City of Santa Monica v. Superior Court for Los Angeles County
| Citation | 41 Cal.Rptr. 824,231 Cal.App.2d 223 |
| Court | California Court of Appeals |
| Decision Date | 15 December 1964 |
| Parties | The CITY OF SANTA MONICA and Earl Reinbold, in his capacity as Chief of Police for the City of Santa Monica, Petitioners, v. The SUPERIOR COURT of the State of California FOR the COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, Respondent, TEE PEE ENTERPRISES, a corporation, doing business as The Plush Poodle, Real Party in Interest. Civ. 28668. |
Robert G. Cockins, City Atty., Robert D. Ogle, Asst. City Atty., for petitioners.
No appearance for respondent.
William A. Kurlander, Santa Monica, for real party in interest.
On August 20, 1964, action was commenced by Tee Pee Enterprises, a corporation, doing business as The Plush Poodle, against the City of Santa Monica and certain of its officials seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, a temporary restraining order, and a preliminary injunction against the enforcement of certain of the city's gambling ordinances. The complaint filed herein alleges that plaintiff has carried on a cocktail lounge and bar business in the City of Santa Monica for many years and now desires to conduct upon its premises a game of cards, commonly called 'panguingui,' which would be played for money.
Plaintiff's complaint further alleges that 'Panguingui' is not a game prohibited by state law but that it is prohibited by various ordinances adopted by the City of Santa Monica. Among the several ordinances challenged is section 4230C of the Santa Monica Municipal Code which expressly provides: 'No person shall operate, maintain or carry on, play at, or participate in, nor permit places owned or controlled by him to be used for playing of 'panguingui,' 'pan', or any similar game.' After alleging that the challenged ordinances are unconstitutional and void, the complaint further alleges as follows:
'There is presently pending before the Supreme Court of the State of California the case of Edward Prival, etc. vs. William J. Mooney etc. (LA 27776), 41 Cal.Rptr. 399, 396 P.2d 815 in which the Supreme Court is considering the validity of the gambling ordinances of the City of Long Beach under the provisions of Section 11, Article XI, of the California Constitution, and the defendant herein, the City of Santa Monica, has filed in said matter presently before the Supreme Court, an amicus curiae brief, contending that the ordinances of the City of Long Beach are not unconstitutional and void in violation of said Section 11, Article XI, of the California Constitution.'
Plaintiff's complaint then concludes with the allegation that because of the threatened enforcement of Santa Monica's ordinances, it
Plaintiff's complaint contains no allegation whatsoever that awaiting the result of the Supreme Court's decision or the trial on the merits of its own action would result in any harm to it, irreparable or otherwise. This would appear to be a commendably honest omission from its pleadings, for it appears almost self-evident that a liquor dispensing business which wishes merely to expand its operation into the field of commercial gambling suffers not damage to its present business operation by reason of its being required to await the outcome of a trial on the merits of the issue and an ultimate determination of the validity of the ordinance in question.
Nevertheless, and despite plaintiff's failure to allege anything tending to suggest any threat of irreparable damage, following a hearing on August 31, 1964, the court below announced that it would issue a preliminary injunction restraining the defendant city, petitioner here, from enforcing the ordinances in question. The issuance of a formal injunctive order to this effect, however, was stayed to enable petitioner herein to file with this court its application for a writ of prohibition. We granted our alternative writ.
Although an appeal would lie from the effective injunctive order when filed, it would appear that this remedy would...
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Cohen v. Board of Supervisors
...that would result from delay in obtaining relief...." (Id., at p. 46, 115 Cal.Rptr. 746; 7 accord City of Santa Monica v. Superior Court (1964) 231 Cal.App.2d 223, 226-227, 41 Cal.Rptr. 824.) At least one Court of Appeal has adhered to the abuse of discretion review standard where the trial......
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Xiloj-Itzep v. City of Agoura Hills
...injunction based on application of a regulation is rarely justified before a trial on the merits. (City of Santa Monica v. Superior Court (1964) 231 Cal.App.2d 223, 226, 41 Cal.Rptr. 824; Mora Amezcua v. City of Pomona, supra, 170 Cal.App.3d at p. 309, 216 Cal.Rptr. 37.) If any of appellant......
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California Water & Tel. Co. v. Los Angeles County
...equity proceedings to obtain an injunction. For examples of decisions using the threat terminology, see City of Santa Monica v. Superior Court (1964) 231 Cal.App.2d 223, 41 Cal.Rptr. 824, and Golden Gate Sightseeing Tours, Inc. v. City and County of San Francisco (1937) 21 Cal.App.2d 582, 6......
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Eckl v. Davis
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