City of St. Paul v. Hurd

• Decision Date: 22 March 1974
• Docket Number: No. 44180,44180
• Citation: 299 Minn. 51,216 N.W.2d 259
• Parties: CITY OF ST. PAUL, Appellant, v. Charles Emmett HURD, Respondent.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Page 259

216 N.W.2d 259

299 Minn. 51

CITY OF ST. PAUL, Appellant, v. Charles Emmett HURD, Respondent.

No. 44180.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

March 22, 1974.

Syllabus by the Court

A municipality has the same right of appeal in a prosecution involving an ordinance violation under Minn.St. 632.11 to 632.13 as the state, but the supreme court shall not have jurisdiction to hear any such appeal after 6 months after entry of an order staying proceedings.

The phrase 'dismissed with prejudice' in a criminal proceeding, or proceeding for an ordinance violation, is inconsequential unless jeopardy has attached.

R. Scott Davies, City Atty., A. Keith Hanzel and Frank E. Villaume III, Asst. City Attys., St. Paul, for appellant.

Richard H. Knutson, St. Paul, for respondent.

Heard before TODD, MacLAUGHLIN, YETKA, and SCOTT, JJ., and considered and decided by the court.

SCOTT, Justice.

Appeal from an order of the municipal court of St. Paul dismissing with prejudice the charge against the defendant under St. Paul Legislative Code, § 425.03. We dismiss this appeal.

The facts relevant to this appeal are not in dispute. The defendant, Charles Emmett Hurd, was arrested for possession of a firearm in violation of the above ordinance which provides in part:

'No person shall carry on his person, or have in his possession or control in any public place, any firearm, except as provided in Section 425.05 and except the following persons:

A. Peace Officers.

B. Military personnel while on duty.

C. Persons holding special police commissions while carrying on their occupations.

D. Employees of the Como Zoo and persons working under the supervision and control of the Director of said Zoo * * *.'

The trial court specifically ruled that St. Paul Legislative Code, § 425.03, is 'unconstitutional in that it prohibits a person from even possessing a gun within the City limits.'

The right of a municipality to appeal from a dismissal of an action involving an ordinance violation has been before this court previously. In State ex rel. King v. Ruegemer, 238 Minn. 440, 57 N.W.2d 153 (1953), we held that the right of the prosecution to appeal in criminal proceedings is contrary to common law and therefore must be expressly conferred by statute or must arise by necessary implication.

Minn.St. 632.11, subd. 1, enacted in 1967, provides:

'In criminal cases the state may appeal in the following instances:

(1) From an order, the substantive effect of which is to dismiss an indictment, information or complaint.

(2) From an order granting a motion to quash an arrest warrant or a search warrant.

(3) From an order granting the return of property or suppressing evidence, or suppressing a confession or admission, when accompanied by a statement as provided in section 632.12.' ¹

Defendant contends that while § 632.11, subd. 1, expressly authorizes appeals by the state in certain instances, it makes no mention of appeals by municipalities. Therefore, he contends that this statutory language must control when coupled with our decision in State v. Thomas, 279 Minn. 326, 156 N.W.2d 745 (1968) that municipalities were not granted the right of appeal given to the state under the above statute.

In State, City of St. Louis Park, v. Brown, 297 Minn. 109, ---, 209 N.W.2d 920, 921 (1973), this court stated:

'In Village of Crosby v. Stemich, 160 Minn. 261, 199 N.W. 918 (1924), this court held that although prosecutions for ordinance violations are considered civil matters for some purposes, they should be considered criminal proceedings for purposes of appeal. We see no reason to change the rule in Stemich, especially in view of our decision in City of St. Paul v. Whidby, 295 Minn. 129, 203 N.W.2d 823 (1972), in which we held that in ordinance violations arising after December 29, 1972, the rules of criminal procedure, along with the proof-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standards and the unanimous-verdict standard, shall apply where the conviction might result in a penalty of incarceration. Therefore, we must reject the city's argument that this appeal is governed by the Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure.'

In the Brown case, involving an ordinance violation, this court then dismissed the appeal, applying the procedural requirements of § 632.13(2) pertaining to timely filing of notice of appeal (part of the same legislative enactment as § 632.11, subd. 1).

This court has already applied much of the Minnesota criminal procedure to prosecutions for ordinance violations as well as sections of the very statutes with which we are here concerned. It is therefore consistent that we apply all the provisions of Minn.St. 632.11 to 632.13 to municipalities in cases of ordinance violations.

In extending this right of appeal to municipalities, it is imperative that the limitations imposed by statute upon state appeals also become applicable to municipal bodies. See, State v. Kinn, 288 Minn. 31, 178 N.W.2d 888 (1970); State v. Maki, 291 Minn. 427, 192 N.W.2d 811 (1971).

Although we have granted to the municipality the right to appeal in limited situations, the appeal before us must be dismissed upon other grounds. The conclusion that this court does not have jurisdiction to hear this appeal is based upon § 632.13 which reads in part as follows:

'The procedure in appeals provided for in section 632.11 shall be as follows:

'(6) The appeal may be heard before the supreme court when it is in session upon application of either party to such court or a justice thereof. The date of hearing shall not be more than six months after entry of the order staying proceedings. The supreme court shall not have jurisdiction to hear any such appeal after six months after entry of the order staying proceedings and in such cases the lower court shall then proceed as if no appeal had been taken.' (Italics supplied.)

The requirements of § 632.13(2) have been satisfied in that the ruling of the municipal court was made on January 17, 1973, and the notice of appeal was filed on January 22, 1973. However, for purposes of § 632.13(6) the written order was made on April 25, 1973, filed on April 26, 1973, and the case was set for hearing on December 6, 1973, well beyond the 6-month time limitation.

It is the obvious intent of the 6-month limitation to guarantee the constitutional right to a speedy trial, rather than the establishment of...