City of St. Louis v. McCann

• Decision Date: 12 June 1900
• Citation: 57 S.W. 1016,157 Mo. 301
• Parties: CITY OF ST. LOUIS v. McCANN.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

57 S.W. 1016

157 Mo. 301

CITY OF ST. LOUIS v. McCANN.

Supreme Court of Missouri, Division No. 2.

June 12, 1900.

LICENSE — OCCUPATION LICENSE — ORDINANCE — CONSTITUTIONALITY.

The enactment by a city of an ordinance, authorized by its charter, requiring real-estate brokers doing business within the city to pay an annual license tax, is not in contravention of the bill of rights of the state constitution (article 2, § 4), declaring that all persons have a natural right to life, liberty, and the enjoyment of the gains of their own industry; and such ordinance is a valid exercise of the police power of the state.

Appeal from St. Louis court of criminal correction; David Murphy, Judge.

John J. McCann was convicted of violating an ordinance of the city of St. Louis, and he appeals. Affirmed.

John J. McCann, in pro. per. B. Schnurmacher, for respondent.

BURGESS, J.

This action was begun in the city of St. Louis August 24, 1897, by summons from the First district police court of that city. The charge was that defendant conducted a real-estate business in said city in 1896 and 1897 without having a license to so do, contrary to sections 1480-1482, art. 8, c. 38, entitled "Revenue," of the Revised Ordinances of said city, approved April 7, 1893. The sections referred to read as follows:

"Sec. 1480. Every person or firm composed of one or more persons, who shall act as agent for any party in the leasing, renting or selling of houses or real estate at private or public sale, or who shall receive or collect rents for another for a commission or other compensation, or who shall advertise or hang out any sign or device which shall designate him as an agent for the renting, collecting rents, leasing or selling of houses or real estate shall be considered as [a] house or real-estate agent [s].

"Sec. 1481. A real-estate broker is one who for commission or other compensation is engaged in the selling of or negotiates sales of real estate belonging to others.

"Sec. 1482. Every person or firm of one or more persons engaged in the business defined in the foregoing sections shall pay an annual license of twenty-five dollars, which shall be payable before any such person or firm shall be permitted to transact any business; and if such person or persons fail to pay said license, then he or they shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction thereof shall be fined not less than one hundred dollars nor more than two hundred dollars."

It was tried September 9th following, plaintiff proving that defendant conducted a real-estate business in said city without having a license to do so, as alleged in the complaint. Defendant demurred to the complaint, and offered evidence tending to show that the taxing of his occupation was unnecessary as a revenue measure. His demurrer was overruled, his evidence excluded, and he was fined $100, took an appeal to the St. Louis court of criminal correction, and filed his affidavit and bond therefor forthwith. On September 9, 1897, defendant was put upon his trial, and convicted and fined $100. He then appealed the case to the St. Louis court of criminal correction, where, upon the 21st day of the same month, defendant failing to appear, the judgment of the police court was affirmed by default. In due time defendants filed in the court last named motions for new trial and in arrest of judgment. In the motion to set aside the default and for a new trial, it is assigned as cause therefor that the judgment was against the evidence, and against the law and the evidence. The motion in arrest of judgment set forth that (1) the ordinance upon which the charge against him (defendant) was founded is in violation of and contrary to section 4 of article 2 of the bill of rights of the state constitution; (2) the facts set forth in the statement of the charge against him (defendant) do not constitute a public offense; (3) the evidence given at the default trial was insufficient to sustain the judgment against him; (4) the court had no jurisdiction of the defendant in the cause, and the entire proceedings therein were unconstitutional, null, and void. Both motions were overruled. Defendant appeals.

As long ago as 1848 it was held by this court, in Simmons v. State, 12 Mo. 268, that the state possesses the power to tax all trades, professions, and occupations. The same rule was announced in City of St. Louis v. Laughlin, 49 Mo. 559, and in Same v. Sternberg, 69 Mo. 289. In the case last cited it is said: "However this may have been elsewhere decided, the power of the state to tax all...