City of Santa Clara v. Santa Clara Unified Sch. Dist.

• Decision Date: 20 December 1971
• Citation: 22 Cal.App.3d 152,99 Cal.Rptr. 212
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: CITY OF SANTA CLARA, a municipal corporation, Plaintiff, Cross-Defendant and Respondent, v. SANTA CLARA UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, a school district, et al., Defendants, Cross-Complainants and Appellants. Civ. 28819.

Page 212

99 Cal.Rptr. 212

22 Cal.App.3d 152

CITY OF SANTA CLARA, a municipal corporation, Plaintiff, Cross-Defendant and Respondent, v. SANTA CLARA UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, a school district, et al., Defendants, Cross-Complainants and Appellants.

Civ. 28819.

Court of Appeal, First District, Division 2, California.

Dec. 20, 1971.

Rehearing Denied Jan. 19, 1972.

Hearing Denied Feb. 16, 1972.

William M. Siegel, County Counsel, County of Santa Clara, Robert T. Owens, Deputy County Counsel, San Jose, for appellants.

Edwin J. Moore, City Atty., M. Van Smith, Asst. City Atty., Santa Clara, for respondent.

ROUSE, Associate Justice.

This is an appeal by the Santa Clara Unified School District, the individual members of the board of trustees of said district and the superintendent of schools of said district from a judgment enjoining the construction of a continuation high school on certain property located within the City of Santa Clara.

The facts are without conflict and may be summarized as follows: The City of Santa Clara has at all times since July 1960 had a master plan which provides for the location of public schools within its boundaries. Ordinance No. 918, which was enacted by the city in February 1960, provides for the issuance of use permits authorizing the location of public schools within residential zones. The ordinance declares it to be unlawful and a public nuisance to locate a school within a residential zone without having first obtained a use permit.

The Santa Clara Unified School District, which was created in 1966, owns certain real property located within the City of Santa Clara. The property in question had originally been acquired by the Santa Clara Elementary School District in 1952, and the Scott Lane Elementary School had been constructed on a portion of the property in 1953. Ordinance No. 918 had not been enacted at the time, and there was no requirement that a use permit be obtained. The property was zoned for residential use at the time, and it continued to be zoned for residential use following the construction of the elementary school.

In April 1967, the Santa Clara Unified School District decided to construct a continuation high school on the unused portion of the district-owned property on which the Scott Lane Elementary School had been constructed. The district reached this decision after considering and evaluating various alternative sites.

Preliminary plans and specifications were prepared, and they were approved by the State Division of Architecture in April 1968. Construction bids were advertised for, and in September 1968, it was determined that the low bid exceeded the estimated cost of construction. The district rejected this bid due to the lack of adequate funding. The plans and specifications were then reviewed and new bids were called for. The new bids were to be opened on November 19, 1968.

After calling for the new bids, the district filed an application for a use permit with the City of Santa Clara. The district's initial application had no plans attached to it, and it was not accepted for filing. The district then filed a second application, in proper form, and on November 13, 1968, the city planning commission ruled that it would recommend approval of the use permit subject to certain conditions having to do with landscaping, construction and parking.

On November 19, the city council filed an appeal from the planning commission's decision.

On November 21, the time having arrived for the opening of the construction bids, the governing board of the school district held a special meeting and voted to award the construction contract to the Near Cal Corporation. The board was aware that the district's application for a use permit was to be reviewed by the city council. However, the board members felt that since the recommendation of the planning commission had been favorable, the city council would in all probability grant the use permit. The construction contract was signed on November 25, and construction commenced shortly thereafter.

On December 26, the governing board of the school district held another meeting. Lawrence Curtis, the superintendent of the school district, advised the board that the Near Cal Corporation felt that there was opposition to the construction of the proposed school and feared that litigation might be in the offing. The board was advised by the county counsel that it had the authority, under Government Code, section 53094, to render the city zoning ordinance inapplicable to the proposed school construction. However, the board decided that it wished to continue to cooperate fully with the city.

The district's use permit application had in the meantime been referred to the city's Architectural Control Committee. Following the December 26 meeting, representatives of the school district met with this committee, and it was agreed that subject to certain modifications acceptable to both sides, the district would comply with the conditions imposed by the planning commission.

On December 30, the city council voted to deny the district's application for a use permit.

On January 2, 1969, a meeting of the governing board of the school district was held. The board members were informed of the city council's action. They were also provided by the county counsel with a resolution exercising their rights under Government Code, section 53094. The county counsel advised the board that if it wished to build the continuation high school on the site it had previously selected, he recommended that the board adopt the resolution. The board decided to take no action until it had held an open meeting on January 7 and had heard from those individuals who were opposed to the construction of the school on the site selected by the district.

At the January 7 meeting, the board explained to those attending the meeting the various factors which had been considered in selecting the site for the continuation high school. After hearing from those in opposition, the board voted to adopt Resolution No. 69--6 rendering the city zoning ordinance inapplicable under Government Code, section 53094. The president of the board testified that after listening to all of the views discussed at the meeting, she still believed that the board had selected the best available site for the continuation high school. Had she felt otherwise, she would have voted against the resolution.

Following the school district's adoption of Resolution No. 69--6, the City of Santa Clara commenced the instant action against the school district, the individual members of its governing board, the district's superintendent of schools and Near Cal Corporation. The city sought injunctive relief and judicial review of the school district's action, and it alleged that the proposed school construction was in violation of the city's zoning ordinance; that Government Code, section 53094, was unconstitutional; and that the school district had acted arbitrarily and capriciously in adopted Resolution No. 69--6.

The trial court held that Government Code, section 53094, was constitutional, but that the school district had acted arbitrarily and capriciously in adopting Resolution No. 69--6. Judgment was entered declaring Resolution No. 69--6 to be null and void and permanently enjoining construction of the continuation high school on the site selected by the school district unless and until there was full compliance with the city's zoning ordinance. The instant appeal followed.

The issues raised on this appeal turn upon the proper interpretation to be accorded to sections 53090 through 53095 of the Government Code. Prior to the enactment of these sections in 1959, our Supreme Court had held that public schools were a matter of statewide concern and that school districts, being local agencies of the state, were not subject to municipal construction regulations when engaged in such sovereign activities as the construction of school buildings. (Hall v. City of Taft (1956) 47 Cal.2d 177, 302 P.2d 574.) It was subsequently held that school districts were likewise exempt from municipal zoning ordinances and that the state had occupied the field of school site selection by general laws contained in the Education and Government Codes. (Town of Atherton v. Superior Court (1958) 159 Cal.App.2d 417, 324 P.2d 328.) The court in the Atherton case stated: 'If, as the Hall case holds, the construction and maintenance of a school building is a sovereign activity of the state, it is obvious that the location and acquisition of a school site is necessarily and equally such an activity. Obviously, too, neither the Constitution nor the Legislature has consented to a municipal regulation of school sites. As said in Kentucky Institution for Education of Blind v. City of Louisville, 123 Ky. 767, 97 S.W. 402, 8 L.R.A.,N.S., 553, as quoted in the Hall case (47 Cal.2d at page 183, 302 P.2d at page 579): "'The principle is that the state, when creating municipal governments, does not cede to them any control of the state's property situated within them, nor over any property which the state has authorized another body or power to control. . . . How can the city ever have a superior authority to the state over the latter's own property or in its control and management? From the nature of things it cannot have." " (P. 428, 324 P.2d p. 335.)

In 1959, the Legislature responded to these decisions by enacting Government Code, sections 53090 through 53095.

Section 53090 provides in pertinent part that '(l)ocal agency' means any agency of the state for the local performance of governmental or proprietary function within limited boundaries; that it does not include the state, a city or a county.

Section 53091 provides in part that 'Each local agency shall comply with all applicable building ordinances and zoning ordinances of the county or city in which the territory of the local agency is situated. . . . Notwithstanding the...