterwards copied by the plaintiff, then acting as the secretary of the assessors, in one of the books of the tax-list for 1881, appropriated to the valuations of, and assessments on, estates of inhabitants of said city in a certain ward. Neither the memorandum nor the "additional" valuations and assessments, nor the copy of the same in said book, were ever subscribed or sworn to by the assessors. Subsequently to the meeting of September 12, 1881, and to the proceedings in relation to the additional assessments, and on another day, a record was made in the book of records of the assessors.

On December 27, 1881, the assessors made and committed to the plaintiff the additional tax-list, and a warrant, signed by all of the assessors, for the collection of said additional taxes.

On September 15, 1881, the plaintiff demanded of the defendants the payment of the additional tax so assessed to their testator, and they refused to pay the same.

The only "discovery" of personal estate of the testator, owned by him on May 1, 1881, and liable to taxation in Haverhill, and which had been omitted by the assessors in their first valuation of estates and assessments of taxes, consisted in a statement made to them on September 12, 1881, by R. S. Chase, one of the assessors, after they had committed to the plaintiff their warrant and tax-list on that day. The statement of Chase to the assessors, which was admitted against the defendants' exception, was, in substance, as follows:

"I had a private conversation with E. G. Wood, one of the executors, on September 12, 1881. I stated to Wood that the assessors were considering the increased valuation of the Hale estate, and that as a citizen of Haverhill his interest in a proper valuation was the same as mine. Wood replied, that he thought it would be impolitic to change the valuation. I said that, waiving that point, in case the assessors concluded to increase the valuation, I would ask him if, from his knowledge of the estate, he should consider $ 500,000 too high a valuation from May 1, 1881. Referring to that point only, he replied, that he thought $ 500,000 too high. I then inquired if $ 400,000 was too much. He said, if there was to be any change, he did not think $ 400,000 was too much."

The conversation referred to took place in the afternoon of September 12, and was afterwards reported to the board of assessors at the same meeting at which the assessors committed the first warrant to the collector. Prior to this conversation, and after the death of the testator, the matter of some additional assessment upon his estate, but of no definite or specific sum or property, had been talked of, and considered by the assessors.

Upon the information contained in the statement of Chase, and upon no other information or facts, the assessors made said additional valuation and assessment. There was no evidence that the assessors discovered any specific stocks, bonds, or other specific property, upon which they made said additional valuation, and they did not specify any particulars of property as discovered by them, and omitted from the previous assessment.

Evidence was offered by the defendants, that Chase did not state to the assessors his conversation with Wood truly, either in form, substance, or effect; but the judge did not consider this evidence, ruling that it was immaterial.

The judge ruled that, upon the above facts, the plaintiff was entitled to recover; and found and ordered judgment accordingly. The defendants alleged exceptions.

Exceptions overruled.

B. F Brooks & H. G. Nichols, for the...

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