City of Tallahassee v. Fla. Police Benevolent Ass'n
| Docket Number | SC2021-0651 |
| Decision Date | 30 November 2023 |
| Parties | CITY OF TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA, Petitioner, v. FLORIDA POLICE BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION, INC., et al., Respondents. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED.
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal Constitutional Construction/Class of Constitutional Officers First District - Case No. 1D20-2193 (Leon County)
Philip J. Padovano and Joseph T. Eagleton of Brannock Berman & Seider, Tampa, Florida; and Cassandra K. Jackson, City Attorney's Office, Tallahassee, Florida, for Petitioner City of Tallahassee, Florida
Carol Jean LoCicero and Mark R. Caramanica of Thomas & LoCicero PL, Tampa, Florida, and Daniela B. Abratt of Thomas & LoCicero PL, Fort Lauderdale, Florida, for Petitioner News Media Coalition Luke Newman of Luke Newman, P.A. Tallahassee, Florida, for Respondents
Shannon K. Lockheart and Paul G. Rozelle, General Counsel, Pinellas County Sheriff's Office, Largo, Florida, for Amicus Curiae Pinellas County Sheriff, Bob Gualtieri
Edward G. Guedes and John J. Quick of Weiss Serota Helfman Cole & Bierman, P.L., Coral Gables, Florida, for Amicus Curiae City of Miami Civilian Investigative Panel
Peter A.D. McGlashan, General Counsel, Volusia County Sheriff's Office, DeLand, Florida, for Amicus Curiae Volusia County Sheriff, Michael J. Chitwood Edward L. Birk of Marks Gray, P.A., Jacksonville, Florida, for Amici Curiae Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, Radio Television Digital News Association, Poynter Institute, Society of Professional Journalists Florida Pro Chapter, Florida Center for Government Accountability, and Asian American Journalists Association Florida Chapter
Benjamin James Stevenson of ACLU Foundation of Florida, Pensacola, Florida, and Daniel B. Tilley of ACLU Foundation of Florida, Miami, Florida; and David T. Goldberg of Donahue Goldberg & Littleton, Brooklyn, New York, for Amicus Curiae American Civil Liberties Union of Florida, Inc.
Carri S. Leininger and Jayme S. Sellards of Williams, Leininger & Cosby, P.A., North Palm Beach, Florida, for Amicus Curiae Palm Beach County Sheriff's Office
This case arises from two unrelated but contemporaneous episodes in which a Tallahassee police officer, asserting self-defense, used lethal force in detaining a suspect. Each officer invoked the protections of article I, section 16(b)-(e) of the Florida Constitution, an amendment adopted by Florida voters that is colloquially known as Marsy's Law. The amendment enumerates certain rights of crime victims "to achieve justice, ensure a meaningful role throughout the criminal and juvenile justice systems for crime victims, and ensure that crime victims' rights and interests are respected and protected by law in a manner no less vigorous than protections afforded to criminal defendants and juvenile delinquents." Art. I, § 16(b), Fla. Const.
The City of Tallahassee (City) proposed to release the two officers' names to the public. The Florida Police Benevolent Association (FPBA) sought an emergency injunction to prevent that from happening. The trial court decided not to issue that injunction; the FPBA appealed, and the trial court's order requiring disclosure of the officers' names was stayed pending appeal. The dispute ultimately made its way here.[1]
To determine whether the officers' names can be released, we have been asked three questions: First, can police officers acting in an official capacity be Marsy's Law "victims"? Second, does Marsy's Law require the commencement of a criminal proceeding to take effect? And third, does Marsy's Law contain a right for victims to remain anonymous?
We need only answer the third question to resolve this case: Marsy's Law guarantees to no victim-police officer or otherwise- the categorical right to withhold his or her name from disclosure. No such right is enumerated in the text of article I, section 16(b) of the Florida Constitution. Nor, as a matter of structure, would such a right readily fit with two other guarantees contained in article I: the right expressed in section 16(a) of the criminally accused "to confront at trial adverse witnesses," and the right found in section 24(a) of every person to inspect or copy public records.
We decide only what Marsy's Law says and does not say; we do not pass upon the validity of any statutory right of certain persons, in certain situations, to withhold their identities from disclosure.
Florida's constitution requires that every twenty years, a Constitution Revision Commission (CRC) convene to "examine the constitution of the state, hold public hearings, and, not later than one hundred eighty days prior to the next general election, file with the custodian of state records its proposal, if any, of a revision of [the] constitution or any part of it." Art. XI, § 2, Fla. Const. Brief summaries of these amendments are then included on the ballot for voters to approve or reject.
In 2018, the CRC proposed several amendments, one of which-Amendment 6-included Marsy's Law. The proposed ballot title and summary for Amendment 6 read in relevant part:
RIGHTS OF CRIME VICTIMS . . . . Creates constitutional rights for victims of crime; requires courts to facilitate victims' rights; authorizes victims to enforce their rights throughout criminal and juvenile justice processes.
Dep't of State v. Hollander, 256 So.3d 1300, 1306 (Fla. 2018). Three individual plaintiffs and the League of Women Voters filed complaints in the circuit court arguing that the ballot title and summary were misleading. In Hollander, we rejected these consolidated claims, holding that the ballot title and summary reasonably informed voters of the chief purpose and effect of Amendment 6. Id. at 1311. And in the subsequent general election of 2018, Florida voters approved the proposed amendment.
The provision states that "every victim is entitled to [various] rights, beginning at the time of his or her victimization," art. I, § 16(b), Fla. Const., including "[t]he right to prevent the disclosure of information or records that could be used to locate or harass the victim or the victim's family, or which could disclose confidential or privileged information of the victim," art. I, § 16(b)(5), Fla. Const. And a "victim," according to Marsy's Law, "is a person who suffers direct or threatened physical, psychological, or financial harm as a result of the commission or attempted commission of a crime or delinquent act or against whom the crime or delinquent act is committed." Art. I, § 16(e), Fla. Const.
On May 19, 2020, a man rushed at a Tallahassee police officer with a hunting knife. The officer defended himself by fatally shooting the assailant. Eight days later, on May 27, a different Tallahassee police officer responded to a crime in progress. The perpetrator, who had just stabbed a man to death, aimed a gun at the officer. The officer defended himself by shooting the man, killing him. A grand jury investigated each shooting and determined in each case that the shooting was lawful and a justifiable use of force.[2]
Reporters sought disclosure of the officers' names from the City. The officers, however, asserted that they qualified for Marsy's Law protections because they were victims of the assaults from which they had defended themselves. And as Marsy's Law victims, the officers argued, they were entitled to prevent the release of their personal identifying information, including their names. The City was not swayed.
The FPBA sued the City on June 12, 2020,[3] seeking a declaratory judgment, mandamus relief, and injunctive relief. The circuit court denied the petition and ordered that the names of the officers be released. The First District Court of Appeal reversed. See Fla. Police Benevolent Ass'n, Inc. v. City of Tallahassee, 314 So.3d 796 (Fla. 1st DCA 2021). According to the First District, (1) "[n]othing in article I, section 16 excludes law enforcement officers-or other government employees-from the protections granted crime victims," id. at 801-02; (2) "a criminal prosecution need not begin before a victim may assert his rights under article I, section 16(e)," id. at 803-04; and (3) article I, section 16(b)(5) "includes records that could reveal the victim's . . . identity," in this case the officers' names, id. at 804.
The City and the News Media Coalition (Coalition) then petitioned this Court to reverse the First District's decision. The trial court's order, requiring the release of documents identifying the police officers' names, was stayed pending appeal.[4]
Interpreting the Florida Constitution is a matter of law that we undertake de novo. See W. Fla. Reg'l Med. Ctr., Inc. v See, 79 So.3d 1, 8 (Fla. 2012) (). In so doing, we begin, and for good reason often end, with its words. Advisory Op. to the Governor re Implementation of Amend. 4, the Voting Restoration Amend., 288 So.3d 1070, 1078 (Fla. 2020) ("First and foremost, this Court must examine the actual language used in the Constitution."). And we give the words of the constitution their plain, usual, ordinary, and commonly accepted meanings at the time they were written. See Brinkmann v. Francois, 184 So.3d 504, 510 (Fla. 2016) . "To discern that ordinary meaning . . . words must be read and interpreted in their context, not in isolation." Sw. Airlines Co. v. Saxon, ...
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