City of Springfield v. Jacobs
Decision Date | 14 April 1903 |
Citation | 73 S.W. 1097,101 Mo.App. 339 |
Parties | CITY OF SPRINGFIELD, Appellant, v. B. F. JACOBS, Respondent |
Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
Appeal from Greene Criminal Court.--Hon. J. J. Gideon, Judge.
AFFIRMED.
Judgment affirmed.
W. R Self and T. J. Delaney for appellant.
(1) The council can not define the meaning of the word "traveling store" as used in the general law. The Legislature does not define the word and it is for the courts to say what falls within the legislative intent in the use of such words. Therefore, the "definition" must be rejected. Water Co. v. City of Neosho, 136 Mo. 511; City of St. Louis v. Railroad, 89 Mo. 44. (2) The question of the reasonableness of the tax is for the Legislature and council and not for the courts. The power to levy a license tax on traveling stores is expressly granted and prima facie the municipal corporation is the sole judge of the necessity for and reasonableness of the ordinance; and when the character of the occupation is considered, this ordinance is not unreasonable, and courts should not so hold even if they have the power to control the city in the exercise of an express power. A large and liberal discretion should be allowed municipalities. City of St. Louis v Knox, 6 Mo.App. 247; City of St. Louis v. Green, 7 Mo.App. 468; Hannibal v. Telephone Co., 31 Mo.App. 23; Skinker v. Heman, 148 Mo. 349.
Wright Bros. for respondent.
(1) The ordinance is unreasonable and void. It provides for $ 50 per day for a license. That fact is disclosed on its face. It is equal to $ 1,500 per month, or $ 18,250 per year. Sipe v. Murphy (Ohio), 31 N.E. 884; City of Carrollton v. Bazette, 159 Ill. 284, 42 N.E. 837. (2) Courts are authorized to intervene for unreasonableness. White v. Railroad, 44 Mo.App. 540; Corrigan v. Gage, 68 Mo. 541; State ex rel. v. Tracey, 94 Mo. 217. (3) The ordinance is void, if for revenue, because its effect is prohibitory, and the city is not authorized to prohibit the business of respondent by taxation. In Cooley on Taxation (Ed. 1879), page 408, the author says: "But the grant of authority to impose fees for the purposes of revenue, would not warrant their being made so heavy as to be prohibitory, thereby defeating the purpose." The city has no right to destroy by taxation. (4) The ordinance is void, if for purpose of regulation, because the amount is unreasonable as a fee for a license. Cooley on same page says: "The fee for license . . . should not exceed the necessary or probable expense of issuing the license, and of inspecting and regulating the business which it covers." The fee to the clerk is fifty cents and to the collector is twenty-five cents. R. S. 1899, sec. 8551; State ex rel. v. Tracey, 94 Mo. 217.
--This is an action originating before the city recorder of the city of Springfield, upon an information charging defendant with violation of an ordinance of the city of Springfield. From a conviction before the police magistrate, the defendant appealed to the criminal court of Green county, where a motion to quash was sustained, and the city of Springfield has appealed to this court.
The terms of the sections of article 1, chapter 15, of the Revised Ordinances of Springfield, or so much as is here material, epitomized are: section 482 declares it shall be unlawful to pursue various avocations, among them, the keeping or conducting a traveling or auction store without first obtaining a license therefore from the proper officers of the city, and making payment of the license fixed by ordinance. Section 483 provides that a license tax is thereby levied and fixed upon the various objects, subjects, persons, trades and occupations, within the city of Springfield, Missouri, thereinafter mentioned, and that the same shall be licensed, taxed and regulated as thereinafter provided.
Section 528 is as follows:
Among the powers specifically delegated to a city of the third class is, authority to levy and collect a license tax on traveling and auction stores; it is worthy of remark however, that the measure of control over such callings is expressly restricted to the imposition and collection of a license tax and is not extended to the broader prerogatives of regulation and suppression conferred and possessed, respecting the numerous callings enumerated in the succeeding paragraph of the statute, by which the authority of regulation or suppression may be exercised additional to licensing and taxing. The bounds within which a municipal corporation can lawfully enforce such delegated powers, as well as the limits within which...
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