State v. Humphrey

• Citation: 217 S.W.2d 551,358 Mo. 904
• Decision Date: 14 February 1949
• Docket Number: 40951
• Parties: State of Missouri, Respondent, v. Forthune Humphrey, Appellant
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Missouri

217 S.W.2d 551

358 Mo. 904

State of Missouri, Respondent, v. Forthune Humphrey, Appellant

No. 40951

Supreme Court of Missouri

February 14, 1949

Appeal from Circuit Court of City of St. Louis; Hon. William H Killoren, Judge.

Reversed and remanded.

Morris A. Shenker for appellant.

(1) The court erred in overruling the defendant's motion to suppress evidence heretofore filed in said cause, which motion to suppress evidence alleged and the evidence adduced in support thereof proved that the search of the defendant and the seizure of the evidence that was used in the trial of this cause before the court and jury, and the arrest of the defendant was unreasonable, and violative of the constitutional rights of the defendant. The search and seizure were not based on any warrant issued by any authority, the defendant was within the peace of the State at the time of the arrest, search and seizure, and the conduct of the police officers in executing the said arrest, search and seizure was violative of Sections 11 and 23 of the Constitution of the State of Missouri, and violative of the rights of the defendant in this cause; and the use of the said evidence at the trial against this defendant was in effect compelling defendant to give testimony against himself. Constitution of Missouri, Art. 1, Secs. 15, 19; State v. Dunivan, 269 S.W. 415. (2) The verdict and judgment in the cause is against the law applicable to this cause. Secs. 4704, 4705, R.S. 1939. (3) The court erred in admitting into evidence and permitting Sergeant O'Connell, a witness for the State, to testify over the objections and exceptions of the defendant that he arrested the defendant at a time prior to June 6, 1946, and that at the arrest of the defendant on June 6, 1946, defendant told him, "Why do you men continue to arrest me? All you do is make money for the bondsmen. I paid Mert Ward $ 23 to get me out the last time." This evidence tended to prove an entirely different crime than the one for which the defendant was then on trial. It was error to admit the aforesaid evidence further because it advised the jury that the defendant was arrested for criminal offenses prior to the time of the arrest for the offense for which he was then being tried, because said testimony brought the character of the defendant to issue, and was a comment on the defendant's character and reputation without the defendant having taken the stand and testifying in his own behalf. Nor was it admissible as an admission against interest but rather was an improper comment on the defendant's constitutional right not to testify against himself. Finally it was not a corroborative factor of the facts sought to be established to substantiate the cause for which the defendant was being tried, but was irrelevant and immaterial to the point at issue, and irrelevant, immaterial and incompetent in this cause. 16 C.J., sec. 1579, p. 771, sec. 1580, p. 772; 22 C.J.S., sec. 682, p. 1084, sec. 676, p 1069; State v. Garrison, 342 Mo. 453, 116 S.W.2d 23; State v. Tunnell, 296 S.W. 423; State v Young, 230 Mo. 170, 140 S.W. 873; City of St. Louis v. Tanner, 143 S.W.2d 354. (4) The court erred in overruling defendant's demurrer, filed the second time at the close of the State's case, and which was filed on the ground that the corpus delicti had not been established, and that the evidence was insufficient to sustain a conviction under the law in the case. 16 C.J. sec. 1580, p. 772; State v. Young, 230 Mo. 170, 140 S.W. 873. (5) The court erred in failing to give and read to the jury defendant's Instruction D, which instruction correctly and accurately stated the law that is applicable to the case at bar, and which instruction submitted the converse of the State's main instruction, and which instruction the defendant was entitled to have placed before the jury for their deliberation. 1 Blashfield's Instructions (2d Ed.), sec. 143, p. 331; State v. Boyd, 354 Mo. 1172, 193 S.W.2d 596; State v. Cantrell, 290 Mo. 232, 234 S.W. 800; State v. Fraley, 342 Mo. 442, 116 S.W.2d 17; State v. Gillum, 336 Mo. 69, 77 S.W.2d 110; State v. Gurnee, 309 Mo. 6, 274 S.W. 58; State v. Hayes, 247 S.W. 165; State v. Johnson, 234 S.W. 794; State v. Majors, 237 S.W. 486; State v. Markel, 336 Mo. 129, 77 S.W.2d 112; State v. Quinn, 344 Mo. 1072, 130 S.W.2d 511; State v. Rutherford, 152 Mo. 124, 53 S.W. 417; State v. Stewart, 29 S.W.2d 120; State v. Talbot, 351 Mo. 791, 174 S.W.2d 144; State v. Worten, 263 S.W. 124.

J. E. Taylor, Attorney General, Arthur M. O'Keefe, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent.

(1) The court did not err in overruling appellant's motion to suppress evidence. State v. Burnett, 354 Mo. 45, 188 S.W.2d 51; Hanser v. Bieber, 197 S.W. 68, 271 Mo. 236; Wehmeyer v. Mulvihill, 150 Mo.App. 197, 130 S.W. 681; State v. Raines, 339 Mo. 884, 98 S.W.2d 580; State v. Pomeroy, 130 Mo. 489, 32 S.W. 1002. (2) The evidence is sufficient to sustain the conviction. State v. Emerson, 318 Mo. 633, 1 S.W.2d 109; State v. Wilkerson, 170 Mo. 184, 70 S.W. 478; Secs. 4704, 4705, R.S. 1939; State v. Kaub, 15 Mo.App. 433. (3) Testimony of statement of appellant made at time of arrest not error. State v. Hepperman, 349 Mo. 681, 162 S.W.2d 878; State ex rel. Shartel v. Trimble, 333 Mo. 888, 63 S.W.2d 37; State v. Davis, 143 S.W.2d 244; State v. Stallings, 334 Mo. 1, 64 S.W.2d 643; State v. Rodgers, 102 S.W.2d 566; 22 C.J.S., sec. 628, p. 962; State v. Murphy, 345 Mo. 358, 133 S.W. 398; State v. Walker, 208 S.W.2d 233; State v. Smith, 355 Mo. 59, 194 S.W.2d 905. (4) The court did not err in refusing to give appellant's Instruction D. State v. Boyd, 193 S.W.2d 596; State v. Hicks, 353 Mo. 950, 185 S.W.2d 650.

OPINION

Hyde, J.

Defendant was convicted of assisting in making and establishing a policy lottery as a business and avocation in violation of § 4704, (R.S. 1939) Mo. Stat. Ann. and sentenced to six months in the workhouse. He has appealed.

Defendant contends that the corpus delicti was not established and, therefore, statements made by him against himself (which were the basis of his conviction) were insufficient to support conviction. We find that this contention must be sustained.

Defendant was arrested in St. Louis by two police officers who saw him get out of his car with some policy drawing sheets in his left hand. As the officers approached he attempted to cover these sheets with his coat which he was carrying on his arm, but dropped them. They were recovered by the officers and they found "ten carbon copies of policy writers' top sheets that had the recordings of numerals, combination of numbers, and the amount paid in each combination of numbers; and also the result of that drawing, showing the class number of the three o'clock drawing in Lovejoy, Illinois, at the Harlem Club, on the policy drawing result ballots and also on the carbon copy of the top sheet result ballots; and also on the carbon copy of the top sheets he had the recordings of the bets." One of the officers asked defendant what business he was in and he said: "You know, I am in the policy racket"; but he further stated that they were "only making money for bondsmen" in arresting him. They also said defendant stated he wrote "for the companies that hold their meets in the Harlem Club"; that "he gets a percentage of the amount of bets that he individually writes himself, and he gets 25 cents for any bets that he takes over from other writers . . .; if they ride over in his car he charges them 50 cents." They also said defendant stated some of the sheets were in his own handwriting but that "others wrapped up separately was for another writer"; and that he said "he made daily trips back and forth to the east side, taking bets over and bringing the result ballots back." However, he refused to name any of those whose bets he wrote.

The two elements necessary to prove the corpus delicti of a lottery in violation of § 4704 are: (1) the establishing of a lottery by someone, (2) that the person charged aided or assisted in making or establishing it. [State v. Emerson, 318 Mo. 633, 1 S.W.2d 109.] To sustain a felony charge, it must also be shown that such person aided or assisted to establish it as a business or avocation. [State v. Cronin, 189 Mo. 663, 88 S.W. 604; State v. Pomeroy, 130 Mo. 489, 32 S.W. 1002.] Proof of these elements is lacking here. Established lotteries with drawings at the Harlem Club in Illinois are merely assumed by the State and it produced no evidence of them at all. While "the body of a crime may be proved by circumstantial evidence alone" (State v. Emerson, supra) there are not sufficient circumstances in this case to amount to substantial evidence to show the existence and operation of a lottery in which defendant was assisting. There is no evidence (independent of defendant's statements) to show the operation of any lottery or what took place in the Harlem Club or what defendant did there or elsewhere. There is no testimony concerning defendant's activities in St. Louis or anything more than his possession of the papers described at the time of his arrest.

The State relies on State v. Emerson, supra, and State v. Wilkerson, 170 Mo. 184, 70 S.W. 478. The deficiency of the proof in this case is well illustrated by considering the evidence of the State in those cases and in State v. Cronin, 189 Mo. 663, 88 S.W. 604. In the Emerson case, a plan showing the elements of consideration, prize and chance was evidenced by a written contract and by the facts shown to have existed which included testimony showing execution of and collection on these contracts. It was contended that there was no lottery because selection of prize winners was not by chance but by design; but it was held that there was sufficient circumstantial evidence to show...