City of St. Louis v. Tanner

• Citation: 143 S.W.2d 354
• Decision Date: 08 October 1940
• Docket Number: No. 25363.,25363.
• Parties: CITY OF ST. LOUIS v. TANNER.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Missouri (US)

143 S.W.2d 354

CITY OF ST. LOUIS v. TANNER.

No. 25363.

St. Louis Court of Appeals. Missouri.

October 8, 1940.

Appeal from St. Louis Court of Criminal Correction; Joseph L. Simpson, Judge.

"Not to be reported in State Reports."

Kenneth Tanner was convicted of disturbing the peace of an individual, and he appeals.

Reversed and remanded.

Frank C. Boland and James H. Connor, both of St. Louis, for appellant.

BENNICK, Commissioner.

This case originated in City Court No. 1 of the City of St. Louis upon the filing of an information charging defendant with the disturbance of the peace of one Arthur Baumgartner in violation of the provisions of Section 1682 of Ordinance No. 41386 of said city.

The incident occurred as the aftermath of a collision between Baumgartner's automobile and an automobile driven by one Wallace, in which defendant and three other young men were riding as guests or passengers. The issue upon which defendant's guilt depended was whether he or one of his companions had committed the assault.

From a judgment of conviction in the city court, defendant appealed to the St. Louis Court of Criminal Correction, Division No. 2, wherein, upon a trial de novo to a jury, he was again found guilty as charged in the information, and his punishment assessed at a fine of $200. His appeal to this court has followed in the usual course.

Among the points raised by defendant is the contention that the court erred in instructing the prosecuting official to inquire of defendant's witnesses with respect to the matter of defendant's character or reputation, when such question was not in issue in the case, and defendant himself had not then taken the stand, nor did he ever take the stand, to testify in his own behalf.

The inquiry concerning defendant's reputation was first injected into the case by the court itself during the direct examination of one of defendant's witnesses; and it was after counsel had objected and saved his exception to the action of the court that the latter directed the prosecutor to make such inquiry of all of defendant's witnesses. The result was to bring before the jury, over defendant's objection and exception, the fact that more than a year before defendant had been convicted of an offense growing out of a fight with some unidentified person, in which fight the witness himself had been a participant, and as punishment for which he had been required to pay a fine.

We think the court was clearly in error in its action in the matter.

Unless defendant had himself first offered evidence of his character for peace, quietude, and good order in attempted exoneration of the offense charged against him, it was not proper for the prosecution to attack his character as bad; and so the court was in error in injecting such issue into the case, notwithstanding the fact that the matter ultimately inquired into was specifically restricted to traits of character involved in the offense for which defendant was being held to account in the summary proceeding on trial before the court. Under the law, defendant's character was presumed to be good in all respects; and he consequently had the right to have his case tried and determined with the benefit of that presumption, unless he himself had elected to raise the issue of his good character by way of lessening the probability of his guilt,...