City of St. Louis v. Murta

• Decision Date: 04 June 1920
• Docket Number: No. 20813.,No. 20814.,No. 20812.,20812.,20813.,20814.
• Citation: 222 S.W. 430,283 Mo. 77
• Parties: CITY OF ST. LOUIS v. MURTA (three cases).
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

222 S.W. 430

283 Mo. 77

CITY OF ST. LOUIS v. MURTA (three cases).

No. 20812.

No. 20813.

No. 20814.

Supreme Court of Missouri, Division No. 2.

June 4, 1920.

Appeal from St. Louis Court of Criminal Correction; Chauncey J. Krueger, Judge.

Separate prosecutions by the City of St. Louis against Samuel Murta consolidated and tried on agreed statement of facts. Defendant was found guilty in each case, and he appeals. Affirmed.

There are three of these cases, and defendant was fined in each upon charges made by the city by information filed. The gravamen of the charges are that defendant operated three lodging houses in said city without paying a license tax and securing a permit from the proper authorities of said city authorizing him to do so. The cases were consolidated and tried as one upon an agreed statement of facts before Judge Krueger in the court of criminal correction. What is here said therefore applies to each case alike. The ordinances under which the cases proceed are 28790-29555. The agreed statement of facts upon which the cases were tried, so far as necessary to quote, provides as follows:

"'Sec. 1. Lodging House — Definition. — The term `lodging house' where used herein shall (unless expressly otherwise indicated) be taken to mean and to include any building wherein, lodging or sleeping quarters for three or more persons in any one room are provided." (Italics ours.)

"Second. That Ordinances 28790-29555 were duly enacted, and, if valid and constitutional, were in force at the times charged.

"Third. That defendant, Samuel Murta, did on May 18, 1917, and at diverse other days and times prior thereto, keep, conduct, and operate three lodging houses in said city without a license or permit issued to him by the board of public service of said city to keep any one of said three lodging houses.

"Fourth. That the defendant did not at any time apply for a permit or license to keep any of said three lodging houses as required by Ordinance 28790, and that he has not paid or offered to pay the annual fee provided for in section 6 of said ordinance."

Forest P. Tralles and Geo. O. Durham, both of St. Louis, for appellant.

Charles H. Danes and H. A. Hamilton, both of St. Louis, for respondent.

MOZLEY, C.

The charges preferred by the informations amount merely to misdemeanors, but we take jurisdiction of the cases because the city of St. Louis is a political subdivision of the state. Const. art. 6, § 12; Straub v. City of St. Louis, 175 Mo. loc. cit. 414, 75 S. W. 100.

The questions presented for determination are:

(a) Whether or not said ordinance applies to all buildings having a room where sleeping quarters are provided for three or more persons irrespective of whether such room or building is operated as a business pursuit or a commercial establishment.

(b) Whether or not said ordinance is void as being unreasonable and discriminatory and not a fair classification of the business of conducting lodging houses and not applicable alike to all engaged in such business, in that it singles out for purposes of taxation only such keepers as shall provide sleeping quarters for three or more guests in one, room. Is the ordinance in question subject to the objections made against it? Is it void because unreasonable?

Section 1 of the ordinance applies expressly and solely to lodging houses wherein lodging or sleeping quarters for three or more persons in any one room are provided. This application is provided for in the ordinance (unless expressly otherwise indicated), and it is nowhere otherwise indicated therein.

But, conceding all of this to be true, does section 1 of said ordinance, when properly construed, affect its validity?

The crux of the cases is as to how said section ought to be construed. Appellant says it must be construed so as to include within its terms private homes, charitable institutions, etc., which under the charter of said city and the laws of the state are not subject to a license tax, hence rendering it void.

Respondent, contra, contends that it was not intended to include private homes, charitable institutions, etc., and, if thus construed, the true intent of the legislative department of the city will be made clear.

It cannot be presumed that the city was ignorant of its charter powers or that it deliberately intended to violate the organic law of the state or city. State ex rel. v. Sheehan, 269 Mo. loc. cit. 427, 190 S. W. 864; Straughan v. Meyers, 268 Mo. loc. cit. 591, 187 S. W. 1159; State ex rel. Aull v. Field, 112 Mo. 554, 20 S. W. 672; Glaser v. Rothchild, 221 Mo. loc. cit. 211, 120 S. W. 1, 22 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1045, 17 Ann. Cas. 576; Perry v. Strawbridge, 209 Mo. loc. cit. 645, 108 S. W. 641, 16 L. R. A. (N. S.) 244, 123 Am. St. Rep. 510, 14 Ann. Cas. 92; 36 Cyc. 1106; Grimes v. Reynolds, 184 Mo. 679, 68...